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THE PLAYING SPECTATOR: 
A study on the applicability of the theories of D. W. Winnicott to 
contemporary concepts of the viewer's relationship to film. 
Abstract 
This thesis presents an exploration of the relationship of the viewer to 
film from the perspective of the theories developed by the English 
psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott (1896-1971) on playing, transitional objects, 
potential space, and a view of the subject that includes a concept of the 
True Self or Self. 
The transitional object is defined as the baby's first play object which it 
uses to achieve subject-object differentiation. Potential space is the 
transitional psychic area between subjective and objective reality, which 
Winnicott posits as the location of cultural experience, the adult's form of 
playing. Playing involves a creative relationship with the subjective and 
the objective worlds and encompasses both specific, cultural activities and 
a general orientation to living. 
These concepts are applied to film through a model of a playing spectator, 
whose wish for cinema is to take a full part in the film-play as agent and as 
maker. The vicissisitudes of the spectator's playing from the opening to 
the ending of the film are traced through analyses of Meet me in St. Louis 
(Minnelli, 1944, USA), which is explored as both a musical and a 
melodrama. 
The specificity of the notion of a playing spectator is clarified through a 
comparison with contemporary film studies of spectatorship. It has 
similarities with theories that stress process and movement in the film 
viewer relationship while the differences arise from the differences 
between Winnicott's views of subjectivity and those adopted in film 
studies. The playing spectator engages with a film in ways that partake of 
both conscious and unconscious processes and makes use of it as her play 
object to obtain an experience of the Self. From this perspective an 
argument is made for the psychic significance and value of the experience 
of cinema for the viewer. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Playing is an experience, always a creative experience and it is an 
experience in the space-time continuum, a basic form of living. 
(Playing and Reality, D. W. Winnicott, 1971, p. 50) 
Winnicott ... reminds us that the world of our perceptions is a 
dead 
letter as long as it is not animated by a look. 
(J. B. Pontalis, in an interview, in Winnicott and Paradox, A. Clancier 
and J. Kalmanovitch, 1987, p. 143) 
This thesis presents an exploration of the relationship of the film viewer 
to the experience of cinema and a study of the nature of the spectator, the 
subject constituted by that relationship. It addresses the following 
questions: Why do we desire cinema? How do we come to engage with its 
stories and its world? What psychic processes are set in play as we watch a 
film? The aim of the thesis is to reconsider the film-spectator relationship 
from the perspective of the concepts of transitional phenomena, potential 
space, playing and the True Self developed by the English psychoanalyst 
D. W. Winnicott (1896-1971). In his theory of playing Winnicott posits a 
location for cultural and creative activity in the psyche as an 'in between', 
transitional position on the boundary of unconscious and conscious, 
fantasy and reality, subject and object. The concept of a psychic transitional 
area bypasses Freud's division of the psyche into conscious and 
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unconscious, and encompasses a different view of subjectivity from that 
assumed in contemporary psychoanalytic film studies. ' In this thesis it 
becomes the place 'between' the film and the spectator. 
In order to examine the applicability of these concepts to film studies, I 
will posit a model of a 'Winnicottian' or a 'playing' spectator, both as a 
subject who engages with a film in order to make use of it for her playing 
and as a subject produced in the film viewing process. I will propose that 
the spectator's desire for cinema comes from her wish to take a full and 
varied part in the play-on-screen and that her interaction with the film 
enables her to do so. Since Winnicott did not elaborate his concept of 
playing as cultural activity, this exploration of the film-viewer 
relationship will also amplify and exemplify his account as a specific 
instance of the adult form of playing. 
Since the 1970s mainstream psychoanalytical film studies of the spectator 
have been largely carried out from within a Freudian-Lacanian 
framework, focusing on issues of the representation and construction of 
subjectivity, both in relation to the institution of cinema and to individual 
films. Much of this work has come from a feminist perspective and has 
been concerned with issues of gender and sexual difference. In part this 
arises from the notion of the subject as constituted within the system of 
sexual difference at the Oedipal stage. The very terms of psychoanalysis 
posit a gendered subject, however fluidly and problematically; further, as 
lI exclude Freud's 'pre-conscious' from my discussion because it is posited as the area of half 
forgotten memory and I am assuming that it therefore belongs to the non-repressed 
'conscious' system. 
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Constance Penley puts it: 'the narrative and symbolic problem of 
establishing the difference between the sexes is the primary motivating 
force of the classical Hollywood film' (Penley, 1988, p. 3). Contemporary 
psychoanalytic accounts of film have likewise been commonly framed in 
terms of gender and sexual difference. 2 
The viewer's relation to cinema is explored in somewhat different terms 
in Elizabeth Cowie's essay 'Psychoanalysis and film theory in the 1980s'. 
Cowie points to the tendency of psychoanalytic film theory in the 1970s to 
conceptualise in different ways the spectator as 'fixed' by cinema or 
individual films into certain unmovable positions. This encompassed the 
attempt to equate the subject of psychoanalysis and of ideology which, 
Cowie argues, is in the end untenable and has largely been abandoned. 
The 'fixing' of the spectator was propounded from different vantage 
points in Screen during the early 1970s, for example, by Christian Metz, 
Raymond Bellour, Stephen Heath and Laura Mulvey, whose approaches 
to spectatorship, Cowie points out, in this way overlapped (Cowie, 1991, 
p. 109); the spectator was seen as fixed in a position of self-miscognition at 
the Lacanian mirror stage or into unconscious structures of looking and 
movement through a narrative. One way out of this impasse for the film 
spectator has been through an exploration of fantasy, the relation of which 
to playing is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis; however, the basic 
psychic structuring of fantasy remains also posited as tied into terms of 
2For example, in Ann Kaplan's edition of essays from the 1980s, Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema, only four of the thirteen do not focus on sexual difference as their major issue; and 
one of these, Janet Bergstroms 'Psychological Explanation in the Films of Lang and Pabst' is 
not strictly about psychoanalysis. 
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sexual difference (Cowie, 1984; Greig, 1989) however variable the 
spectator's own position in relation to that structuring might be. 
A large body of complex and productive theory and criticism has been 
produced within the Freudian-Lacanian framework adopted by film 
studies and the terms of its debates have changed and have become more 
fluid. Nevertheless, to a large extent it has marginalised - indeed has 
often specifically excluded as being marred by idealist assumptions or as 
having no relevance for the female spectator - aspects of the film 
viewing experience which can broadly be defined in terms of their 
personal and aesthetic effects: the sense that the process of watching a film 
can, in itself, be experienced as not only pleasurable but psychically 
significant for the spectator. The tendency to posit an exploration of the 
film viewing experience in terms of sexual difference, as an example, 
precludes discussion of that experience in other terms; questions 
concerning the spectator's enjoyment of, engagement with, and even her 
gain from watching a film become conflated with the gender specific 
issues. 
Winnicott's concepts of playing, transitional phenomena and potential 
space, on the other hand, offer a way of addressing the issue of the 
spectator's enjoyment of, and stake in, the film directly. Following 
Melanie Klein, Winnicott worked with a view of subjectivity that is based 
within a bi-sexual pre-Oedipal stage, of a subject that precedes - and to a 
large extent is unrelated to - language and sexual division. His theories 
of playing and creativity therefore override and decentre questions of 
sexual difference; the process of playing is posited as a fundamental 
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human process, not dependent on the gender of the subject - although its 
mode of representation might be. 
In the following chapters I will explore the psychic processes and 
vicissitudes of the spectator's playing, from her first move into the film at 
its opening to her withdrawal from it at the end. My case study for the 
spectator's progress through the film is Meet me in St. Louis (Minnelli, 
1944), which, particularly through its status as a mixed-genre film, offers a 
variety of positions and scenarios for the playing spectator. I will also 
make reference to Woody Allen's The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985), a film 
about cinematic play and illusion, whose central protagonist serves as an 
illustrative example of the playing spectator. As I trace the spectator's 
playing I will specify the nature of subjectivity that a model of a playing 
spectator entails, indicating points of convergence with and divergence 
from current psychoanalytic film studies. The thesis therefore also 
explores the difference to ways of thinking about the spectator that a 
Winnicottian perspective can make. 
In Chapter 2, 'The spectator on screen', I explore the spectator's first 
movement into a relationship with the film as the moment at which she 
'enters' its world - the point at which traditionally she suspends disbelief 
and makes a move to another psychic state where she accepts the reality of 
what unfolds on screen in front of her. This exploration of the spectator's 
move into the film-space will involve a consideration of how Winnicott's 
notion of potential space can relate to existing accounts of cinematic and 
narrative space. 
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In Chapter 3, 'The playing spectator', I take up the central focus of this 
thesis, the nature of playing and the construction of a playing spectator, to 
explore the spectator's participation in the film action and to consider how 
the notion of a playing spectator relates to existing film studies concepts of 
an active spectator. I will argue that watching a film is an example of what 
becomes of the child's playing when it is 'diffused' into cultural 
experience (Winnicott, 1971, p. 5). In Meet me in St. Louis playing is 
explored in terms of the film's status as a musical in order to examine the 
relevance of genre to the notion of playing and to consider ways in which 
the musical can be construed as a 'playful' genre. 
Any psychoanalytical account of film studies entails the fundamental 
assumption of the unconscious and a divided subject. This problematises a 
common-sense or anecdotal view of cinematic pleasure and even the 
notion of 'pleasure' altogether. As Constance Penley puts it, 'desire does 
not always aim for pleasure': it might for instance originate in the death 
drive (Penley, 1989, p. 203); psychoanalytic film studies seeks to explore the 
lure of cinema beyond and at times even in spite of its apparent 
'pleasures'. The notion of playing as a transitional position between 
conscious and unconscious clearly, therefore, cannot account for the 
whole of the experience of the spectator's engagement. with a film. 
Winnicott retained the Freudian and Kleinian models of the unconscious, 
and in Chapters 4, 'The breakdown of playing', and 5, 'Replaying loss', I 
therefore move away from an exclusively Winnicottian position to 
explore the incursion of the unconscious into playing and the relevance of 
film studies accounts of the unconscious to the Winnicottian spectator. 
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Nevertheless there are different views of the nature of the unconscious 
and Winnicott's different approaches are important to his notion of 
playing. On the one hand his work and background entailed a 
commitment to the Freudian view of the repressed unconscious and its 
variation in Melanie Klein's notion of psychic reality as an earlier and 
more generalised formation. On the other hand, Winnicott also worked 
with another view of the unconscious, which I will term the 'creative 
unconscious'; this underpins and is related to his complex notion of the 
'Self' or 'True Self', explored in Chapter 6, 'The spectator finds her Self', 
the concluding chapter of the thesis. The concept of the Self, with its 
associated ideas of creativity in relation to playing and cultural activity, 
marks the point of greatest difference of Winnicott's theories from those 
of contemporary psychoanalytic film studies. I will argue that it brings 
together the experience of the playing and the unconscious spectator and 
offers a re-formulation of the stake for the spectator in engaging with a 
film. In this chapter I will extend Winnicott's own accounts with a 
consideration of the work of two other psychoanalysts, Marion Milner and 
Christopher Bollas, whose ideas on creativity and the Self supplement and 
elaborate his concepts. 
In framing my thesis from a Winnicottian perspective, then, I introduce 
different concerns from those current in film studies: notions of sexual 
difference and ideology have been displaced by those of creativity and 
playing; the transitional object and potential space; the inner and outer 
world; the Self. While Winnicott does not posit a return to the unified 
subject - an impossibility with any concept of the unconscious - he 
decentres the emphasis which has been adopted in film studies on the 
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split subject with the possibility of an intra- and inter-personal 
reconciliation and connectedness. This framework has enabled me to 
construct a model of a playing spectator for whom the lure of cinema is an 
invitation to a precarious but dynamic and satisfying intermediate area 
where she can both discover and make her film object, and encounter or 
create her Self. 
The assumption of current psychoanalytical film studies of a subject-in- 
process that is constructed in and by the film/spectator relationship has 
produced film analyses that exactly demonstrate the movement of film 
and spectator in interaction; this is the approach that I have adopted in my 
analyses. To express this in a Winnicottian way, I focus on the area of the 
overlap created by the interaction of two separate systems, the film and the 
viewing subject, where, I will argue, the playing spectator (a new 
construct) comes into existence. 
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D. W. Winnicott 
D. W. Winnicott evolved his theories that are the concern of this thesis 
about the nature of the subject, playing and transitional phenomena 
during his life-time's work as a psychoanalyst and paediatrician. As a 
paediatrician (his first profession), he retained a model of human 
development within an environmental setting which reflected his early 
study of Darwin (Phillips, 1988, pp. 3-4). His view of the development of 
the subject from an innate potential that he was later to term the Self 
became an important factor in his work. As a psychoanalyst his 
background was initially classically Freudian but his work was particularly 
marked by the influence of Melanie Klein, with whom he had a close but 
ambivalent relationship. 3 He met her when she first came to England in 
the 1930s and she supervised some of his cases with children; she 
confirmed his interest in early infancy and his experience (as a 
paediatrician trying to apply psychoanalysis to his work) that 'babies could 
be emotionally ill' (Winnicott, 1962, p. 172) before the Oedipal stage. 
Klein's chief theoretical contribution to Winnicott's work was to 
strengthen and extend into its origins in infancy Freud's concept of 
'psychic reality' as a subjective experience which expresses itself in fantasy 
and has its basis in bodily functions. Her major methodological influence 
was in her use of playing as a means of analysing children. However 
Winnicott was to go beyond the idea of playing as a means of therapy to 
seeing it as its desired outcome. For Winnicott the ability to play becomes 
the person's ability to forge a creative relationship with both inner, psychic 
3Rodman (1987) describes the fluctuations in their relationship in his introduction to Winnicott's letters. 
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reality and the external world; between the primary process of the 
unconscious and the secondary process of conscious experience. 
Winnicott became a part of the British Psycho-Analytical Society's 
'Independent' or 'Middle' grouping, which emerged during the time of 
'The Controversial Discussions' between the followers of Melanie Klein 
and Anna Freud during the 1940s. This grouping at first simply consisted 
of those in the Society who were neither strictly 'Kleinians' nor 
'Freudians'. They were not constituted as a 'Group' until the 1960s and 
were named officially as the Independent Group in 1973, with the 
institution of their own training programme, two years after Winnicott's 
death. Winnicott himself worked within the British Society in a fairly 
individualistic way but played a leading role in it and it was an important 
part of the context in which he developed his ideas, some of which, in the 
end, mark a radical departure from both Freud and Klein (Kohon, 1986, 
Introduction). 
The Middle Group is associated with the development of the theory of 
object relations, a broad term, used variously, which can have reference to 
both inner and outer relationships. Laplanche and Pontalis define it as: 
... a term enjoying a very wide currency in present-day 
psychoanalysis as a designation for the subject's mode of relation to 
his world; this relation is the entire complex outcome of a particular 
organisation of the personality, of an apprehension of objects that is 
to some extent or other phantasied, and of certain special types of 
defence. 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 272) 
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The differences in usage of the term comes from the greater or lesser 
emphasis on the fantasy content of the object. For instance, Melanie Klein 
insisted on the primacy of the infant's internal objects from birth, in what 
remained essentially her one-person psychology. By contrast, some 
analysts, particularly in the USA, put much greater stress on external 
relationships and, as a part of that, the development of the ego (Greenburg 
and Mitchell, 1983). In America, object relations theory has been taken up 
in feminist work which focuses on the early, pre-Oedipal experience but 
this also draws on socio-anthropological studies of mother-baby 
relationships and so moves away from the primary importance of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious (Chodorow, 1989; Benjamin, 1988). Winnicott 
too emphasised the 'environmental' mother, but only in so far as her 
behaviour is a 'part of the child', and for him it is the impact of her care 
on the child's psyche, including its unconscious, that is the important 
focus. This thesis retains the British focus on object relations as dealing 
with 'the relation of the subject to his objects', which encompasses 'the 
specific way in which the subject apprehends his relationships with his 
objects (both internal and external). It always implies an unconscious 
relationship to those objects' (Kohon 1986, p. 20, my italics). In his concept 
of the transitional phenomenon, the baby's use of its first toy or 
equivalent as a basis for its development as a subject and its ability to make 
relationships and to play, Winnicott was to introduce a further, 'in 
between', object. 
Laplanche and Pontalis point out that the term 'object' is used as in 'love 
object', as 'any thing or person to which the instincts are directed', and 
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they stress that 'relation' assumes an interrelationship: not only does 'the 
subject constitute his objects but they also shape his actions' (1973, p. 272). 
They suggest that the development of object relations theory is part of a 
general shift in modern thought from consideration of 'the organism in 
isolation' to 'its interaction with its surroundings' (ibid); in psychoanalysis 
this represents a shift away from Freud's emphasis on the early, 
instinctual life. This may be summed up by Winnicott's apparently 
provocative but actually deeply serious remark, 'there is no such thing as 
an infant! ' (Clancier and Kalmanovitch, 1987, p. 7), stressing the early 
mother/baby 'dyad' as a basis for the development of the infant's 
propensity to 'relate' to objects from a very early stage, to the extent that 
(in contrast to the Freudian model) 'the instincts are not pleasure-seeking 
but object-seeking' (Kohon p. 21). 
This approach derives in part from Melanie Klein's views on the 
development of the infant's relation to 'the world of objects', at first 
through 'part objects', typically the mother's breast, onto which the infant 
projects its love-and-hate impulses, and which are therefore experienced 
as absolutely 'good' or 'bad'. The growing ability to relate to and 
distinguish 'whole' objects, initially the mother, and to compensate for 
the loss of the original object, is experienced in the 'depressive' position as 
the wish to 'make reparation', to allay the guilt arising from the 
destructive impulses directed towards 'her' or, originally, her 
substitute/part, the breast. For Kleinians the idea of reparation, the 
restoration of the object to its original wholeness, is a crucial motivator for 
the artist: 'we constantly find that drawing and painting are used to make 
people anew' (Klein, 1929, p. 93). Winnicott was to emphasise also the 
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importance of primary destructive and aggressive impulses for the child 
in making art or playing. 
Winnicott wrote and lectured a good deal in his lifetime but his influence 
has continued to grow since his death in 1971 with the publication of more 
of his writings. Playing and Reality was published posthumously in 1971. 
During the 1980s a number of his writings were published (or re-collected) 
for the first time, for instance, Home is where we Start from (1986), 
Human Nature (1988) and the last, Psychoanalytical Explorations (1989), 
which fills out some important aspects of his thinking. A number of 
biography/ commentaries have also been published: for example, Davis 
and Wallbridge (1981), Phillips (1988), Grolnick and Barkin (1978). 
Winnicott's work is recognised in psychoanalytic circles in France. Playing 
and Reality (1971) was published there soon after its publication in the UK, 
and Pontalis, who co-translated it, writes about Winnicott's particular 
contribution to psychoanalysis (Pontalis, 1981, chs. 9,10). A book on 
Winnicott's life and work was published in France in 1984 (Clancier and 
Kalmanovitch, 1987). Conversely, Winnicott himself acknowledged the 
influence of Lacan's mirror stage on his paper, 'Mirror-Role of Mother 
and family in Child Development' (Winnicott, 1971, Ch. 9); he and Lacan 
seem at one time, to have been on good terms .4 Andre Green, a French 
psychoanalyst, has combined aspects of Winnicott's and Lacan's thinking 
4A warmly expressed letter from Lacan to Winnicott written in 1962, reprinted in October, 
1987, has at its context Lacan's conflicts with the International Psychoanalytical 
Association. 
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both in his clinical and literary work. Julia Kristeva (1980) draws on it in 
her theory of the pre-Oedipal mode of discourse, the 'semiotic'. 
Winnicott's approach to and expression of his ideas encourage their 
appropriation by others; he does not write as a systematic theorist, far less 
as an academic. Rather he writes from his own experience of patients over 
the years and his published works include writings for both lay and 
professional audiences. As commentators (for instance, Clancier and 
Kalmanovitch, 1987; Adams, 1988) have noted, there is a quality of what 
he might have called playing in his writing, which is in part to do with his 
insistence on 'being himself' in a context which tended to encourage 
conformity. When he is writing about his own ideas he seems to be 
exploring as he writes (a good many of his published essays are based on 
talks) and he proceeds in rather elliptical leaps and bounds; he refers to his 
influences rather cavalierly, insisting on the impossibility of being able to 
acknowledge his sources consistently. 5 He invents his own terms, such as 
'potential space', which he tends to describe rather than define, and often 
ignores established psychoanalytic terms. His writing opens up ideas 
rather than forecloses them. 
Winnicott's use of Freud illustrates his approach. While he purported to 
adhere to Freud's basic ideas and techniques (taking them as read, as a 
5 In a talk delivered to a group of senior British analysts, in 1967, 'D. W. W. on D. W. W. ', 
Winnicott attempted to review the influences of other analysts on the development of his 
work: he began by a statement of regret for'not properly correlating my work with the work 
of others', and he ended by expressing a wish to'make amends'. (Winnicott, 1989, p. 5671). 
However, for many, it is precisely his individualistic quality which makes his writing interesting. He is also indicates that otherwise he could not have developed his own ideas. 
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child might those of a parent), yet in some ways his move away from 
Freud was more radical than he himself acknowledged (Phillips, 1988; 
Guntrip, 1971), for instance in his emphasis on the provision of a 'holding 
environment' for his patients to grow in, rather than on interpretation, 
particularly with 'borderline' cases. As Greenburg and Mitchell put it: 'His 
manner of juxtaposing his innovations with prior theory becomes 
understandable only within the framework of his allegiances: [he had] a 
loyalty to the classical tradition not strong enough to affect the basic 
structure of his thought, but sufficient to proclaim that which was not 
there' (Greenburg and Mitchell, 1983, pp. 81-2). 
Winnicott was more explicit in his distancing of himself from Klein; in 
particular he rejected her concept, developed from late Freud, of a 'death 
drive' and of an original, primary 'envy' of the -baby for its mother, even 
before, in Winnicott's terms, it had 'separated' from her .6 His increasing 
stress on the need to withhold interpretation, in order not to 'impinge' on 
the patient, and to enable the development of autonomy, was also part of 
his disagreement with Klein and Kleinians, who insisted on the centrality 
of interpretation in therapeutic technique. 
Altogether, Winnicott's refusal to consider the possibility of the death 
drive and his insistence on the importance of play, creativity and the 
necessity of 'feeling real', into which surfaced every now and then the 
concept of the True Self, may be contrasted with Freud's stress on work 
and understanding; the picture emerges of an optimistic rather than the 
6A series of papers critical of her concept, written over a period, are put together in Psychoanalytic Explorations, 1989. 
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pessimistic view of life which both Freud and Klein tended to present. For 
Freud's confrontation between the pleasure and reality principles (the 
unconscious and conscious) Winnicott was to substitute a mediating 
process of playing in a 'third' transitional area between them. In place of 
Klein's primary envy he posited a non-malign, healthy 'destructiveness'. 
Adam Phillips cites an early paper that Winnicott presented on Klein's 
notion of 'manic defence', which she postulates as a reaction against the 
guilt of the depressive position. Winnicott stresses the 'normal' 
enjoyment of a music hall performance as an aspect of mental health, not 
as defence against the 'demands of the depressive position'. For him, the 
point of the performance is precisely that it is: 'a denial of deadness.... 
Sooner or later, one adds: "here is LIFE" (Phillips, 1988, p. 60). Long before 
he formulated his ideas around playing, Winnicott was looking at 
performance as a sign of psychic health, as something to be celebrated 
rather than explained. In these terms, 'entertainment' is not 'mere 
escapism' or sublimation of repressed sexuality, or even just wish- 
fulfilment, but rather represents an aspect of psychic health. 
In the UK, object relations has been largely ignored in recent mainstream 
psychoanalytically oriented cultural and film studies, which have focused 
on the Lacanian-derived view of the relationship of subjectivity to 
language, ideology and sexual difference and which have generally been 
influenced by French literary theory and criticism. There are fundamental 
differences between the two approaches. For instance, Klein's view of art 
as reparation - the restoration of the object that has been destroyed - 
necessarily favours the traditional approach to a work of art that values its 
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unity (Klein, 1929) whereas the post-Lacanian critic looks for its gaps and 
points of incoherence. The Kleinian emphasis on interpretation is 
reflected in criticism which looks for 'meanings' behind the content of the 
work which those critics who stress the processes of reading find reductive 
and simplistic.? Such differences have their roots in their proponents' 
different views of subjectivity: object relations theories stress the 
development of the ego and the possibility of integration between 
conscious and unconscious whereas Lacanians stress the irrevocable split 
and the divided subject. A typical response to Winnicott is expressed by 
the authors of Formations of Fantasy who see object relations as having an 
idealist view of: 'the world of "objects" as preconstituted, as always already 
"there" for recognition' and therefore as ignoring the 'constitutive role of 
representation in the cultural production of "reality"' (Burgin et al., 1986, 
p. 4). 
However something of Winnicott's considerable influence in the USA 
may be seen in litererary and cultural studies which involve a 
consideration of Nancy Chodorow's work, for instance in Linda William's 
(1984) essay on the maternal melodrama, which is based on the notion 
that the mother-child relationship opens a space for a feminine discourse, 
as explored by Chodorow in The Reproduction of Mothering (1978). Nancy 
Chodorow (1989) and Jessica Benjamin (1988), in relation to literature, also 
draw on Winnicott's views on sexual difference: in an essay in Playing 
and Reality he introduces the notion (within his general assumption of a 
7A recent example of such a Kleinian approach is the Rustins' book of post-war children's 
stories in which they seek to show how the authors 'have found symbolic equivalent or 
containers for states of feeling' (Rustin, 1989, p. 3). 
20 
bisexual theory) of a fundamental difference between a masculine 'doing' 
and a feminine 'being'. Several essays on literature are included in 
Grolnick and Barkin (1978) and, in the UK, Winnicott Studies, the Journal 
of the Squiggle Foundation publishes articles on art and literature from a 
Winnicottian perspective: for example, Peter Fuller (1987) writes on the 
relationship between Henry Moore's accounts of the mother baby 
relationship in his drawings and sculpture. However these examples tend 
towards a formalist or an interpretative approach and are outside the 
present film-studies approach to the text and the reader/spectator. 
The object relations move from a focus 'from what happens within the 
psyche to what happens between' one psyche and another' (Wright, 1984 p. 
79), however, may clearly be applied to the relationship between text and 
reader, particularly in terms of the transference, where the object is 
invested with the subject's unconscious fantasy. Furthermore, 
psychoanalysis stresses that the relationship of subject to object must 
always be seen from the subjective point of view and in terms of fantasy 
and the unconscious: the establishing of the subject and therefore also of 
the object is never unproblematic, and is a struggle which is endlessly 
repeated throughout a life, a repetition of disentangling and of endless 
inner negotiation in every encounter with the external world: as 
Winnicott frequently stressed, no-one is 'free from the strain of relating 
inner and outer reality' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 13). 8 
81n a letter to Melanie Klein, he writes of his own 'illness' which is 'not far away from being the inherent difficulty in regard to human contact with external reality' (Rodman, 1987, p. 37). 
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Winnicott himself pointed to the application of his ideas to 'cultural life' 
(Winnicott, 1971, passim), and in general his interests and concerns would 
seem to be of direct application to art, particularly to studies of the 'reader' 
(in which I include the 'spectator'). Elizabeth Wright (1984) points to 
Winnicott's concern with the developing baby's ability to make use of 
illusion through its play objects, which 'raised the question of the kind of 
interplay that was going on between the inner world and outer world, 
between fantasy and reality' (Wright, 1984, p. 92). She discusses how 
Winnicott's ideas on illusion suggest a 'suspension of disbelief. ' However 
she too goes on to make the objection that, for Winnicott, 'objects are 
already made, not found' (ibid). This critique echoes that of others who 
write from a materialist perspective: that Winnicott ignores the basic 
problem that 'subjects are produced within social processes' (Lorenzer and 
Orban, 1978, p. 274). While it is true that, given his background, Winnicott 
tended to regard the material world as a given, and that this is how he 
presents 'external reality', yet he displays no such certainty in his dealings 
with patients, nor in his explorations of his ideas; subjectively every 
individual has continually to re-negotiate his or her relationship with the 
world, which in this sense can never be taken for granted. This 
negotiation is played out within the third area, through the person's use 
of transitional objects; for the playing film spectator, I will argue, it takes 
place through her relationship with a film. 
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Meet me in St. Louis 
Meet me in St. Louis (Minnelli, MGM, 1944), the major film example for 
this study, is set in St. Louis at the time of the St. Louis International Fair 
in 1904. The film is based on the childhood memoirs of Sally Benson, 
published as a book with the same title. The film's slight narrative plot is 
constructed out of one episode in the book (Minnelli, 1974). The Smith 
family is disturbed when Mr Smith announces that his firm wishes him 
to move to New York. This causes conflict between him and the rest of his 
family: his wife, his five children (a boy, two girls of near-adult status and 
two younger girls), a grandfather and a cook. The conflict is resolved when 
the father gives in. Otherwise the film is constructed around seasonal 
events in the family's lives, and divided into seasonal episodes: Summer, 
Autumn, Winter, Spring. The film ends with the opening of the St. Louis 
Fair, with the coupling of the older children and the family's differences 
resolved. 
Before embarking on my own analyses of the film I will consider the range 
of responses to the film since it was made, which have a part in 
constructing the film for the viewer, in order to place my own readings of 
it. In the mythology of the cinema Meet me in St. Louis is a film that 
viewers 'love' and that families sit down together to watch, these days in 
front of the television. In their book Film Art (1986) Bordwell and 
Thompson use it as an example of a film which, fairly straightforwardly, 
reaffirms the dominant American ideology: it presents the American 
small town, epitomised in a large 'ordinary' family, that offers all that its 
inhabitants can ever wish for, an uncomplicated blend of tradition and 
hope for the future (in the Fair) and above all an assertion of family 
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values. 
In spite of a slight, apparently light-hearted, plot, with musical and comic 
aspects, the film leaves a vivid visual and emotional impression, and I 
have been intrigued that, at certain moments, it can be unexpectedly and 
forcefully moving in ways that cannot be explained by its celebratory and 
sentimental stance (which in any case seems very dated today) and 
pleasing mise en scene. It is this dichotomy between its surface style and 
forcefully moving moments that I am interested in exploring from a 
Winnicottian perspective: why do audiences continue to enjoy and engage 
with the film and what are the different range of pleasures it makes 
available to the spectator? 
The film can be said to contain a celebratory and a 'dark' side; this division 
is manifested in oddities, ruptures and disjunctions in the film's surface 
structure and is reflected in very different readings of it. These range from 
publicity accolades, authorial and genre studies (of its status as a musical), 
to analyses which set out to contest and deny the film's affirmative 
ideological position. A recent study of Minnelli's films by James 
Naremore brings together these approaches and restates the 'meaning' of 
the film as 'the way it turns a vision of home into an ideal entertainment' 
(Naremore 1993, p. 89). Psychoanalytical readings have focused on the 
film's 'dark', unconscious side and have sought to expose its celebratory 
status as a sham. In my reading of the film I will argue that, from within 
psychoanalysis, a Winnicottian perspective offers an affirmative reading 
which throws light on the spectator's stake in the film and that the film 
can be 'reclaimed' for the enjoyment and use of the playing spectator. 
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will focus particularly on the film's portrayal of the Smith family, the 
point of a good deal of the critical discussion about the film, both positive 
and negative, and the source of the film's emotional charge. 
St. Louis incorporates characteristics belonging to a number of different 
genres, including 'romance', comedy, and even the horror film, but most 
notably the Hollywood musical and, less obviously, the family 
melodrama. In this way, I will argue, it makes available different and 
shifting positions for the spectator: that as a musical it transgresses 
conventional cinematic realism and gives a place for playing in the 
Winnicottian sense, and as a family melodrama it can 'move' the 
spectator on an unconscious level. 
Celebration 
The myth of St. Louis is that it is a pleasure-giving film. Advertisements 
put out at the time of its first showing in 1944 promote it as a studio 
product from MGM, known for lavish productions under Arthur Freed: 9 
'Two great stars captivate America in a Glorious Love Story with Music, 
Excitement, Technicolor! ' Even here, however, a possible ambiguity in the 
film's genre status is suggested by the publicity, which names the film a 
'romance' but depicts two females as its main stars, one of them a child. 
This indicates the greater importance of the family than the couple in this 
film, as well as the promotion of its 'child star', which extended to the 
9These examples of promotional material come from the British Film Institute Press Book 
for the film. 
selling of 'Tootie dolls' and clothes. In line with common practice, the 
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director's name, 'Vincente Minnelli', is placed in very small letters at the 
bottom of the advertisements, after the writers of the screenplay, Irving 
Brecher and Fred. F. Finkelhoffe, and the author of the book on which it 
was based, Sally Benson. 
The viewer is promised a Hollywood period spectacular: 
'Gay, Glorious Love Story with Music and Technicolor'. The 
advertisement shows period sketches of the Fair and of the film songs. 
Another advertisement has a 'strip' of four sketches down one side, 
promising: 'EXCITEMENT, (Margaret O'Brien, the loveable kid sister ... 
turns that Hallowe'en party into a near catastrophe); 'ROMANCE ('Judy 
Garland and the boy-next-door in a scrappy, happy love affair'). Later (anti- 
celebratory) critics, however, were to give alternative and less innocent 
interpretations of the 'scrappy' love affair and the 'grand climax' of the 
ending (Wood, 1979; Britton, 1978). 
The film became an immediate box-office success and was followed by a 
number of imitations (Altman, 1989, p. 323; Naremore, 1993, p. 72). Since 
then it has become celebrated as a 'classic'. In the UK it continues to be 
shown quite regularly on British television, particularly at Christmas, 
presumably partly for its Christmas scenes, strongly connoting sentiment, 
nostalgia and the family. It is also shown fairly frequently at the London 
National Film Theatre. Programme Notes for showings in the late 1980s 
indicate that, by this time, the film had gathered a status as 'special': the 
film was shown as one of 'Three of the Best'. The Notes include an extract 
from the publicity for a 1978 New York retrospective of 'The Films of 
Vincente Minnelli', which highlights the Minnelli/Garland partnership 
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(they were married for a time and their own myth is perpetuated in their 
star daughter, Liza Minnelli), suggesting that the relationship brought out 
in each other, and in the film, previously unknown qualities: 'It took 
Minnelli to transform Garland ('in her first-grown up part') into 
something more interesting and desirable ... endowed her with a glamour 
she had not previously possessed and would never again achieve on 
screen'. On the other hand, Garland's 'severity, her emotional intensity, 
released a depth of feeling never before evident in Minnelli's work ... He 
gave her style and she gave him warmth'. Here the celebratory tone has 
extended to Minnelli as director. 
A musical 
The 'celebratory' construction of the film continues in popular accounts of 
it as a musical; in reading it as a genre movie the focus turns to elements 
in the film that are common to its classification and to questions of 
audience expectations. Although the word does not appear on the original 
advertisements, the musical is the most obvious classification for the film, 
one of a famous batch produced in the 1940s and 1950s by Arthur Freed at 
MGM, many with Minnelli as director and Judy Garland, known for her 
musical roles, as star: the film contains seven song-and-dance numbers. In 
line with other musicals the film has a slight plot concerning the family's 
threatened move and its resolution. As a musical the film's theme is to do 
with 'coupling' (Altman, 1991) and with the celebration of St. Louis as the 
site of the family-community's desires. 10 
l°St. Louis as a musical is explored further in Chapter 3, on Playing. 
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J. A. Casper's Vincente Minnelli and the Film Musical (1977) combines a 
celebration of Minnelli as director with a celebration of the musical. The 
book ends with a panegyric to Minnelli's musicals: 'A Minnelli musical 
brings back fantasy ... to contemporary life ... and upholds life values 
which modern man has abandoned' (Casper, 1977, p. 166). The musical is 'a 
world of movement, change, transformation, transcendence and a 
celebration of it is desired in one's depths' (p. 164). In similar celebratory 
terms (of the musical in general) Rick Altman ends his book on the 
American musical with a lament for the lost values of music making (as 
opposed to consumption). He hopes (in an address to the reader) that this 
book 'will send you back to the musical' and, further, 'make you return to 
the piano, your clarinet, or simply your vocal chords (Altman, 1989, p. 364). 
The celebration of the musical has been complexly problematised in film 
studies since the 1970s. Nevertheless the terms in which Casper describes 
the musical's pleasures are similar to those of Richard Dyer (1977) and 
Jane Feuer (1982) who analyse and critique it as a genre. As a musical Meet 
me in St. Louis is expected to give an almost irresistible pleasure. 
Minnelli as author 
The context for Casper's elevation of Minnelli s musicals onto a 'spiritual' 
plane is, precisely, that he is writing not about musicals in general but 
about those of Minnelli: Casper's book is a celebration of the director-as- 
author of the films that bear his name (Casper, 1979). Adopting the now 
popularised traditional authorship approach introduced by the Cahiers du 
Cinema in the 1950s which regards the director as the creative source of a 
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film, Casper assumes that the musicals that Minnelli directed can be 
viewed as a part of a coherent body of work which expresses his unique 
vision-11 Today this approach has become entrenched into popular film 
discourse and in naming Meet me in St. Louis as a 'Minnelli' film, 
expectations which are largely to do with his 'style' and the 'beauty' of his 
mise en scene are activated for the viewer. 
This view of Minnelli can be seen in writing from the late 1950s and early 
60s. For example, an article in Film Quarterly describes Meet me in St. 
Louis as 'Minnelli's masterpiece in the lyrical evocation of an era' 
(Johnson, 1958, p. 24). An article by Mark Shivas in Movie (1962), the 
British journal which deliberately took up an authorial approach, uses an 
interview with Minnelli on his approach to making a film as a starting 
point for exploring his 'methods'. 
"It's an unconscious process - you must wait, hoarding impressions. 
As you mull it over, you begin to see a form, a style. This is the crucial 
moment - you have to resist all outside influences, for everything 
brings back memories of something else, and another style may 
superimpose itself on what you have in mind. This is the tricky point: 
you must wait until you are sure that you can hold onto the essential 
thing - the style you want. You can't see a single detail - you don't 
know how to put it all together, but that doesn't matter; you can see 
this form, this style. I think it is largely a matter of intuition". 
(Shivas, 1962, p. 17) 
11Other approaches to authorship will be considered in Ch. 3. 
Shivas explores the outcomes of the process in the methods that Minnelli 
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uses to 'stage' a story': his use of actors; his camera work 'always at the 
service of his actors, tending to move from a larger view of the scene, 
closing in on the important characters, first establishing their 
surroundings, and then allowing the actors to take over'. Minnelli 
explains his liking for long takes: 'they give the actors a greater chance to 
be natural and to sustain the mood' (ibid). 
Shivas sets out to demonstrate Minnelli's qualities as a 'stylist', which has 
become the hallmark of favourable critical views of his films: that they can 
give the spectator a visual, aesthetic pleasure which can override what 
might be thought of as a thematic or dramatic banality (Minnelli never 
wrote his own screenplays. ) Minnelli was a stage-designer before he went 
to Hollywood, was interested in surrealism and admired the films of 
Welles and Ophuls. His interest in 'style' gives Minnelli and the viewer a 
reason to admire the musical: 'I didn't look down on musicals as so many 
people who were doing them did, treating them as a romp' (quoted in 
Casper, 1977, p. 33). Important to an interest in film's formal properties is 
the notion that the mise en scene itself makes meaning; the director's task 
is to deploy cinematic means to 'express' his vision: 'realism in the 
surroundings is replaced by a dramatically meaningful decor' resulting in 
'an intensified realism' (Shivas, 1962, p. 17). 
Thomas Elsaesser's essay on Minnelli, first published in 1969, is a more 
extensive 'celebration' of what he considers to be unique in Minnelli's 
films; ten years later in an 'Afterword' he qualifies his essay as being 
overly authorial (Elsaesser, 1969/79). His essay is typical of the approach to 
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authorship in its attempts to crystallise his own experience of the impact 
on him of Minnelli's films. Elsaesser asserts that Minnelli's films are 
important, that they speak to the spectator (mainly by means of the mise 
en scene) of something fundamental about the human condition; of the 
'discrepancy between an inner vision ... and an outer world that appears as 
hostile' (p. 18). As an example in Meet me in St. Louis he cites the father's 
wish to change jobs and go to New York and his subsequent change of 
mind as: '... [Minnelli's] optimism about the individual's potential to 
make the world conform to his dreams and an equally acute sense of the 
tyranny over others implicit in it realisation' (p. 19). Drawing on 
psychoanalytical concepts - the drive, desire, projection and gratification 
- he asserts the 'seriousness' of . Minnelli's films which, for him, go 
'beyond' escapism and beyond 'style' to the assertion of human creativity 
and urge to self-expression and the realisation of his dreams. 12 
After celebration 
In contrast to the readings that celebrate Meet me in St. Louis, two critics 
writing at the end of the 1970s, Robin Wood (1979) and Andrew Britton 
(1978), set out to expose these pleasures to critical scrutiny. Both essays aim 
to reveal how in apparently celebrating the family, Meet me in St. Louis in 
fact represents an attempt to cover up family conflict and oppression. 
Wood argues that by the 1970s the film looked very different from when it 
was produced in 1944, partly because of changes in perceptions of the 
12 It is notable however that Elsaesser's contrast between energy and constraint recalls that 
of writers on the musical in gereral. For example, Collins, Dyer, Feuer, Sutton, in Altman, 
1981, all describe the difference between the numbers and the narrative in similar terms. 
family, claiming that the post-war 'myth' of the happy family had been 
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exposed and what in the film had previously looked like a 'celebration' 
had become a display of 'the psychopathology of the family' (Wood, 1979, 
p. 9). Britton's purpose, rather more subtly, is to expose the contradictions 
between the film's surface celebration of the family and its underlying 
unconscious critique of it. 
Both Wood and Britton take little account of the film's status as a musical 
and turn to other genres in their analyses. Wood names the film as a 
'family comedy', which sets up the father as the butt and victim of its 
jokes; he loses in the conflict about the move, and is dominated, by stealth, 
by his wife and family. However, Wood argues that the comedy has 
turned sour: all the film's sexual relationships look pathological and the 
film now has horror film overtones (Wood, 1979, p. 11). Britton puts a 
similar case in his discussion of the film's evocation of nostalgia. He 
places the film in what he terms the 'alternative small town tradition' as a 
'modified pastoral' but does so in order to stress 'its Satanic opposite'. 
Although Britton acknowledges the film's appeal to audiences more than 
Wood does, in their denial of audiences' pleasure in Meet me in St. Louis 
both essays may be seen as illustrations of what Bill Nichols criticises as 
film studies' 'Great Refusal' of Hollywood cinematic pleasure. Nichols 
claims that, during the 1970s, particularly in Screen, the post-structuralist 
political readings of Hollywood cinema that set out to expose the capitalist 
and patriarchal ideology which it transmitted and helped to sustain, were 
dominated by a puritanical 'work ethic' approach: in analyses which 
attempt to account for and at the same time to subvert the viewer's 
pleasure, 'the old aesthetics of pleasure is now seen as the pathology of 
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pleasure ... we must learn how to refuse the pleasures that excuse and 
perpetuate contradictions of sex, race, class and nation' (Nichols, 1985, 
p. 19); a 'counter aesthetics of psychopathology has emerged that takes it 
upon itself to tear the veil of innocence from the face of culture' (p. 20). 
Nichols' criticism of this approach is that the 'will to knowledge ... can all 
too readily take precedence over play, leisure ... and the pursuit of 
pleasure' (ibid). Although neither Wood nor Britton wrote for Screen, 
their essays markedly show the influence of the 'aesthetics of 
psychopathology', by which, in its political film studies project of the 
1970s, Screen attempted to jolt the spectator out of his or her acquiescence 
in the pleasures of Hollywood cinema. This thesis attempts to address this 
'imbalance, ' 
Meet me in St. Louis as a family melodrama 
Although they do not use the term, in focusing on 'the psychopathology' 
of the family, both Wood and Britton read Meet me in St. Louis as if it 
were a Hollywood melodrama, particularly in the case of Britton who is 
interested in it as a 'woman's film'. Melodrama is a more problematic 
genre category than the musical, 'newly discovered' by film studies in the 
1970s (Gledhill, 1987, p. 1) and used to deal with questions of ideology, 
gender and cinematic pleasure. The collection of essays from the 1970s and 
80s in Christine Gledhill's Melodrama and the Woman's Film(1987), 
which traces the genre's critical history, demonstrate generational and 
sexual conflict and the establishing of sexual and gender identity as 
melodrama's major preoccupation. These conflicts, whether overtly or 
covertly, are Oedipal and 'invite' a psychoanalytical reading. 
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The essays in Gledhill's collection are divided into those that deal mainly 
with Hollywood family melodrama of the 1950s and those concerning 
'women's films' of the 1940s. While both categories pursue similar family 
scenarios, she suggests that the woman's film, with a female main 
protagonist and identificatory figure, opens up a space for female discourse 
whereas the family melodrama usually presents a male point of view. 
However, these categories are not usually clearly demarcated, since all 
melodrama is concerned with the establishing of sexual identity and the 
point of view is rarely fixed: Meet me in St. Louis speaks from its women 
characters' point of view, and the family disagreement around the father's 
projected move to New York is played out in terms of gender. However 
the conflicts it presents involve the question of the whole family's 
survival, as do Minnelli's family melodramas of the 1950s. 
Gledhill argues that the melodrama has two conflicting impulses: in 
seeming to represent with verisimilitude 'ordinary' families, it adopts the 
realist, illusionist format of Hollywood fictional cinema, with a tight 
narrative structure and trajectory and usually unobtrusive mise en scene. 
However, its need to express issues of sexual difference and subjective 
family conflict shifts it towards 'heightened' or exaggerated non-verbal 
expression as a means of articulating what realist Hollywood cinema tends 
to repress. Both aspects may be seen in Meet me in St. Louis. 
As Minnelli, who in the 1940s directed musicals, turned to melodrama in 
the 1950s, an authorship reading might be expected to discover a nascent 
melodrama in Meet me in St. Louis, produced in 1944. Interestingly, 
Elsaesser (1969), part of whose article on Minnelli is printed in Gledhill's 
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book on the melodrama, as well as in Altman's (1981) earlier collection on 
the musical, names Meet me in St. Louis as one of Minnelli's 'non- 
musicals' (Elsaesser, 1969, p. 17). This invites us to look for parallels 
between this film and Minnelli's later melodramas and to read it as an 
example of 'a musical turned inside out', where 'tragedy is present as a 
particular kind of unfreedom, as the constraint of an emotional or artistic 
temperament in a world that becomes claustrophobic, where reality 
suddenly reveals itself as mere decor, unbearably false and oppressive' 
(ibid). Since the film is also classed as a musical, following Elsaesser we 
would expect it to present a dialectic movement between what Elsaesser 
presents as opposites: energy and constraint, freedom and oppression, with 
the result that the film can give rise to the opposing readings, celebratory 
and pessimistic, that I have noted here. From this description it may 
clearly be argued that St. Louis has elements of both genres; that it is two 
films. Its opening announces the film as a musical; however, as Dyer 
points out, four of its seven numbers appear before the start of the main 
'plot', which is initiated by the father announcing his move to New York, 
towards the end of the second, Autumn episode (Dyer, 1977, p. 188). This 
puts the family into danger, the conflict threatening its continuity, but the 
threat is averted by the father's giving in and changing his mind at the 
end of the following, Winter, episode, when the family unit is restored 
and consolidated by the coupling of the older children. The final, Spring, 
episode is a cursory fulfilment of the film's initial promise of the opening 
of the Fair and of its coupling, which was set in motion in the first episode 
and which, according to Altman (1989), is the basis of the musical's 
narrative form. Once the family conflict is resolved, the musical part of 
the film returns in this final episode, although the episode is low on 
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spectacle and lacks the final big number originally intended for it 
(Shipman, 1992, p. 157). 
Although there are two musical numbers in this middle (melodrama) 
section of the film, even these seem to function as a part of the domestic 
drama: 'Have yourself a merry little Christmas' is an intimate song, sung 
by Esther to comfort her sister. The last song of the film (apart from the 
replay of the title song), 'You and I', is peculiarly domestic. After their 
quarrel about the proposed move it reunites the parents at the piano in a 
duet that they sang when they were young and is marked by intimate and 
'ordinary' touches: the father fails to reach the high note, the mother has 
to exercise her fingers before starting. The couple are presented as 
'ordinary', not as stars, and as parents, not a romantic couple (although 
the film here allows them a touch of romance, the number's main 
function is to bring the family together). These two numbers work to deny 
the spectacle and overt staging that characterises a musical, replacing them 
by a sense of ordinariness and domesticity. However they both also speak 
of a nostalgic world which, although it is beyond reach, in the future or 
the past, the film makes possible; the domestic melodrama becomes shot 
through with the utopian aspiration of the musical. 
At other, highly charged, moments in the film, however, a different way 
of approaching the question of these two genres in Meet me in St. Louis 
becomes relevant: the view that the musical and the melodrama also have 
elements in common. Flinn (1992) refers to their obvious similarities in 
the importance of music as a signifier and points out that both genres also 
deploy stylised mise en scene to represent characters' emotions. In the 
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musical, characters may break into song; in the melodrama, the setting 
and the action are exaggerated. 
In the following chapters I explore the film spectator relationship in 
analyses of short sequences from Meet me in St. Louis. Broadly, I focus on 
the film as a musical in my account of a 'playing' spectator, and on its 
melodrama aspects in considering the 'unconscious' spectator (when her 
playing breaks down); this encompasses two kinds of different but related 
pleasures. However this division suggests a static schematisation which is 
sometimes belied in close analysis of all the elements of particular 
sequences, when classification by genre becomes less relevant. The 
unconscious may make its mark regardless of genre, and the playing 
spectator moves about fluidly in her relation to the film. The essential 
quality of playing is that it is a process and always in movement. 
37 
CHAPTER 2 THE SPECTATOR ON SCREEN 
The line becomes a space; the metaphorical boundary that divides 
internal from external, that either/or in which the object has 
traditionally been entrapped, expands into the ... playground of 
transitional phenomena. 
('Potential space in psychoanalysis: the object in the setting', 
Andre Green, 1978b, p. 177) 
Events take place, a place for someone, and the need is to pose 
the question of that one. 
('Narrative Space', Stephen Heath, 1981, p. 69) 
... to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a 
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for those shadows of the 
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, 
that constitutes poetic faith. 
(Biographia Literaria, S. T. Coleridge, 1817, p. 169) 
In this chapter I will explore the spectator's 'entry' into the film as she 
begins to engage with it; I will argue that this involves her use of the 
film as a transitional play object and that, to begin playing, she must 
make a psychic move both into what Winnicott terms her own, 
internal transitional area of 'potential space' and 'into' the space on 
screen. 
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The film as a transitional object 
How does the spectator come to cherish the film she watches? The 
relationship of the (Winnicottian) playing spectator to the film is 
founded on the trace of the baby's devoted relationship with the 
transitional object, which for Winnicott marks the originary point of 
playing. Winnicott's paper 'Transitional objects and transitional 
phenomena' was first published in the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis in 1953, but the concept, which is probably his best 
known contribution to psychoanalytic thinking, began to gain much 
more general currency when the paper appeared with others related to 
his notion of playing in Playing and Reality in 1971. Winnicott derives 
the concept from the commonly observed but hitherto un-theorised 
behaviour pattern in babies from a few months old of using a blanket 
or soft object as a comforter and play object, to which they become 
extremely attached and which 'survives' both their loving and 
aggression. Behaviour patterns such as 'babbling' and rhythmic rocking 
may serve a similar function, and since it is the use that the baby makes 
of an object or activity that is at stake, Winnicott came to prefer the 
term 'transitional phenomenon' to avoid over-emphasis on an actual, 
material object. 
The transitional phenomenon has a crucial function in the infant's 
development from what Winnicott posited as its primary state of being 
'merged in' with the mother to recognising both itself and her as 
separate. He expresses this as the: 
... intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the 
teddy bear, between oral eroticism and the true object- 
relationship, between primary creativity and projection of what 
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has already been introjected, between primary unawareness of 
indebtedness and the acknowledgement of indebtedness. 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 2). 
It is the formulation of this 'in between ' area, the notion of a 'third' 
area between Freud's pleasure and reality principle, 
on which Winnicott is so insistent here, that marks his departure from 
- or addition to - classical psychoanalysis. 
Although the transitional phenomenon may be associated with reality 
testing in the Freudian sense, the crux of the concept is the ambiguous 
nature of the object: it is neither wholly internal nor wholly external; 
neither wholly imagined nor wholly concrete. While, in a sense, it 
'stands for', and is symbolic of, the mother/breast, it is equally 
important and valued by the child for itself. Above all, the object's 
status as being both objective and external, and imagined and inner is 
crucial in its being neither under magical omnipotent control (as 
would be the internalised breast in the Kleinian model) nor wholly 
outside, beyond control. Most importantly, this ambiguous, 
intermediate status is unquestioned, 'a paradox not to be resolved' 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. xii). The object is both inner and outer. 
In due time the object becomes decathected and the child loses interest 
it, although it might be revived in times of stress. Nevertheless it 
leaves its trace and the experience of the third area provides a 'resting 
place' for the individual 'engaged in the perpetual human task of 
keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated' (Winnicott, 
1971, p. 20). The experience of the transitional phenomenon is dispersed 
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into the public domain of play, cultural activity and religion, which 
similarly provide an experience whose reality status need not be 
challenged; within these fields the shared nature of illusion adds to 
their pleasure. However, where beliefs or experiences are not shared or 
a reality status is claimed beyond what is generally accepted, then 
difficulties and arguments about those 'beliefs' arise. (It is noticeable, 
for instance, how frequently those who talk about their religion refuse 
to engage in debates about 'evidence' for it, claiming that their faith has 
nothing to do with such an argument, as if, precisely, it lies in another 
area or domain altogether. Similarly, people talking seriously about the 
characters and events in television soaps do not question their reality; 
rather, engaging in gossip about them, they claim a reality status which 
they choose not to challenge. ) 
An American collection of essays, Between Reality and fantasy: 
Winnicott's concepts of Transitional Objects and Phenomena (Grolnick 
and Barkin, 1978), indicates the range of directions in which 
Winnicott's concept may be taken: its contributions, which often reflect 
the American psychoanalytical focus on the development of the ego, 
comprise discussions on the philosophical, clinical and cultural 
dimensions of the transitional phenomenon and build up a more 
elaborated picture of the concept from different viewpoints, including 
discussions of poetry and art. In an essay on the function of the 
transitional object, 'Between reality and fantasy', Muensterberger uses 
Freud's much cited account of the 'fort da game' where a baby 
repeatedly throws away and retrieves a cotton reel as an example of the 
activity of the use of the transitional object; from being 'controlled' by 
being put in a position of passively accepting the absence of the mother, 
the baby transforms the situation into a game and uses the object for its 
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playing. From representing the mother the object becomes 'valued' for 
itself and enables the mother's absence to be accepted; the transitional 
object defeats passivity. 
The transitional object is further specified in a comparison with 'pre- 
cursor' and 'fetish-like' objects. Grolnick and Barkin (1978) argue that 
in addition to a fetishised object, whose use appears at the Oedipal 
stage, relates to the fear of castration, and is associated with significant 
sexual or aggressive discharge, there also exists an earlier fetish-like 
object which may have the attributes of the transitional object (p. 541). 
However, instead of being used adaptively and playfully, it is used 
repetitively and compulsively, as if its function is solely to avoid 
separation; the function of the true transitional object, on the other 
hand, includes negotiating that separation. In 'Transitional object 
origins and the psychosomatic symptoms' Gaddini (1978) puts forward 
the notion, which she formulated with Winnicott's concurrence 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. xiii), of 'precursor objects', which may also develop 
into fetishised objects. These serve a comforting and consoling 
function and in this represent a replacement - and only a replacement 
- for the mother, their function being to do with maintaining the 
stage of hallucinatory unity. Very often they are 'provided' for, even 
imposed on, the child by the mother, which negates its ability to make 
and create its own object world. 
These examples highlight the specificity of the transitional 
phenomenon, which is to do with its paradoxical status as the first 'not 
me' object (Winnicott, 1971, p. 2), which is also 'myself' as it is also, at 
the same time, both the mother and not the mother. Related to this is 
its availability for creative play and its function of connecting the 
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subject to the world of objects. The use of the transitional object always 
implies an engaged activity on the part of the baby. 
A number of the essays in Grolnick and Barkin's volume explore the 
question of the derivatives of the transitional phenomenon. Winnicott 
postulated that the transitional object is gradually decathected and loses 
its emotional charge as it is dispersed into cultural activity. The notion 
of a transitional 'function' that continues to serve as a 'bridge' between 
the familiar and unfamiliar is an important thread running through 
several accounts. If the object itself is decathected, nevertheless the 
process of its use by the child is arguably internalised in order for the 
transitional process to continue into adult life. As Barkin (1978) puts it, 
'it is because the functions are internalised into both self and object 
representations that the transitional object is not mourned' (p. 527) and 
he concludes that aspects of transitional objects and phenomena are 
internalised into both self and object representations. In an essay 
written much later, 'Psychoanalytic critique of productivism', Robert 
Young describes his Filofax as a specific example of an adult's 
transitional object; 'the texture and luxury of the feel of it' recalls the 
child's sensuous 'comfort' which it gets from the transitional object, 
valued both for itself and the mother's presence that it represents 
(Young, 1991, p. 513). 
Gilbert Rose goes further in systematically finding a place for the 
derivatives of the transitional phenomena, in an 'essay entitled 'The 
creativity of everyday life' (Rose, 1978). Citing the new physics and 
systems theory, he, too, criticises Winnicott's apparent assumption of a 
'fixed' reality which can be objectively perceived. Instead he postulates 
a world of energy 'in constant flux' where the 'organism is viewed as 
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an open system in exchange with its environment' (p. 349). The 
function of art and other cultural forms - and, indeed, the form- 
making capacity itself - is to bring about the subject's 'orientation to 
the world', through a process of 'abstraction and selection' whereby he 
builds up a construct of himself within his setting: his "Umwelt". This 
Rose sees as a means of the 'mind' constituting itself 'in dynamic 
relation with the outside' (ibid). Rose's contribution to Winnicott's 
concept is in his description of it as a life-long negotiation with the 
outside world as a reconstruction of the individual's sense of reality; he 
proposes the term 'transitional process' to indicate that 'the 
differentiation of self and reality is a continuing and mutual everyday 
process ' (Rose, p. 353). This emphasises that the person continually and 
actively, as a life-time endeavour, remakes his or her world in every 
new encounter. Like Winnicott himself, Rose presents this as a process 
that applies as much to the receiver as to the producer of cultural 
artefacts. Playing thus extends from being a specific activity, 
constituting a 'relief' from the negotiation with the outside world, to 
its function of a bridging between subject and object, the individual and 
the environment. 
For Winnicott, the transitional object relates to the development of the 
capacity for illusion-making, the basis for playing. Grolnick and Barkin 
claim that Winnicott is the 'first psychoanalyst to have attempted to 
trace the developmental line of illusion formation' (1978, p. 542), which 
is dependent on the use of the transitional object: 
As the ego's capacity to experience illusory phenomena 
differentiates itself from the infant's delusionary and hallucinatory 
world, reality testing, at first a crude device, gradually evolves 
into a function capable, in its own service, of suspending its own 
activity, of oscillation, and even playfulness; ultimately the 
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capacity for illusion, for "as if" and "lets pretend" can develop 
(ibid) 
In Winnicott's scheme, the first stage in this development is the baby's 
total illusion of the mother/breast as a part of itself and therefore as 
magically and omnipotently under its control - an 'hallucinatory 
stage', which for the observer is simply a 'delusion'. Illusion-making 
starts to comes in with the initial conjunction between the mother's 
presentation of the breast at the moment that the infant needs and 
hallucinates it; Winnicott describes the process as the illusion 'that 
there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant's own capacity 
to create' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 12). This experience takes shape in the 
transitional object with which the baby can play because of its 
ambiguous status of being both found and made. This marks the 
beginning of an 'interchange' between mother and baby where 
previously they were one; it is an area of ambiguity which is 
experienced as play rather than as anxiety. 
The transitional object also marks the beginning of the baby's capacity 
to make use of symbols in a way that can be compared with the adult's 
use of culturally acquired symbols (for example a rose; a cross). The 
object is concrete and experienced in its own terms, as itself; in that it 
also represents the mother, it accumulates accretions of meaning, 
associations to do with the sensations of the experiences of 
'mothering', so that its value 'for itself comes to include the 
simultaneous apprehension of these associated experiences. Since the 
mother is not at first perceived as separate from the infant, these 
experiences also belong to itself; the transitional object has acquired 
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attributes of both subject and object. The experience of the object 
therefore encompasses aspects of the baby's sense of itself as a part its 
environment. The baby's cherishing of the transitional object includes 
an appreciation of itself and its mother, which invests the object with 
aspects of the inner and the outer world. The value of the experience of 
the transitional object for the person's growth is that it enables any 
object or activity to be similarly endowed with inner and outer 
associations, so that the external world can be 'loved' because, without 
delusion, and without losing its specificity as object, it also stands for 
'myself'. 
Winnicott's view of illusion is clearly different from the traditional 
one of 'false sensory perceptions' (Grolnick and Barkin, 1978, p. 542). In 
his essay 'Discussion of Anthony Flew', countering Flew's criticism of 
Winnicott's concepts, Flarsheim (1978) argues that, for Winnicott, 
illusion is to do with the enrichment of the perception of external 
reality that can derive from its 'integration with internal reality' 
(p. 508); he cites the American College Dictionary definition of illusion 
as 'perception of a thing which gives its qualities not present in reality'. 
This may be contrasted with, on the one hand, hallucination (a total 
belief in the internal world) and on the other a 'totally unimaginative 
perception of the external world' (ibid). The acceptance of the 
paradoxical status of the transitional object marks the capacity for 
illusion-making and enables the subject to engage in fictional activity. 
The transitional object and film 
At this point we may say that a film can represent a transitional object 
for the spectator in specific ways, by comparing Winnicott's list of the 
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attributes of the transitional object with those of a film for the 
spectator. These points will be developed further in the course of the 
thesis. (This 'List' is taken from Playing and Reality, p. 5). 
Summary of special qualities in the relationship 
The infant assumes rights over the object, and we agree to this 
assumption. Nevertheless some abrogation of omnipotence is a feature 
from the start. 
Viewers have the feeling that a film belongs to them, that it is their 
object, for their privileged use. Privately and in their talk about the 
film, they will assume those rights of ownership. At the same time the 
film remains itself and the spectator knows it. 
The object is affectionately cuddled as well as excitedly loved and 
mutilated. 
A film is 'loved' by viewers and can elicit sexually derived responses, 
which may be conscious or unconscious. 
It must never change, unless changed by the infant. 
Predictability is an important feature of popular cinema, in its genre 
and narrative structure as well as in the phenomenon of sequels. 
Viewers become angry when films do not fulfil their expectations. 
(This response is illustrated in The Purple Rose of Cairo, discussed in 
the next section, in the fury of the audiences when the film's hero steps 
out of the screen and changes the film. ) 
It must survive instinctual loving, and also hating, and, if it be a feature, 
aggression. 
The film can be experienced as both a good and a bad Kleinian object: 
loved and as irrationally hated (Metz, 1982, p. 6 and 7). (The necessity 
for the spectator to be able to 'use' the film-object for her own purposes 
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but for the film also to 'survive' is taken up in Chapter 6 on the 'Use of 
an object'. ) 
Yet it must seem to the infant to give warmth or to move, or to have 
texture, or to do something that seems to show that it has a vitality or 
reality of its own. 
The film object may both represent something other than itself and, at 
the same time, be fully, lovingly and excitedly valued for what it is in 
the here and now; spectators love a film (any film), not only for what it 
is 'about'. 
It comes from without from our point of view, but not so from the point 
of view of the baby. Neither does it come from within; it is not a 
hallucination. 
The photographic moving image creates a mysterious reality 
impression, yet as a play of shadows it eludes the spectator's grasp; it is 
a material object that exists 'out there' on screen but also seems to be a 
product of the spectator's imagination. 
One of the peculiar fascinations of film is its ability to seem to be 
projected from the spectator's psyche: 'the film is what I receive and 
also what I release' (Metz, 1982, p. 51). The illusionism of cinema 
comes from the ability of a film to become endowed with aspects of the 
spectator's inner world while at the same time it remains itself as 
outside, a separate and autonomous object. The spectator 'believes' in 
the film, as she continually creates and transforms it into her own 
unique, transitional object. 
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This 'belief' does not necessarily depend on the film's own illusionist 
operations since the spectator may be drawn into a similar relationship 
with a very wide range of types of cinema, quickly adapting to changing 
practices. Similarly, the 'shared', public nature of cinema allows its 
secondary, pre-and-post production discourses, including publicity and 
reviews as well as viewers' own talk about it, to be based on a mutual 
understanding that somehow the film events have the status of 
'truth'. When we engage with a film we make a move into a psychic 
state where we suspend judgement about its reality status and accept it 
on its own terms. This psychic move, I will go on to argue, is a move 
into the 'potential space' between subject and object where the film 
takes on the status of a transitional object. 
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The spectator finds her place. 
The playing spectator's wish to take a part in the film-play activates a 
psychic movement into the space of the action on screen. I will argue 
that this move is effected through the interaction of the film's spatial 
operations and the spectator's psychic shift into her 'potential space', 
the psychic area that Winnicott posits as the location for cultural 
experience. To put it the other way round, she internalises the film 
space - the combination of space and movement - and the film 
'enters' her psyche. The process of luring and allurement of the 
spectator into the film is therefore one of activating her wishes, even 
longings, to be 'there', on screen, playing her part; the screen space 
makes available to her a playspace and, conversely, her ability to make 
use of her own potential space enables her to engage with the film and 
take up her place in it. 
In this examination of potential space, my focus moves away from the 
film as a transitional object to look at the relationship between the 
spectator and film in terms of the space and the movement between 
them. The exploration of the placing of the spectator will encompass 
and bring together different kinds of space: material, cinematic space 
and metaphoric, psychic space. In this chapter I consider mainly the 
spatial operations of film whereas in the next I explore the spectator's 
engagement with the narrative action. However, within the film 
narrative system this distinction between space and narrative is clearly 
somewhat artificial and is not always sustainable, as the title of Stephen 
Heath's essay, 'Narrative Space' (1981), considered below, suggests. 
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Winnicott's notion of potential space is closely related to that of the 
transitional object but he uses the term to extend his exploration of 
transitional phenomena in infancy into the question of the 'location of 
cultural experience' in adulthood He chose to delineate this psychic 
state metaphorically in terms of a 'space' or 'place': 
I am making an examination in terms of the position, relative to 
the individual in the world, in which cultural experience, play, can 
be said to 'take place'.... I put forward the hypothesis that the 
position is the potential space between the baby and the mother. 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 107) 
Part of Winnicott's purpose in positing the transitional area of 
potential space was to fill a gap in Freud's topography of the psyche. As 
he puts it: 'Freud did not have a place in his topography of the mind 
for the experience of things cultural.... he did not get so far as to tell us 
where in the mind cultural experience is' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 95). 
In two short late pieces, 'The location of cultural experience' (originally 
published in 1967) and 'The place where we live' (Winnicott, 1971, 
chs. 7 & 8) he hypothesises a 'third area' between the outer and inner 
psychic domain, whose origin is the 'place in space and time where and 
when the mother is in transition from being merged in with the infant 
and alternatively being experienced as an object to be perceived rather 
than conceived' (p. 96). On the one hand there is the 'inner life' ranging 
from 'instinctual experience' to 'contemplation' and on the other, the 
outer, shared reality; this marks the difference between the 'subjective 
object' which belongs to the perception of inner reality and is 
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essentially a part of the subject, and the 'object objectively perceived', 
which is a developmental achievement for the subject. Potential space 
is at the 'interplay' between them: between there 'being nothing but 
me and there being objects and phenomena outside omnipotent 
control' (p. 100). This intermediate area is where play 'takes place' and it 
expands into 'creative living and into the whole cultural life of man' 
(p. 102). For the adult, then, cultural life is 'located' in the 'potential 
space between the individual and the environment, that which 
initially both joins and separates the baby and mother' (p. 103). In this 
account of potential space Winnicott posits a continuity from the baby's 
use of the transitional object into the child's make-believe, and then 
into the adult's various forms of playing; what he calls the 'cultural 
field'. 1 
However this internal 'space' is only 'hypothetical' - hence 
'potential' space -- since, although it can later, in pathology, become 
'an infinite area of separation' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 109), it is not, in fact, 
usually actualised. Instead it is 'filled' with 'objects and creative 
playing' (ibid), so that a 'connectedness' between the individual and 
the outside, initially the mother, is retained and developed. Where the 
potential space is 'filled' in this way, it is because the baby has 
developed confidence and trust in the mother (newly a separate not- 
me object) remaining available on the margin or boundary of that 
space, so that the baby is psychically never 'alone', even when 
physically alone. Winnicott explores this state in his paper 'The 
capacity to be alone' (1958): the child develops the capacity to be alone, 
1This continuity is questioned by some commentators, for example Phillips; 'the 
cultural field is curiously undifferentiated' (1988, p. 117). I take this point further in Chapter 3, on playing, and in Chapter 6, in my account of the work of Marion Milner. 
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psychically satisfied because of the presence of the mother. For the 
adult, the need for the actual mother's presence has dropped away, and, 
where the transitional process has been successfully negotiated, such 
activities as playing, imaginative and cultural activity, and religion 
have filled the gap, the capacity to be alone achieved. 
The psychic movement into potential space involves a shift in 
discourse and in the spectator's dealings with her external and internal 
world, which has been likened (for example, by Wright, 1984, p. 92) to 
Coleridge's 'willing suspension of disbelief' [which] 'constitutes poetic 
faith' (Coleridge, 1817, p. 169): the condition where the human 
imagination animates the outer world and similarly enables the 
'reality' of the external world to act upon the products of the 
imagination, so that there comes about a link between them. In this 
suspension of disbelief -a suspended state - the spectator can accept 
that the fictional events on screen are happening, without needing to 
question their reality status further. She can wait in front of the empty 
screen, without need for further action, for the film to unfold - on 
screen and inside her. The spectator's 'willingness' to enter this state 
comes not from a conscious decision on her part but from the wish and 
capacity both to engage with the film and to move into that psychic 
state where she does not question the veracity of what she sees in front 
of her. At this moment questions of belief and disbelief become 
irrelevant and are not asked. 
It is possible to take Winnicott's account as it stands and accept that, as 
a 'cultural experience' film must be located in potential space. But in 
positing a connection between material, cinematic space and the 
psychic phenomenon of potential space, I am extending Winnicott's 
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question of where 'is' the individual who is playing to consider 
'where' the spectator is 'placed', both in relation to cinematic space in 
general and at specific moments during a film. In pursuing this 
question I am assuming an activating process in cinema-spectator 
relations which can translate cinema's material phenomena into 
psychic ones, an assumption which underlies the psychoanalytic 
approach to the spectator. 
As an illustrative example of the film spectator's psychic move into 
potential space and screen space, I examine Woody Allen's The Purple 
Rose of Cairo (1985) which is a play on, and about, cinematic 
illusionism. In particular it explores what can happen when the 
spectator's 'conviction' of the 'truth' of a film narrative is taken to its 
absurdly logical conclusion: the film character with whom the heroine 
(played by Mia Farrow) is in love joins her in the theatre, and she in 
her turn later goes onto the screen to take part in the film. The film 
playfully subverts the strict division between screen and auditorium, 
between fiction and fact, and inner and outer reality, both for its 
characters and for the spectator, and depicts the space between reality 
and fantasy where the spectator (both the spectator-in- the-inner film 
and the 'real' viewer of the film in the cinema) can play out her desires 
untroubled by questions of reality. 
The movement of the spectator in that intermediate space is illustrated 
and figured in the striking moment of cinematic play when Tom, the 
hero of the inner film-within-the-film, steps out of the screen to join 
his fan in the auditorium. Cecilia (Farrow) is a poor young housewife 
who is bullied by her husband and who goes every day to see the same 
film as a way of escaping her problems and dreary existence in the 
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Depression. She falls in love - it is not clear whether with the hero or 
with the film-viewing process itself. 
The spectator has already been placed in an ambiguous relationship to 
both the films on screen, the Woody Allen film, shot in colour, and the 
black and-white-inner film that Cecilia is watching. The spectator has 
been given an image of the film star, Farrow, playing a fictional film 
character, Cecilia, who is herself also watching a film. It is an image in 
which the spectator has already been encouraged to invest some 
identificatory emotion: partly, even before coming to the cinema, 
because of Mia Farrow's status as star and her relationship with Woody 
Allen, and partly, now, during the film, as Cecilia, to be sympathised 
with as victim of her husband's bullying and as someone caught up by 
the fantasised pleasures of cinema. The film opens with a close-up of 
her rapt face, an identificatory technique conventionally used to invite 
the spectator to 'read' and perhaps to 'be' that character. Cecilia's 
character's situation is presented as 'reality' with its details of the 
bleakness of life in a small American town during the Depression, 
which can only be escaped by watching the movies. It is a 'reality' that 
the spectator has been lured into believing by this point in the film, as a 
base against which to gauge subsequent events and a contrast with the 
'fiction' of the film Cecilia is watching -a pastiche of a thirties B- 
movie, clearly marked by the character's stylised acting and stilted 
dialogue as 'unreal' (and incidentally as a bad movie). 
As well as being placed in the position of the knowing spectator 
watching a film character watching a film, the spectator is also 'given' 
the film as her own: at first the film is shown being played in the small 
town theatre with both film and audience on screen - then, in the 
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next shot, the whole screen is filled with the black-and-white film so 
that the spectator is put in the place of Mia Farrow and given her point 
of view in the audience. Partly, then, the spectator is with the 1930s 
audience, on screen in the 1930s auditorium, along with, even in the 
place of, Mia Farrow; partly in her own seat watching the whole scene 
from the outside, perhaps also watching herself watching. However, 
where she is placed is not a question the spectator asks herself as she 
watches a film, until she is jolted out of her absorption in the 
narrative. 
This 'jolt' suddenly takes place. Intriguingly the same clip of film has 
been played several times over (indicating the number of times that 
Cecilia has seen it), but this time Tom suddenly pauses in the middle of 
a line of dialogue, interrupting a gesture, while he turns from left to 
right of screen as if he has just noticed something. He looks straight out 
to camera -a look that is rare in classic Hollywood cinema and 
certainly new in this clip - and into the 1930s auditorium: to the 
audience there; to Mia Farrow; to us, the spectator; and says 'You must 
love this movie'. 
Tom's move off-screen is achieved in a series of quick cuts. As he 
speaks there is general consternation in the theatre and screams from 
members of the audience. Tom first addresses Cecilia from the inner 
film screen, his audience also in view; there is a cut to Mia Farrow, in 
close-up, horrified, filling our screen; then a cut back to the black-and- 
white film, which now fills our screen. Tom walks towards Cecilia, 
right up to camera (the spectator) saying "I've got to speak to you". A 
very quick cut to an anonymous fainting spectator is followed by a 
quick cut back to the black-and-white film screen, which is now shown 
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again in frame along with the cinema audience. This time, Tom, 
appearing for the first time in colour like the rest of the audience, 
stands against the screen from which he has stepped out. The move 
has looked like magic, the achievement of a cinematic impossibility. 
However this piece of cinematic illusionism is so quickly carried out 
that in a sense the spectator accepts it as 'real', simply as a part of the 
narrative and, at the same time, she laughs at the joke in which she 
has been implicated in several, pleasurable ways: as victim of the trick 
because she believed it; as receiver of Mia Farrow's wish-fulfilment; 
and as sophisticated viewer who knows a piece of clever filming when 
she see it. 
This psychic 'jolt', a sense of delighted outrage, stems mainly from the 
daring and impossible transgression of the boundary between film 
screen and spectator, a boundary which our common sense and 
fundamental knowledge of the material world tells us can never be 
crossed: we 'know' that it is impossible to mix the material world with 
the play of light and shadows on the screen. Yet, on one level, with that 
part of ourselves which, in a state of suspension of disbelief, accepts the 
'reality' of the narrative, we accept everything that happens in it, and 
participate both in the daring transgression and in the cleverness 
(which smacks of omnipotence) of the film maker in making the 
impossible possible. The playing spectator accepts it with that part of 
herself that operates in potential space, and the reality status of what 
happens is not questioned. In this film fiction, as illustration of the 
playing spectator, Cecilia is able to make the move into the film space 
and to 'summon up' her hero into her potential space because it is 
where she herself is already psychically placed. 
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In general, film criticism maintains the boundary between film and 
spectator, who is conceived as being placed firmly outside the screen- 
space: for instance, as unified ideal viewer; as voyeur; as controller of 
the film narrative. We may choose to maintain the unbridgeable line 
between spectator and screen and keep our psychic distance. This 
position offers a range of pleasures, although we may be so far outside 
the film, refusing or unable to believe in it, that we lose interest in 
watching. However when a film succeeds in maintaining our attention 
and catching our belief - and films are notorious for doing so even 
against our better judgement - then our experience is that, psychically, 
we may well step over that physically impassable line, to take part, in 
different, shifting ways, in the screen play. Cecilia later does this, to play 
a part in the film that she has watched but which she has also 
constructed for her use, in her longing to escape and to find an 
alternative life. 
Cecilia - and the playing spectator, to the extent that she identifies 
with Cecilia and has been given her point of view - is able to do this 
because the boundary between the outer world of the film and her 
inner world has become blurred and has altered. In this sequence the 
process is depicted concretely: a psychic event has turned into a literal 
one. Between the screen and Cecilia's psyche has been created a space 
which is depicted as neither just her fantasy, since the move out of 
screen has been seen to take place, nor as common-sense reality. It is a 
space where Cecilia can play out her daydreams (although not 
omnipotently because Tom and his world also have their independent 
existence) and where the distinction between 'real' and 'non-real' does 
not operate. This film presents a psychic space, where the interplay 
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between Cecilia and her film object takes place as a material one. For 
the playing spectator this place between film and Cecilia represents her 
own potential space. 
Winnicott does not explore further in his two articles on potential 
space, discussed above, what happens when the potential space is not 
'filled' so that it comes to be experienced as actual rather than as 
'potential' - simply stating either 'that in unfavourable circumstances 
the creative use of objects is missing' or, a quite different problem, that 
it becomes 'filled with what is injected into it from someone other 
than the baby' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 110); both have adverse 
consequences for the baby's development. 
However in the following analysis of a scene from Dreyer's Gertrud 
(1962) I explore the process whereby the spectator is drawn into a space 
which is not 'filled with objects and creative playing' (Winnicott, 1971, 
p. 110) but which has become actual: no longer a psychic 'playspace' but 
a void. Such an experience may be the lot of those who have been 
unable for whatever reason to play and for whom the creative use of 
objects is missing. As Susan Deri puts it in 'Transitional Phenomena: 
vicissitudes of symbolisation and creativity', where the mother has 
failed 'to hand over the world to-the child' there is 'a disruption 
between the child and the surrounding inanimate world'. Its 
surroundings feel full of 'useless dead objects' and its inside is 
experienced as a 'seething cauldron of destructive undefined cravings' 
(Deri, 1978, p. 50). From this perspective Gertrud can be seen as a 
woman who is unable to reconcile herself to the loss of an absolute, 
unconditional 'ideal' love; unable to 'mend the gap produced by the 
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absence of the gratifying mother' (ibid). Of herself, Gertrud says: "I want 
love without bounds. " 
As Elizabeth Cowie points out in an essay, 'Stratagems of Desire', 
which discusses Gertrud's desire and that of the spectator in 
Freudian/Lacanian terms (and on whose analysis I am drawing on 
here), this film intriguingly invites a range of spectator identifications 
in spite of its formally distancing spatial and shooting techniques 
(Cowie, 1986, p. 89). The film's point of view is largely set up as 
Gertrud's. Its alienating and disorientating spatial operations, where 
we follow looks of the characters into spaces rather than at each other, 
set up the possibility of the spectator experiencing for herself the 
'disconnectedness' of Gertrud from the outside world and, in 
particular, from her lovers: an experience of cinematic space where 
spaces delineate the gaps and distances between characters rather than 
bridging them by editing and point-of-view reverse shots. 
At a critical point in the breakdown of Gertrud's relationship with her 
lover, Lidman, he lights candles on either side of a blank mirror; and at 
the end of the sequence, blows them out, decisively marking the 
breakdown. The camera dwells long enough on the mirror for the 
spectator to note that it will be significant and to set up an expectation 
of seeing the image of Gertrud in it, and to the extent that she takes on 
the character's viewpoint, her own. This moment is extended long 
enough for the spectator to fear that, in fact, neither she, nor indeed 
anyone, will be reflected there, with the suggestion that she is looking 
at her non-reflection, a nightmare fear of the 'negative hallucination' 
formulated by Andre Green: 'a mirror without reflection, where the 
self-contemplative subject sees no image ... this is the absent' (Green, 
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1978a, p. 288). (For Winnicott, the missing reflection is initially that of 
the mother who fails to reflect back the baby to itself, denying its 
identity; Winnicott, 1967). When Gertrud's image finally appears, the 
effect is unexpected and disturbing: it is of Gertrud's whole body, as if of 
a miniature, like an unreal 'manikin' doll, dressed entirely in black. It 
disrupts the spectator's expectation because it indicates that Gertrud is 
not placed within the bounds of the frame where in classical 
Hollywood she would be for a regular shot-reverse-shot, when only 
half of her body would be seen. 
The delay is also sufficiently extended, and the figure sufficiently 
strange, for the spectator to have the impression of its having been 
'summoned up' by the man's desire, appearing as it does to loom up in 
the mirror as if in a dream, and from his and the spectator's 
unconscious - since it is also the spectator who has seemed to 
summon up the image, by having been given the extended view of the 
empty mirror in which to 'find' herself. 
The next shot further implicates the spectator: Gertrud (whose image 
we now see in the mirror) is addressed from a point at the extreme left 
of the screen to a point that should be well behind the 
camera/audience, far outside the screen-space where we would assume 
her to be placed given that her whole body is reflected in the mirror, 
indicating a large distance from it. The spectator, then, seems to be 
placed between the two speakers, in the middle of the field of action, 
which at this point has extended well beyond the screen boundary. 
Because of a continuing discrepancy between the tiny, but whole, image 
of Gertrud and the habitual expectation of a part-image in the mirror 
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that would have been shown in conventional cinema, this scene 
disrupts our sense of knowing 'where' in it we are. 
It is as though Gertrud, like the character in The Purple Rose of Cairo, 
has stepped out of the screen, but not to join the spectator, rather to 
disappear. Furthermore Gertrud's image appears 'wrong'. Although it 
looks like Gertrud, it also seems doll-like and non-alive, an impression 
emphasised by her black clothes, reinforcing the impression that the 
whole scene has been set up as if for a wake. As the space is also opened 
up behind the spectator by the address off-screen, it creates a sense of a 
gap, clearly articulated as a space which is not 'filled' by a subsequent 
shot of Gertrud, only by her disembodied voice. The space is actualised, 
rather than 'potential', and its unfamiliarity, against the continuity 
editing norm of narrative cinema, emphasises the lack of 
connectedness between the characters, including the spectator. This is a 
space into which the spectator has been drawn not to play but to 
experience loss. When Gertrud's image does appear, it is only to voice 
the ending of her love because of her realisation that the man's love 
for her was insufficient. The voicing of this loss by the unreal image of 
Gertrud suggests that she too has psychically died. Moreover the space 
itself is strange and unfamiliar, large and with undefined boundaries, 
as the speaker looks beyond us. We are left stranded in that space 
between screen and auditorium, our only play object on screen the 
mechanical-looking image of Gertrud, strange and unanimated, 
mouthing its and our loss. 
The space in this scene has worked firstly to project the spectator into 
the mirror, where nothing at first is reflected back so that she finds 
neither the desired object, Gertrud, nor herself and is threatened with 
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the deep-seated anxiety of 'getting nothing back' from the 
mirror/reflection; secondly, to put her into the space in which she is 
placed by a look off-screen and which she experiences as 'actual' rather 
than 'potential: as empty, rather than 'filled with the products of (the) 
creative imagination' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 102). 2 
Material and metaphoric space 
The spaces of cinema are, of course, of a quite different order from 
Winnicott's potential space: for all its illusionism, film space is 
material and literal, and can be perceived by observers in common, 
whereas Winnicott insists that he uses the term 'space' metaphorically: 
'the third world is an inner world ... the locus is not on an inner actual 
place that can be concretised and measured' (Barkin, 1978, p. 524). 
At the same time, however, there is also a sense in which Winnicott's 
use of the term 'potential space' has a material and literal basis. 
Subjectively, we do not simply experience psychic space metaphorically 
but conceive it in material terms as a way of constructing boundaries 
between our internal and external world - as Freud's 'topography' 
persists as a useful way of describing the make-up of the psyche. Andre 
Green notes that the concreteness and specificity of the concept of 
potential space was clearly important to Winnicott, as his use of the 
quotation from Tagore indicates: 'On the seashore of endless worlds, 
children play' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 95). Green himself talks of a 
fascination with the 'interplay between the edge of curtains' (Green, 
2From a different perspective, but relevantly to my argument, Raymond Carney notes a 
number of occasions in the film where mirrors show Gertrud's image without her 
appearing on screen and argues that the effect is of a disorientating 'virtual reality' 
where image becomes more important than substance (Carney, 1989, p. 316). 
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1978b, p. 177). The account of potential space within which 'the 
transitional process occurs and from which emerge transitional objects 
and phenomena' (Barkin, p. 545) is predicated on a notion of material 
space delineated by boundaries; and the account of the developing 
individual is of one 'within its own skin' gradually establishing a sense 
of itself with an 'inside', with a 'limiting membrane' in relation to an 
'outside' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 106). As the infant experiences itself as a 
separate entity, its sense of its own boundary involves a perception of 
other, separate individuals existing in their own, separate spaces. The 
space between the subject and his or her objects is necessarily 
demarcated even though it is not. absolute. 
In her essay 'The use of space during the separation-individuation 
phase' Bergman suggests that the toddler's growing sense of separation 
from others takes place in the actual space around him 'which itself 
has become a precious and protected possession, not part of himself or 
of others' (Bergman, 1978, p. 148). There is a hypothetical moment at 
which the child's sense of itself and its mother as separate objects in 
space is both literal and psychic; the mother 'exists both on the outside 
and inside as an inner presence' (ibid). Winnicott describes the case of a 
boy who used string obsessively both to join and separate himself from 
his mother and other adults (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 15-20), making use of 
material space in this way so as to deal with his sense of his mother as 
'out there' and separate from him, both physically and psychically. Deri 
suggests that, developmentally, 'transitional space is neither 
contiguous nor continuous with the space of reality' but is 'interwoven 
seamlessly with it' (Deri, 1978, p. 48), and stresses the need for a physical 
'good playspace' for the child. 
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For the adult, who, according to Deri, has internalised transitional 
space, Winnicott's use of the term 'potential space' is more clearly 
metaphorical and less dependent on the original notion of physical 
spatial relations. Yet we continue to seek playspaces, both physical and 
psychic, in adulthood. A physical playspace, where games with a 
cultural and emotional significance (the rituals of any ball game for 
instance) take place, has psychic significance. Similarly, I am proposing, 
the film screen-space offers a playspace for the spectator, the material 
space of the film meshing-in with her inner experience. 
Winnicott himself points to and gives examples of the range of spatial 
metaphors that occur in everyday discourse - 'I am at sea, ... in 
seventh heaven' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 104). The subjective experience of 
an equivalence between physical and psychic space seems to me to be 
exactly represented by the expression "I need my own space", which 
expresses both a physical and a psychological need. It is not for nothing 
that feminists have taken up Virginia Woolf's case for the necessity for 
A Room of One's Own (Woolf, 1929) to claim more autonomy over 
themselves and their environment,, indicating how a material space 
may operate as the 'interplay' between an individual and the outer 
world. The general assumption of an underlying correspondence 
between outer, physical space and an inner experience fills out 
Winnicott's formulation of potential space as more than a metaphor. 
Poetry has particular rhetorical means to represent the correspondence 
between inner and outer space through its use of imagery. Two well- 
known examples from Wordsworth, on his childhood, and Yeats, on 
old age, are: 
But huge and mighty Forms that do not live 
Like living men mov'd slowly through my mind 
By day and were the trouble of my dreams. 
(The Prelude, William Wordsworth, 1805, Book 1, lines 425-427) 
I must lie down where all the ladders start 
In the old rag and bone shop of the heart. 
(The Circus Animal's Desertion', W. B. Yeats, ' Complete Works, 1939) 
In a poetry analysis, one would need to examine the means by which 
elision, metaphor and other rhetorical devices yoke together inner and 
outer references to make them equivalent to each other: the 'Forms' 
and the 'shop' have both been transformed into objects that exist in 
both the inner and outer world, and in the process have partly lost 
their identity as physical, recognisable, external objects (the 'shop of the 
heart'; the mysterious 'Forms', that seem to 'live', but not like 'living 
men' and which 'move' but only through the mind). 
While poetry can only refer to space indirectly, the specificity of 
cinematic space by contrast is precisely that it already has a material 
existence: within the frame; between the frame and what it appears to 
'close off' around it; between the screen and the audience. Yet the 
ambiguity of our perception of psychic space is paralleled by that of film 
space. While it exists 'out there' on the screen, the spectator also knows 
(but usually does not take into account) that it is merely the effect of a 
play of light on a flat surface and. lacks a material physical existence. 
Being both material and illusory, it also has a wavering psychical 
existence. The spectator may make use of this ambiguous space in 
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engaging with a film, when her psychic move into her own potential 
space is figured by her move into the screen space. What is at stake for 
the playing spectator is her psychic placing and movement in relation 
to that space and the correlation of two spaces, one psychic, one 
material, each inhabited by an agent. I imagine myself inside a space 
depicted on a screen; I move through a film that has become a film in 
my head. If film space is a metaphor for potential space, which in its 
turn represents a psychic experience, then the spectator registers the 
metaphor, the correspondence between these two orders, concretely, as 
both an inner, psychic space and as the outer space on screen where she 
can find a place. 
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Potential space/film space 
The question of how the spectator thinks, perceives or constructs 
cinematic space is a common concern of film theory; a complementary 
concern is how she, in turn, is psychically placed or positioned in 
relation to that space. I shall examine some accounts of cinematic space 
so as to make a comparison between the placing of their viewer and 
that of the spectator in potential space. 3 
Formalist analyses of cinematic space usually work on the assumption 
that the viewer is 'placed' outside the screen space, and aim to account 
for the formal operations that enable him or her to read that space. For 
example, analyses of the composition of single frames describe how 
depth is constructed in relation to the 'rules' of perspective painting, or 
discuss dramatic relationships between the characters on screen in 
terms of spatial relationships: Bordwell and Thompson (1986) give an 
account of how space and depth is constructed and perceived through 
such features as edges, relative sizes of objects, lighting; Seymour 
Chatman analyses a still from Citizen Kane which he claims 'expresses' 
compositionally a dramatic moment of conflict between Kane and his 
friend Leland Stewart, through such features as the lighting and the 
placing of the two men in relation to each other and to the frame 
(Chatman, 1978, p. 99). Focusing on the film system as a whole, 
formalist writers discuss the means by which classic Hollywood cinema 
constructs an apparent spatial/ temporal coherence as part of its 
continuity system: the 180-degree rule, eyeline match, consistency in 
entrances and exits. 
3As in the previous section I am taking 'cinematic space' to refer to the viewer's psychic 
relationship to the action on screen: to the 'narrative space'. 
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These accounts of how cinematic space is articulated tend to have little 
to say about the spectator, on the assumption that she is simply the 
receiver of the body of formal devices the writers delineate. The 
spectator is written into, or indeed out of, the impersonal critical 
discourse, which assumes that there is a direct correspondence between 
what it presents as being in the text under scrutiny and the viewer's 
perception of it. In a formalist analysis the spectator-of-the-film is 
assumed to be conterminous with the reader-of-the-critical-text about 
the film; the spectator is embedded within the analytic discourse about 
the text and in the process the viewing subject is lost as a separate object 
of analysis, even, in some cases, in discussion of off-screen space. For 
example, Noel Burch's description of the off-screen space as consisting 
of 'six segments' (four faces from the four sides of the screen, a space 
behind the camera, and a 'space' behind the frame) is a formal 
approach which discusses cinematic space in terms of the relationship 
between the visible and non-visible elements and its formal/ aesthetic 
organisation (Burch, 1969, p. 17). Also taking a deliberately formal 
approach, against the grain for representational cinema, Wyborny 
(1987), as part of an attempt to describe the 'grammar' of classic cinema, 
discusses ways in which continuity editing apparently serves to weld 
together on- and off-screen space. 
Yet, at the same time, even these formalist writers introduce a notional 
spectator into their analyses, as if from an assumption that 'off-screen' 
space is that of reality, and therefore a part of the viewer's world ('the 
universe itself' (Heath, 1981, p 25): since the very notion of off-screen 
space is hypothetical - until it becomes on-screen space - it comes to 
be discussed in terms of a 'someone' who can conceptualise its 
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hypothetical existence. Burch (1969) discusses off-screen space as having 
a 'fluctuating' existence for the spectator, and Wyborny (1987) explores 
the spectator's ability to 'speculate' about and 'construct' off-screen 
space. Bordwell makes this process more explicit, arguing that, in 
practice, all traditional, mainstream film theory assumes an 'ideal' 
spectator: it 'creates a perspective eye for cinema, one we can call the 
invisible observer' (Bordwell, 1985, p. 9). This acknowledges the 
presence of the viewing subject with a separate existence outside the 
screen and film-play. 
Stephen Heath's argument in 'Narrative Space' (1981), which takes up 
the question of how film 'places' the spectator, encompasses cinematic 
space, the narrative system as a whole and psychic space. Like other 
writers concerned with the subject/ spectator constructed by the film- 
signifying system, Heath assumes that the spatial operations of 
narrative cinema can have psychic effects; for him these psychic effects 
are necessarily ideological. First published in Screen in 1976, his essay 
reflects the interest of film studies of that time in the ideological effects 
of cinema, which drew on a combination of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and a Brechtian, subversive approach to dominant theatre. Hence the 
article offers an analysis and deconstruction of the viewing subject of 
classical cinema as 'the point of a sure and centrally embracing view' 
(Heath, 1981, p. 32). 
In addressing the question of how the spectator is constructed by 
classical cinema, Heath draws on the rules of Renaissance perspective 
painting, which were adopted by classical cinema and which always 
'centre' the viewer at a stable point, placing him in the position of the 
one who appears to 'see everything'. Acknowledging the greater 
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complexity of the cinematic system, but maintaining as his reference 
point its perspective space, Heath analyses the means by which 
narrative cinema subordinates formal, compositional 'space' to 'place' 
and 'action'; and, through the operations of its continuity editing, 
succeeds in 'binding in' the spectator to its own system of unity and 
centredness. Klaus Wyborny (1987), both critic and film maker, goes 
further in this approach to cinematic space and the spectator in offering 
an expose both of the 'deceitfulness' of dominant cinema in its 
'pretence' of being realistic, and, by the same token, of the gullibility of 
the viewer in accepting cinema's 'realistic' conventions: 'narrative 
cinema is a matter of a meagre collection of little artifices to which the 
spectator reacts with Pavlovian certainty'. His spectator is one who 
entirely accepts the illusion of a 'connection between units of space and 
time not naturally connected' (Wyborny, 1987. p. 114). 
These different approaches to the viewer's relationship to cinematic 
space concur in the assumption that cinema definitively (and 
deceptively) places the spectator in a passive, fixed position. Heath is 
concerned with the spectator as a 'subject in process', constructed by the 
operations of the film: film is a 'a series of relations with the spectator 
it imagines, plays and sets as subject to its movement' (Heath, 1981, 
p. 52). Nevertheless, he proposes that the ideological function of 
dominant cinema is in the end to set up the spectator as fixed and 
unified: as in classical perspective painting, the subject 'in play' is 
transformed into the unified subject of dominant cinema. Through the 
operations of perspective space, cinematic narrative and movement - 
a movement which sets up desire, but a desire which is regulated and 
controlled by the continuity editing system - the spectator is placed 
'immobile' in front of the screen, fixed finally in the 'retotalisation of 
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the Imaginary' (ibid, p. 57). The Lacanian Mirror stage where the subject 
miscognises itself as unified is aligned with the 'centred' place of the 
viewer of perspective painting, which in its turn represents the 
Renaissance version of a unified subjectivity. 
Heath argues in this essay that only avant-garde cinema or moments of 
disturbance in dominant cinema can challenge this position; he 
analyses such a moment in Hitchcock's Suspicion and takes the 
discussion further in an analysis of a sequence from Oshima Nagisa's 
Death by Hanging (1976). This, he claims, undermines the spectator's 
expectation of being presented with the centred space of dominant 
narrative - the assumption being that, in the process, the film 
constructs an alternative viewing subject, who is neither centred in 
spatial terms, nor fixed and unified as a viewing subject: the spatial 
disorientation in the film is assumed to necessarily involve a psychic 
one. (Heath, 1981, p. 66-9). In this part of Heath's discussion, however, 
the spectator-as-subject is taken up into the analytic formal discourse in 
the way that I have suggested happens in formalist accounts, and 
disappears as an object of analysis. As a result, it is difficult in the end 
to locate Heath's alternative viewing subject anywhere than as an effect 
of the film's system which constructs and absorbs the spectator. 
The tyranny of dominant cinema that Heath and others posit places the 
viewer firmly outside the film at the apex of the triangle of spatial 
perspective, while in the process it binds him in to its narrative and 
ideological operations. This conception of the spectator relates to that 
proposed by Metz, in 'The Imaginary signifier'; his proposition is also 
that cinema 'fixes' the spectator in an Imaginary state analogous to 
Lacan's mirror stage: the spectator expects to be 'reflected' on screen. 
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Given the possibility of exploring identification with characters on- 
screen that this perspective might seem to offer, it is notable that Metz 
disregards such 'secondary' identification and asserts only the 
spectator's identification with 'himself as pure act of perception'. 
Because 'this mirror (the screen) returns us everything but ourselves ... 
we are wholly outside it' (Metz, 1982, p. 49). However caught up in the 
narrative process she might be, the spectator remains outside the 
screen. 
In contrast to these writers I will now consider three who, from very 
different perspectives, construct a spectator that can be construed as 
being 'on screen': Andre Bazin, Laura Mulvey and Andre Green, who 
writes on theatre. Bazin is cited as a prime example of the 
mimetic/realist approach to cinema, criticised because of its tendency to 
ignore the constructed and mediating basis of film. His fundamental 
premise about cinema is that it can re-present or reveal the 
phenomenal world to the spectator: 'the image is evaluated not 
according to what it adds to reality but what it reveals of it' (Bazin, 1969, 
p. 28). As Heath points out, for Bazin this is achieved most clearly 
through the representation of space, hence his apparent assumption 
that the relation between on-and-off screen space functions - or 
should appear to do so - as a screening off, or a framing, of part of the 
real world (Heath, 1981, p. 42). Similarly Bazin's preference for the use 
of deep space and long takes is based on the premise that it can 'reveal', 
in an apparently unmediated fashion, the pro-filmic world for the 
contemplation of the viewer: 'they bring the spectator into a relation 
with an image closer to that which he enjoys with reality' (Bazin, 1969, 
p. 35) and provide an opportunity 'for a more active mental attitude' 
(ibid). Duration is an important factor in this process: as Henderson 
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puts it, for Bazin the long take time gives the spectator the opportunity 
to peruse the screen-scene, which includes both the characters and 
setting, and which, being in real time, constitutes the 'time's event' 
(Henderson, 1971, p. 315). Such perusal returns the viewer to the 
phenomenal external world which, for Bazin, it is film's function to 
reveal. 
From the perspective of the playing spectator duration is relevant in 
other ways: for example, an establishing shot or sequence may serve as 
an invitation to the spectator to 'enter' the screen place and her own 
transitional space; a landscape which remains for an unusually long 
time unpopulated, as in Antonioni's films, (as if 'waiting' for its 
characters to appear) may represent either the possibility for a playspace 
or the threat of emptiness for the spectator. For Nowell-Smith (1964) 
this psychologically distances the spectator from Antonioni's 
characters; however, for the spectator in potential space, the absence of 
the film characters may serve rather as an invitation to find her own 
place on screen. 
Bazin's spectator is assumed to be placed outside the screen, 'presented' 
with a film which reveals aspects of the phenomenal world and reality. 
However, this view of the spectator is inflected by Bazin's 
philosophical background, which includes Henri Bergson's non- 
mechanistic view of the world, a kind of animism (Dudley, 1978). From 
this perspective reality is not a simple empiricist's encounter with an 
external, phenomenal world but an inner experience of unity with it. 
The purpose of cinema then becomes to 'reveal' and even to give the 
spectator an experience of this unity. Bazin's view of what 'reality' is 
may reconcile the apparent contradiction between his view of cinema 
74 
as a realist medium and his acknowledgement of its constructedness; 
for example as Henderson (1971), critical of Bazin, points out, Bazin 
'explains' the stylisation of Murnau's films as an attempt to bring out 
the deeper, underlying structure of reality. Although the relation of 
spectator to the screen image is presented by Bazin in the first place as 
one of looking - or contemplation - unlike the other theorists on 
space cited above, this also involves an intimate, psychic interaction 
with what is presented on screen as a re-presentation of the 
relationship between the individual and the external world. In Bazin's 
terms this is not a passive state but one of active concentration and 
awareness. Accordingly, although the spectator is 'outside' the film 
space, the experience of 'seeing' implies a seeing 'beyond' the 
phenomenal world to a reality where she is also a part of what she sees. 
This begins to move Bazin's position towards a view - although it is a 
very specific one - of the spectator as participating in and being a part 
of the film: from this perspective Bazin's spectator may take up a place 
on screen as a means of re-encountering the phenomenal world. 
Laura Mulvey's definition of the 'passive' (feminine) and 'active' 
(masculine) spectator offers an intriguing possibility of a 'spectator on 
screen' which, however, she presents negatively, and does not pursue. 
Her seminal paper, 'Narrative cinema and visual pleasure' (1975), 
about the nature of the masculine/feminine viewing position, which 
has become a recurring motif, much critiqued, in debates in feminist 
film criticism, draws on both Freud and Lacan to point up the 
importance of the look as a means of structuring film narrative in 
cinema. Mulvey constructs a spectator who 'owns' the look and who is 
'masculinised' in being defined as active not passive in relation to the 
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film's narrative system. In these terms the female spectator is 
consigned either to identifying herself in the passive position as the 
object of the look, along with the female character on screen, or to 
taking on the masculine, active position of looking. Identification with 
the female protagonist offers only a position which is at best a 
narcissistic pleasure of looking at herself being looked at - and at 
worst a masochistic one, as a willing object of the sadistic, voyeuristic 
and fetishistic masculine gaze. Mulvey's masculinised spectator does 
the looking from the outside, usually off-screen; the female is 'on 
screen' and is looked at. 
What is elided by Mulvey's account of the look in terms of its 
male/female power relations is an exploration of the experience of 
being the object of the look; of being, that is, 'on screen. 4 This may 
firstly involve the wish to take on the passive position of the object of 
the look which, as Ann Kaplan points out, 'may be an inherent 
component of both male and female eroticism' (Kaplan, 1983, p. 31) - 
although, as a social phenomenon, wishing to please the looker in 
everyday life is arguably a position to which women are particularly 
conditioned; in fantasy the wish to be looked at is associated with a 
regressive narcissistic and masochistic wish which is available to the 
male as well as to the female spectator (Rodowick, 1991, p. 12). 
Beyond this, however, the place on screen that Mulvey assigns to the 
female may be that which, precisely, the Winnicottian, playing 
spectator wishes to take up. Mulvey's female spectator/protagonist, 
4 The active spectator has for Mulveya surrogate 'on screen' the (male) character who 
also owns the look. The focus remains on a subject-object relationship, in which the 
'object of the look' remains unmovably on screen. 
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who seems to have no voice and no position from which to speak 
except from the point of view of masculine desire, may have 
something to offer the playing spectator precisely because she is defined 
only in relation to the 'male gaze' and therefore not yet defined at all 
in her own terms. Mulvey does not enter her psyche and explore her 
desires, as she does that of the male voyeuristic spectator; the 'object of 
desire' remains uncharted, the 'enigma' of femininity of Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. As an 'absence' in the male narrative 
structure, the image of the female protagonist on screen remains a 
blank, a tabula rasa on which the spectator may inscribe her own 
consciousness, history and desire, existing there to be discovered and 
re-made by the playing spectator who takes up that position to rework 
and replay her own wishes and scenarios. 
Once the spectator has psychically stepped over the boundary onto the 
screen, to take the place of the 'blank' representation of the female 
protagonist, then the narrative that she constructs is given substance by 
an intermeshing of her own desires with those that the film plays out. 
In these terms, the source of the narrative does not reside solely with 
the spectator who looks; the playing spectator participates from her 
place on screen. 5 
Theatre space/film space 
The possibility of the spectator 'moving' into the diegetic space is 
explored in Andre Green's account of potential space in the theatre. 
Green is a French analyst and literary critic who, in the 1960s, was 
influenced by Lacan but increasingly began to see Winnicott's 
5 This is pursued in my account (below) of Brown's essay on Stagecoach (1975, ch. 3). 
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particular approach to object relations as relevant to his work during 
the 1970s, in common with a growing number of French analysts 
(Clancier 1987, pp. 119-25). He retains from Lacan an emphasis, though a 
diminished one, on language, which, as he says, Winnicott virtually 
ignores, and on a split subject (Green 1978a, p. 290). However, he also 
uses the concept of the transitional object and potential space in both 
his clinical and literary work, refashioning it somewhat from his own 
perspective but clearly seeing it as important in both areas. Green draws 
particularly productively from both Lacan and Winnicott in essays on 
drama and fiction to construct his own formulation, for instance on 
writing/reading, and creativity generally, in his essay relating 
psychoanalysis and criticism, 'The double and the absent' (1978a). 
In an essay on clinical work, following Winnicott, Green posits the 
purpose of analysis: 'the essential feature is no longer interpreting but 
enabling the subject to live out creative experiences of a new category 
of objects' (Green 1978b p. 176), and he re-formulates the analytic setting 
as a potential space where an 'analytic object' can be created, made up 
of 'the double' of the analyst and of the patient, which the patient can 
eventually 'reconstitute in the outer world through cultural 
experience, through sublimation, and more generally through the 
possibility of pairing' (p. 180). 
This concept may clearly be applied to the film viewer relationship, the 
'double' of film and spectator being reconstructed within the potential 
space of the film-viewing process, related but not equivalent to the 
'film' and the 'subject' outside that relationship. This notion relates to 
that of a subject in process in those psychoanalytic film studies which 
are concerned with the subject of film constructed within the film- 
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viewing set-up, but it places more emphasis on the mutuality of the 
process. Here there is no question of the spectator being 'fixed' by the 
film, nor, the other way round, of the film being 'fixed' as a system in 
the way that the formalist critics propose. Rather, the film and spectator 
'double', the amalgam that is constructed, emerges out of the interplay 
between spectator and film. The spectator now has available this new 
object to take away with her after the film is over, a notion I take up in 
the final chapter of this thesis, where I explore the spectator's use of the 
film object. 
Of particular relevance to film studies is Green's combining of notions 
of the look, the basis for much recent psychoanalytic work on 
cinema/ spectator relations, with potential space in his account of 
spectator processes in the theatre. This is presented in the Prologue to a 
collection of his essays on drama, The Tragic Effect (Green, 1979). He 
describes the spectator as being taken into the theatre space - or rather 
theatre spaces - through mechanisms that involve the spectator's 
gaze, a notion of potential space and different kinds of boundaries, both 
psychic and material. 
Green suggests that this process takes place in several stages. The 
spectator first leaves the space of the outside world by entering the 
theatre, where the walls of the auditorium represent the boundary 
between the spectator-subject and his external objects. Although Green 
himself does not posit it in these terms at this point, the theatre may 
clearly represent a potential space, a location for cultural activity. The 
spectator can leave the world of objects behind, withdraw from his 
habitual need to negotiate that world and go into the theatre 'as a 
resting place' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 2): in short for entertainment. Equally 
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clearly the same can apply to the film theatre. The setting and rituals of 
both cinema and theatre - such as the illuminated screen or stage and 
the darkness surrounding the spectator, the clearly marked beginning 
and ending, the behaviour patterns - all signal theatre/cinema-going 
as a 'movement' into what may also be experienced as a psychic move 
into potential space. Both the theatre and cinema are psychically 
privileged and specific places, serving as a materialisation of the 
psychic domain. 6 
Green goes on to discuss the next stage of the spectator's psychic 
processes, as the play begins. The boundary between the world of 
objects and the subject is now represented by the boundary between the 
stage and the auditorium, so that, in the clearly marked moment of the 
curtain rising and lights going out, the spectator's negotiation with the 
external world is replaced by his negotiation with the stage world: 'the 
relationship of otherness between the subject and the world is replaced 
by the otherness of the spectator in respect of the objects of the gaze' 
(Green, 1979, p. 4). If, to go further than Green, this negotiation can now 
be seen as happening both within the 'potential space where 
everything is permissible' (Clare Winnicott, 1978, p. 29), and yet at the 
same time operating also as a simple substitute for the subject's 
encounter with external objects, then it seems to me that the spectator's 
'belief' in what is happening on stage has the opportunity of being 
doubly reinforced: she will take for granted the 'reality' of the stage 
events, as a replication of what she takes for granted as reality in the 
6 This thesis does not deal with video watching. Whereas the video spectator's 
encounter with the film/video fiction can move her into and take place within 
potential space, as any fiction can, the set-up of video watching is less immediately 
inducive in spatial and setting terms of that psychic shift. Nevertheless, video 
watchers create their own rituals and since video viewing can more easily involve talk 
the construction of the film object for playing can become a group process. 
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external world. In her potential space this replication allows her to 
suspend disbelief, to abandon her habitual reality-testing and engage 
instead with the 'reality' of the drama. 
However Green suggests that the 'replacement' of stage-for-world is 
more complex. At the point of the encounter of the spectator's gaze 
with the scene on stage, as it meets and crosses the boundary between 
auditorium and stage, the third boundary comes into play: that 
between on-stage and off-stage. This is the boundary between 'the 
visible theatrical space' and the 'invisible theatrical space', where the 
'illusion' is formed and the 'false is fabricated' (Green, 1979, p. 4) - the 
space which, for the spectator, now represents the unconscious. This 
'hidden' space appears to be the source of all that is spoken and shown 
on stage, where there seems to remain merely the trace of what is 
unsaid and has been repressed. This boundary between stage and off- 
stage, between conscious and unconscious, can never be traversed: 
repression cannot be gainsaid. 
The mechanism by which Green suggests that the spectator comes to be 
psychically placed on stage is to do with what happens to the gaze as it 
encounters the spectacle there. As it hits the boundary between stage 
and theatre, the spectator's gaze is 'sent back' to him. Already the 
'otherness' of the spectacle has been modified for the spectator by the 
fact of his interest and engagement (as it has to be, or he would leave 
the theatre) and by a sensed inherent identity between object and 
subject, originating from the Lacanian Mirror stage.? As a result, now 
7"Certainly, the tableau is in my eye. But I, I am in the tableau ... in the scopic 
relation, the subject hangs in an essential vacillation on a fantasy which hinges on a 
specific object: the look"' (Lacan, quoted in Willemen, 1976, p. 42) 
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'the gaze explores the stage from the point at which the spectator is 
himself observed' (Green, p. 5): the spectator is already there, on the 
stage, in the guise of the other. 
The greatest and most decisive lure to the spectator comes at the next 
moment - in fact it is simultaneous - as the 'gaze suffers a second 
reversal' because it is unable to cross the boundary to offstage, the 
untransgressable barrier of repression. Yet because the stage spectacle 
seems so decisively to be only a trace of what has been repressed (what 
is 'unsaid'), and to be hiding the truth, it holds the spectator in thrall: 
'it is as if these objects ought not to have been in full view, yet by some 
incomprehensible paradox, will not allow the perceiver ever to escape 
them' (Green, P. Q. The spectator remains bound-in to an expectation of 
and desire for the return of what has been repressed and to a search for 
the solution to the enigma of the source of what is said on stage. 
Moreover this is also a search for himself, since the secondary 
elaboration of the play's text of the primary unconscious (off-stage) 
material 'blocks the view of the original source where the subject 
would have to recognise his own silhouette' (p. 5). Green likens this 
experience to the negative hallucination, the subject's experience of 
looking in the mirror without seeing his own image, only 'all the 
elements of the setting around him', and to the 'dream space where 
one sees without seeing, hears without hearing' (p. 5). The engaged 
spectator is bound-in to the search for the missing image of himself. 
What Green offers, then, is an account of how the spectator becomes 
engaged with a drama, by both her failure and success in crossing 
boundaries in psychic/theatre spaces. Following Winnicott, Green 
proposes three psychic spaces: the area in which the subject interacts 
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with the outer world; the domain of the unconscious; and the potential 
space. (Although Green does not take it this far, moving into the area 
of potential space could also involve the possibility of opening up 
access to the 'backstage' unconscious material that underlies and 
motivates the play in performance. ) 
I have argued that entering both the theatre and the cinema can give 
the spectator an experience of potential space. Green examines the 
psychic mechanisms activated by. the spectator's look in respect of the 
action on-stage; however he suggests that this process cannot be the 
same for cinema: 'this space is circumscribable, confined within the 
walls of the great chamber that is the theatre ... [whereas in the cinema] 
... the chamber 
is the camera but the entire world may be swallowed up 
in it [which makes it] impossible to explore these means as a lure for 
the cinema spectator' (Green, 1979, p. 5). 
There are various possible rationales for this assertion: for instance that 
in the theatre the spectator is contained in the same space as the actors 
and the spectacle, and, as Metz points out (addressing the status of 
cinema very differently from Green), the simultaneous actual presence 
of actors and spectator makes for 'a promise' of 'real' negotiable object 
relations that cinema denies (Metz, 1982, p. 63). Secondly, and nearer to 
what Green is suggesting, the boundaries of cinema are less clearly 
defined than those of theatre. In particular, there is no clearly defined 
'off screen' space like the off-stage space in the theatre, hence no area 
that is positively and fixedly defined as for ever inaccessible, 'where the 
plotting takes place': no hidden space that may function as a stand-in 
for the spectator's unconscious, and which may therefore lure her into 
the stage space/play in the way that Green suggests. 
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I would argue however that, in a sense, cinema can offer more in these 
terms than the theatre, for the spectator is repeatedly 'given back', in 
every change of shot that reveals new space, the off-screen space that 
the previous shot has denied her. In the cinema, the manifest action, 
the 'plot', as Green terms it, in distinction to the off-stage 'plotting', 
seems itself to extend to off-screen space by means of the movement 
from shot to shot. In this case, there may no sense of a'forbidden, space 
that can never be transgressed, since off-screen space repeatedly 
becomes naturalised and known. 
If, on the other hand, off-screen space may, in the moment before it is 
'given back', be experienced, as Green suggests of the theatre, after all as 
forbidden and standing in for the unconscious, then the boundaries to 
it are transgressed with every cut, and what is hidden is always being 
revealed. It is as if there no are no limits to what the spectator may 
'find out' in the rather covert, guilty pleasures of cinema; as though 
she is allowed to imagine scenes which, for a moment - for the 
duration of a shot - are off screen and inaccessible, but which in fact 
may be given to her each time in the following shot. While, therefore, 
on the one hand, this process may negate the idea of an encounter with 
the unconscious - since everything is made conscious - on the other 
hand, by giving access to the ostensibly forbidden off-screen space, 
cinematic operations seem to make access to the unconscious more 
possible. Each single shot sets up the desire for what may be (but is not 
yet) revealed by the next: cinema functions as tease and seducer. 
Central to the view that cinema/ spectator relations are determined by 
the spectator's look is an assertion of the distance of the spectator from 
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the screen: controlling, and voyeuristic. The spectator's place in 
relation to the screen space remains the same as criticism has 
traditionally assumed - outside it. Green's argument introduces an 
alternative account of the mechanism of the look, which provides a 
useful model for considering how the workings of cinematic space may 
implicate the spectator in its action on screen. 
This possibility, I argue, is intrinsic to the process of getting 'involved', 
or 'caught up', in a film narrative. At certain moments, determined by 
a film operations as well as by a subjective, psychic trigger, we 'cross' 
the screen barrier and psychically step over into the action of the film, 
moving into the space of the film, to the place of the screen-playing, as 
by the same token our psychic operations 'move' us into the potential 
space where our own playing takes place. 
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Meet me in St. Louis: the opening - an invitation into 
potential space 
The work of the opening of the Meet me in St. Louis for the playing 
spectator is to make available for the spectator a place on screen and to 
set up her psychic move into her own potential space. It also establishes 
the setting of the narrative, introduces the main characters, locates 
them within both their physical environment (the Smith's house, 
inside and out) and in their relationship to each other, and introduces 
the film as a musical .8 
The film opens with an extra-diegetic chorus singing the title song 
'Meet me in St. Louis, meet me at* the Fair' as the credits roll on. A 
background chorus invites the listener to meet an unknown speaker 
('me') at the Fair, in a story-like town at a particular moment in history 
(1904) with a promise of imaginary childhood pleasures and 
excitement. In its direct first-second person address the film announces 
itself as discourse, with a place for the spectator. This is a first 
invitation into potential space, the domain of playing: as Britton (1978) 
points out, the historical moment of the actual city is transformed into 
an idealised setting for a family romance (p. 4). The city will become the 
displaced focus for the family's wishes and fears of change, and the fair 
a metaphor for a young girl's growth into sexuality and assumption of 
her family's and society's values. The city takes on the qualities of a 
'real' (essentially a contradiction in terms) utopia (Dyer, 1977). It is an 
actual city, holding an actual historical event, but, at the same time, the 
81n a detailed analysis of this establishing sequence Beth Genne (1983) focuses on 
'Minnelli s style': the use of the moving boom camera, for which Minnelli was 
renowned; his composition, decor, colour and light; and in particular, for this sequence 
and film, the co-ordination of the music with the movement of camera and characters, 
to produce 'an integrated musical'. 
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projection of the film's characters' desires at particular moments in the 
film; in the address to the spectator, her wishes and fantasies are also 
evoked. 
The singer-speaker is anonymous, consisting simply of the voices of 
the chorus - the chorus that 'takes over' in the way familiar to 
musicals, from the narrative character once s/he has established s/he is 
singing. This moves the spectator outside the film space. The song 
begins momentarily before the credits, with a muted fanfare which will 
herald each new episode and the Fair itself, so at this moment there is 
not yet any place for the spectator except in the singing, no speaker 
except the singer - except that there is also the suggestion of a dance: 
the song is in 3/4 time and is in fact taken up as a traditional waltz a 
few minutes into the film, by the old-style grandfather dancing. If we 
project ourselves into a place where there is speaking, but no one is 
there, the speaker becomes ourselves, speaking our wishes. So, the 
spectator at this moment has the possibility of two positions: both 
outside the film's diegesis (which. is barely yet established) but also 
already in the screen, narrative space as speaker and receiver of the 
invitation. 
To begin the film with a song/dance, without a competing visual 
element, may serve as a particularly strong invitation to enter the 
intermediate domain. As there is nothing, or no-one, concretely 'out 
there' - the music being disembodied - the music is internalised, 
and the spectator 'put back' into herself. It is as if the film is already 
embedding itself in the spectator's own psyche, so that the image that 
will in a moment emerge onto the screen will seem to be partly 
projected from herself. 
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The dance beat also ties in the music and the movement to the verbal 
signifiers, the down beat accenting the words, Meet, (St) Louis and Fair; 
the invitation, the place and the magical fair. The difficulty in resisting 
the dance comes, precisely, from a physical response to the 'catchy' 
tune and rhythm - the spectator's body moving, even inwardly, to the 
fast beat inside the emphatic down beat swing which contains and 
frames it; the rhythm is measured but with an underlying sense of 
excitement, in the faster pulse which is barely contained and which 
could break out (as the feet of the waltzers move quickly inside the 
slower sway of their bodies, each contained by the other). In this way 
this dance tune can be registered as representative of a delimited zone, 
yet one where, in terms of playing and fantasy, anything might be 
possible. The invitation is taken up from the song - which moves on 
to announce the other theme tunes, both on the sound track and on 
the credits - by the 'greeting card' device, which introduces each 
episode of the film. This also suggests an invitation, though less 
markedly than the sung invitation, to the fair (a greeting card may or 
may not be an invitation) and again from an anonymous speaker. 
At first the card consists only of a wavy, rather ornate border, marking 
the sense of period, against a dark blue background, the inner part of 
the card, which so far (although in fact momentarily) remains blank 
and empty. This recalls the framing of the film screen, defining the 
space of the film's action, marking it off as a seemingly separated space, 
a framing-off from the world, within which another world is given 
form. 
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This blank greeting card offers the experience of potential space in 
various ways: firstly in that its central space is materially 'potential', a 
space to be filled, where the subject 'waits' to discover and make the 
form that will emerge from or be put into it; secondly as an invitation 
for the subject to 'move' into it psychically and metaphorically, as she 
psychically shifts into potential space. The sense of material, 
perspective space in depth established by the dark blue background is 
important because it suggests iconically the space of action and 
movement, rather than that of a flat surface. Thirdly, the blank space 
has something of the quality of a mandala, a space onto which the 
looker can project the images that arise in meditation, conceived as the 
images of an aspiration for unity with an inner self or God. In 
psychoanalytic terms this is a space for the projection of the looker's 
desire; the two longings converge in a desire for a lost unity, with God, 
or with the Mother. The specific offering of this film is the possibility of 
projecting onto the screen-play wishes that have already been set up 
around childhood pleasures in the utopian town, prefigured in the 
title, the credits and the song. 
What the space actually becomes 'filled' with is a picture of a house 
(the Smith's family house) set right back, with a coach and horse in the 
foreground. This will be the home of the film, the major site of its and 
our wishes. 
Here, just before the film is set in motion, I will pause to consider 
where the spectator is now placed. She may have been inwardly 
singing along with the theme song and moving with the dance rhythm 
of its beat as both receiver and speaker of the invitation. The 
subject/enunciator of the singing, where language is giving way to 
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bodily movement, is already in a discourse that is different from what 
we habitually engage in and with which we negotiate our relations 
with the outer world. At the same time, as receiver of the invitation, 
without being able to respond to - in part because the song has already 
moved on to others - we are also receivers of the film, waiting to see 
what will be presented and for it to take us on its pre-determined route. 
Our position, that is, is analogous to that of the baby in potential space 
in relation to a transitional object. It will both 'find' and 'create' what 
the mother will present: the great paradox of the intermediate area. As 
with the baby, both our passive, receiving and our active, making 
positions are in operation at the same time. We will both make and 
receive the film; we will be 'in' it but not 'fixed' by it. 
The camera moves forward, in a movement that takes the spectator 
towards the house (the perspective is well marked in this picture) and 
which leaves the image of the coach and horse to the far left, all but the 
horse's head off frame; a framing which, if continued, could be 
disconcerting. 
At this point however the picture comes to life; the coach and horse 
begin to move, right, towards centre across the screen; the movie story 
has begun. The moment is marked but, happening quickly and fluidly, 
not strongly; the magic of an inanimate object coming to life is also 
given as 'natural'. In the illusion making of potential space, pictures 
simply come to life. This too recalls the moment of play and illusion 
when the baby has the sense of making what is in fact presented to it, 
with an accompanying sense of excitement and power -a power, 
which, however far from constricting or forcing its object, brings 
something to life, makes it happen. In potential space the question of 
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who makes the coach move and sets the story in motion, is irrelevant, 
and not asked. Certainly it involves the spectator as she is taking part, 
and is moved into the picture, in the very moment of its coming alive. 
The camera tracking right maintains this involvement for the 
spectator, in a movement which'recalls the fundamental exhilaration 
and surprise of the cinema as moving pictures. 
In a typical Minnelli movement a boy on a bicycle goes towards the 
house, is tracked by the camera, and in a rapid, fluid dissolve we are 
taken into the kitchen, further into the space of the story and image, to 
the centre of the Smith's house, the 'heart' of the family, the setting for 
their and our story. The spectator is in place, and the story-playing is 
about to begin. 
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Chapter 3 THE PLAYING SPECTATOR 
And on the basis of playing is built the whole of man's 
experiential existence. No longer are we either introvert or 
extrovert. We experience life in the area of transitional 
phenomena, in the exciting interweave of subjectivity and 
objective observation, and in an area that is intermediate between 
the inner reality of the individual and the shared reality of the 
world that is external to individuals. 
(D. W. Winnicott, 1971, p. 64) . 
In the previous chapter I argued that the interaction of the spectator's 
move into potential space and the film's operations enables her 
psychically to find a 'place' on screen. In concrete terms I go on to 
consider the question: finding herself in the screen-space, how does the 
spectator now take up a place in the action of the film-play? In this and 
the following two chapters I pose two possibilities: that she may either 
take an active part, in which she retains autonomy in relation to the 
filmic process, the position that I am designating as playing; or she may 
take a passive position, caught up in an unconscious structure over 
which she has little control, a point at which her playing breaks down. 
These two positions, 'active' and 'passive', which I also designate as 
'conscious' and 'unconscious', are closely linked and easily merge into 
each other, since by willingly taking up a playing position the spectator 
may also open herself to the passive position that catches her 
unawares. Moreover, as a transitional mode, playing is always 
informed by both the inner (unconscious) and the external (conscious) 
domains. At the same time, paradoxically, as a derivative of the 
transitional object, as a bridge, playing also keeps these domains 
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separate and the percolation of unconscious into conscious can be 
mediated - managed and made use of by the subject. 
When I go on to discuss the 'breakdown' of playing I will be 
considering those instances when the subject is 'taken over' by the 
unconscious, retreats to her inner world and therefore, momentarily at 
least, can no longer play. At all times the boundaries between inner 
and outer, unconscious and conscious are tenuous and fluctuating; and 
I will discuss the shifting relationship and movement between them in 
varying terms in these three chapters, as I explore playing, fantasy, 
psychic reality and the unconscious. In this chapter I will propose that 
the central feature of the playing spectator is a full and active 
participation in the minute-by-minute process of the film-play, and 
that this is an experience that gives her a sense of creative control. 
Winnicott's account of playing extends and develops his concept of 
transitional phenomena and of potential space as the location for 
cultural activity. As a derivative of transitional phenomena playing 
becomes a vital and pervasive psychic process for the adult as well as 
the child. Although he was to diverge from them significantly, 
Winnicott's notion of playing also had its origins in Freud (who 
theorised about playing) and Klein (who used playing to practise the 
psychoanalysis of children). While playing is seen as a conscious ego- 
related activity, all three psychoanalysts emphasise, in different ways 
and using different terms, a close relationship, even a continuum, 
between playing and the unconscious. 
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For Freud, playing begins with children's fantasy and make-believe 
games, which are both underpinned by unconscious processes. In 
'Creative Writers and Daydreaming' (1908), he argues that adults' 
daydreaming has its origins in children's make-believe play and 
suggests a continuum between both these activities and popular 
fictional romance (today the same point may be applied to Hollywood 
cinema). He emphasises the child's emotional investment in its 
playing, which is replaced by the writer's attitude to his fiction. In both 
cases the question of the activities' relation to reality is not an issue that 
concerns those engaged in them. 
Freud's analysis of the relationship between daydreaming, children's 
playing and fiction throws up the difficulty in practice of drawing clear 
demarcation lines between different forms of play and fantasy, and 
suggests a reason for the overlap in the use of the two terms. If, for 
instance, we take dreaming to be one end of the continuum of a 
fantasising process which is quite clearly not under the subject's 
conscious control, and fiction-making as being clearly a conscious 
process, the lines of demarcation are nevertheless unclear: novelists 
habitually speak of their characters 'visiting' them or refusing to do 
what their authors want while, on the other hand, even the course of a 
dream may be subject to modification by the dreamer. 
In everyday life, too, the lines between different modes and levels of 
playing and fantasising easily merge. If 'no human being is free from 
the strain of relating inner and outer reality' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 13), in 
that process we continually remake stories about our own histories and 
those of other people, and invent scenarios for our futures to match 
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our desires. The levels of 'reality' in such activity are not easy to 
distinguish. 
For example, thinking about the practicalities of such an apparently 
mundane matter as a committee meeting may seem a realistic, practical 
matter. Yet while the wish to get one's point of view accepted may be a 
matter of external convenience it may also be heavily cathected by the 
peremptory demands of 'His Majesty The Ego', the basis for Freud of 
every daydream (Freud, 1908, p. 138). Planning what one will say may 
seem to be a rational activity but it also involves story-making, a form 
of playing, which is unable fully to take into account the need to adapt 
to another's responses in the actual event; for example, negative 
attitudes to the chairperson of the committee might be based on 
unconscious Oedipal fears and desires involving the wish to replace 
the rival parent. In this kind of everyday situation, positions from 
reality-based activity, through story-making, daydreaming and deep- 
rooted fantasy structures are continually shifting and in flux. 
Winnicott assumes a continuity between the unconscious and 
conscious in a different way, introducing a new dimension through his 
account of playing as a derivative of the transitional phenomenon and 
in his model of the intermediate area or potential space which gives a 
'place' for playing as privileged psychic process. In 'Playing: a 
theoretical statement' (1971, ch. 3), on the one hand he posits playing as 
an activity of the ego, but, on the other, by tying the notion to the 
infant's use of the transitional object, he also insists that it remains 
connected to inner, psychic reality. On the one hand playing remains a 
process which has a regulating function related to ego-activity - 
Winnicott stresses its quality of 'quiet satisfaction' and the 
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'preoccupation' akin to the concentration of older children and adults 
(p. 39). From this perspective 'the instincts are the main threat to 
playing as to the ego' (ibid). On the other hand, for Winnicott as for 
Klein (though with much less emphasis), playing has its origins in 
bodily experiences, being connected with the manipulation of objects 
and associated with aspects of bodily excitement. At the same time, 
however, too-strong instinctual 'excitement' can cause playing to cease. 
However, for Winnicott the possibility of 'instinctual arousal' is less 
important than the 'precariousness' of its intermediate position: 'Play 
is always exciting ... since it always deals with the knife-edge between 
the subjective and that which is objectively perceived' (Winnicott, 
1968, p. 332). In this sense, playing is creative, involving the use of 
illusion which also depends exactly on the interplay between inner and 
outer: 'without hallucination the child puts out a fragment of dream 
potential and lives with this sample in a chosen setting of fragments 
from external reality' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 51) - just as, in infancy, it 
was able to establish an exact contiguity between 'discovering' and 
'creating' the mother's breast, and subsequently the transitional object. 
A development of this process of making something from what is 
found is Winnicott's use of the 'squiggle game' which he used in his 
diagnostic consultations with children (described in 'The Squiggle 
Game' Winnicott, 1989, pp. 299-317). The participants take it in turns to 
find, create and develop representational objects out of each other's 
formless, arbitrary 'squiggle'. In its mixture of spontaneity and 
deliberate form and story making and its need for intra- and inter- 
personal sensitivity, this game (which was a game before Winnicott 
used it for his work) encapsulates Winnicott's view of playing. As 
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Andre Green puts it of the game: 'meaning does not emerge complete 
... it is for us to construct it ... meaning is not discovered, it is created ... 
an absent meaning ... a potential meaning' (Green, 1978b, p. 185). He is 
discussing the analytic situation but in the cinema too the spectator has 
to construct her meaning, firstly from 'marks' on the screen into an 
image, then out of isolated shots into a narrative. The spectator too has 
to allow the film's meaning to emerge as it unfolds in front of her, and 
in her interaction with it. An analogous process is proposed by Modell 
to exist in primitive cave painting, where formations in caves were 
used as parts of the painting in the way that 'objets trouves' are used in 
modern art: 'the created and the actual environment interpenetrated'. 
What is created is not an entirely new mechanism but a 
'transformation of that which already exists' (Modell, 1970, p. 244). 
The development of the capacity to play has become for Winnicott 
perhaps the most important aim of therapy, for the adult as well as the 
child: 'Play is the universal ... playing facilitates growth and therefore 
health; playing leads to group relationships (Winnicott, 1971, p. 41). 
Winnicott's playing can be a specific activity, the prototype for which is 
children's make-believe, but the capacity to play can also inform the 
person's whole approach and orientation to everyday living. In the 
adult, the capacity to play may be discerned, for instance, in 'choice of 
words, in the inflections of the voice, and indeed in the sense of 
humour' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 40). 
In an important sense playing gives an experience of 'control' over the 
external world. This may seem surprising, because the wish to control 
is usually characterised as a rigidity and an inability to allow objects 
their separate existence. In part the player experiences a sense of 
'magical' control because, operating in potential space with the 
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transitional object, a strictly demarcated degree of omnipotence may 
still pertain, stemming from the baby's relationship with, and use of, 
the mother's breast when it experienced the breast as being under its 
own control as a part of itself. The sense of omnipotence is modified, 
however, in that the transitional object is the first 'not-me' object; this 
introduces the sense of a relationship, a dynamic interplay with 
another. In Winnicott's use of the term 'control' there is also a 
suggestion of the subject being able to 'make her mark' in the minute- 
by-minute creative interaction with the world: as he puts it: 
Play gives the child control over a limited area. While the child 
finds limited power to control-he or she at the same time discovers 
the unlimited scope of the imagination ... Through play the child 
deals with the external reality creatively. In the end this produces 
creative living and leads to the capacity to feel real and to feel life 
can be used and enriched ... without play the child is unable to see 
the world creatively and in consequence, without the experience of 
playing, the person feels unrelated to the world and is thrown 
back on compliance and a sense of futility or on the exploitation 
of direct instinctual satisfactions. 
('Notes on Play', Winnicott, 1989, p. 60). 
('Compliance' is a word which Winnicott uses quite frequently with 
rather chilling effect). The result of the failure to play is such a sense of 
being cut off from the world that it can lead to a sense of psychic 
deadness. This for Winnicott is the difference between being able, or 
not, to play; if the person cannot create his or her own world, in this 
sense the world does not exist. 
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Although playing is an area of activity where the conflict between 
reality testing - the demands of the ego - and the pleasure principle 
of the id does not operate, it can also enable the subject better to adapt 
to the demands of the external world when she 'returns' to it from her 
playing. This point is made by James Britton, an educationist who 
explores children's make-believe and related activities such as listening 
to stories from Winnicott's perspective, in an article 'The third area 
where we are more ourselves' (Britton, 1977). Britton describes playing 
as having an 'assimilative function' for the child, in contrast with 
what he describes as 'escapism' as an 'attempt to avoid the claims of 
real life ... lessening the possibility of an adequate response' (ibid p. 46). 
The move from solitary to group play is marked by a greater need to 
negotiate the external world - other children - to make a scenario 
work, but Britton points out that solitary play may also involve 
working over a relationship between inner and outer material. 
Winnicott contrasts playing with escapist fantasising: playing 'takes up 
time and space'; in playing one has to 'do things, not simply to think or 
to wish' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 40). The 'characteristic of play is pleasure' 
(Winnicott, 1989, p. 59); it also has a use. Playing comes to be seen not 
only as both a means of negotiating reality and as a 'relief' from it, but 
beyond that as a continual reworking - or replaying - of that 
infantile state where the process of differentiation between inner and 
outer has not yet been established. The continuation of the capacity to 
play through adulthood is 'an achievement in human growth' 
(Winnicott, 1989, p. 59), a sign of psychic health and 'aliveness', where 
the individual experiences him or herself as 'making' his or her world, 
rather than as being constructed by it. 
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Making play: The Purple Rose of Cairo 
Cecilia, the heroine of The Purple Rose of Cairo, takes a part in the 
screen play and both makes and finds her film/ transitional object 
when Tom, her hero in the film she is watching, abandons the playing 
he has come from to join her in the auditorium. Her desire for him 
brings him 'alive', although there remain limits to her 'control' over 
the process. He is a 'great kisser' but beyond the kissing the lights fade 
and their love making is controlled by the censor. He can win a 'clean' 
fight but loses when Cecilia's husband turns dirty. 
This playing between two characters, in the space between film and 
spectator, may be seen in the light of Andre Green's (1978b) account of 
the analytic setting as a play space (presented in Ch. 2) where the 
'doubles' of the analyst and analysand encounter each other to create 
the 'analytic object' (a play object), which, drawing on Winnicott, 
Green explores as the aim of analysis. In these terms the 'double' of 
Tom, who is no longer simply either character or actor, encounters 
Cecilia - or rather her 'double', the wishing or playing aspect of her, 
- in a space that becomes almost a facsimile of the real world, where 
fact and fiction cannot be distinguished. Eventually the situation gets 
quite out of their control and reality and fiction become disturbingly 
confused as the protagonists try to realise their potential world. 
An account of the beginning of The Purple Rose of Cairo by Mary Ann 
Doane (1987) uses the opening image of Farrow's 'rapt' face to explore 
issues of sexual difference in the cinema, particularly the 
representation of the female spectator. She argues that the sense of 
'familiarity' of Farrow's image, caught up in the 'lure' of cinema and 
her own longings, comes from her being presented as a woman, since it 
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would be difficult to imagine dominant cinema presenting a man in 
this 'rapt' state - at the very least, the contents of his fantasy film 
would be different. Doane focuses on Farrow's rapt face to raise 
questions about the spectator's psychic closeness to or distance from the 
screen action (arguing that the woman spectator is always represented 
as unable to maintain a distance) and judges Tom's move off-screen to 
be a demonstration of the hallucinatory strength of Cecilia's fantasised 
wishing (Doane, 1987, pp. 1-2). 
From the perspective of Winnicott's view of playing, I offer a different 
reading. At first we may indeed read Farrow as 'rapt' - 'transported', 
'wholly engrossed', 'carried out of this world' (Chambers Dictionary) 
- entirely wrapped up in, lost in the film. At this moment she is inert, 
inactive, absent as a subject as she repeatedly re-watches the film. 
However, out of this engrossment in the film comes her different state 
of playing. When Tom steps out into the auditorium, the film and its 
spectator interact as Cecilia starts to make her own, different, film out 
of the one she has been watching. Tom weaves into her life and she 
later into his, when she steps over into the screen, to the outrage of the 
other characters. She is a part of the film, 'in it', yet she is also active as 
she reconstructs it for her playing. 
Cecilia enters the film theatre as a relief from her life; she gets 'lost' in 
the film. However, out of her total immersion in it she becomes able 
also to play with it: both to 'create' and interact with the scenario. She 
neither passively accepts it as it is, nor omnipotently hallucinates or 
appropriates it entirely for her own purposes. Rather the autonomy of 
her object - Tom, and indeed the whole film - ensures that she 
interacts and plays along with it, in the intermediate space between 
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them. Further, the spectator is also invited to play, both through her 
psychic move into her own potential space, and by being offered 
several positions in relation to the film, to identify not only with the 
narrative or with the heroine's wishing - which in any case is 
ironised by the film - but also by being put in the place of the 
illusionist, the film-maker, and the knowing viewer, all possibilities at 
the same time. 
The playing is subversive; fiction and reality become intriguingly 
mixed and their boundaries blurred. The leader of the cinema orchestra 
announces, 'every man for himself", throws away his baton, and start 
to tap-dance across the platform/screen. Playing has released new 
freedoms and energies and by the end it will be stopped by the film 
producers and distributors, afraid of the implications of everyone 
making their own film and of the complaints from those who like 
their film as it is. 
At the close of the film Cecilia, like any spectator, has to choose 
between her film fantasy and external reality, and by this time it is with 
some relief both for her and the spectator that the inner/outer 
distinction and boundaries are re-established. Cecilia's playing and that 
of the spectator have to end and it could be said that it ends in Cecilia's 
disillusionment. While she has found relief from the strain of coping 
with her dreary existence, she now has to return to her husband, to the 
reality principle and acceptance of the status quo. But the spectator has 
seen her in, and has been encouraged to act out with her, a different 
kind of experiencing, which is more than a passive escapism. If we 
wished to draw a Winnicottian moral from the film we could say that 




knowing comment she makes on her situation in the middle of her 
adventure: "I've found this wonderful new guy - he's fictional, but 
you can't have everything". 
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The film spectator plays 
How can the film spectator be thought of as 'playing'? In this and the 
following sections, I will explore some of the implications of applying 
Winnicott's notion of playing to a study of the spectator, and will 
consider aspects of film theory which, I will argue, also have a 
relationship to the notion of a playing spectator. 
In proposing a model of a playing spectator based on the idea of the 
transitional phenomenon, I am necessarily drawing on Winnicott's 
view of a subject which begins very early on to establish 'itself' from 
what is 'outside', although, since this process continues throughout 
life, separate subjectivity is never achieved absolutely. For Winnicott 
there is a clear line of development from transitional phenomena to 
playing; to shared playing; to cultural experience. Therefore the 
spectator has a pre-existing capacity to play which she brings to and 
takes away from the film. Without this capacity the spectator does not 
engage with the film, move into her own potential space or suspend 
disbelief. At the same time, however, watching the film is a privileged 
process and the playing spectator is only actualised during the process 
of the spectator-film interaction. In this way the playing spectator is 
also a subject-in-process, a construct and contributory part of the film- 
text system, always in flux in the moment-by-moment movement of 
the film-spectator relationship. 
This playing spectator can be compared and contrasted with both the 
model of a 'subject of cinema' that is fixed and constructed by the film 
text and with that which is separate and pre-constructed, responding to 
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the film as one system to another: the one a 'passive', the other an 
'active', position. 
The difference between a 'passive' and an 'active' spectator may be 
seen in comparing the work of Heath and Bordwell, referred to in the 
last chapter on cinematic space. Heath's account of the spectator, 
whether of classic narrative or of counter cinema, in his essay 
'Narrative Space' presents a viewing subject constructed by the film 
narrative system which leaves no opening for the spectator outside it 
(Heath, 1981); the film system itself determines whether its spectator is 
'unified' or 'split', self-aware or not. This is quite different from that of 
the playing spectator that I am proposing in this thesis: Heath's 
spectator is played and moved by the film but does not himself play; 
the film makes the subject, the subject does not, as does the playing 
spectator, make the film. 
Bordwell's spectator, on the contrary, is 'active' because he constructs 
the film's meaning for himself. However, the text is seen as already 
'there' in an ideal pre-existing state, waiting to be discovered by the 
intelligent spectator. In Narration in the Fiction Film (1985), Bordwell 
attempts to account for the spectator's activity that in his previous 
book, Film Art (Bordwell and Thompson, 1986), cited in the last 
chapter, is largely taken for granted within his description of the film's 
formal devices. In the later work Bordwell criticises Heath's model of a 
spectator in 'Narrative space' as being perceived as passive in relation 
to the film. Bordwell's spectator is active, able to do the work of 
'constructing' both the film's narrative and its spatial and other formal 
relationships; Bordwell here draws on the constructivist approach in 
cognitive psychology to formulate a spectator who is able to conceive of 
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and hypothesise about the film, by relating his own set of expectations 
or constructs to the narrative and formal 'cues' set up by a film. This 
spectator is one who thinks - Bordwell addresses the question of 
'affect' but only in terms of an interplay between expectations met, 
frustrated or denied. Bordwell's concern, then, is not with a desiring 
spectator with an unconscious, the subject of psychoanalysis, but with a 
rational one, the spectator as scientist. His use of constructivism 
certainly problematises any simple empiricist notion of spectatorship, 
but does not distinguish between the process of getting meaning from a 
film and other aesthetic products, or indeed from any other kind of 
perception. Nor is there any question of the spectator playing a part in, 
identifying with, or being 'played' on by, a film. 
In this sense Bordwell's analysis suggests little of a dynamic 
relationship between the spectator and the text which is important to 
the notion of the spectator at play. Bordwell's spectator as constructor 
of the film's meaning is indeed active, but unlike the playing spectator, 
is entirely preformed. The playing spectator, like Winnicott's notion of 
the transitional phenomenon from which it derives, is in 'an in- 
between' position in relation to the models assumed by Bordwell and 
Heath: she both is and is not a construct of the film-viewing process. 
In the particular relationship between the film and the playing 
spectator, the 'distance' between them fluctuates. The spectator 
psychically moves in and out of the screen action, as do the characters 
in The Purple Rose of Cairo literally. The film does not 'consume' the 
spectator but neither is she able to destroy it by complete appropriation 
of it to her own purposes. For the spectator for whom a film is a play 
object, there is a compromise between the film 'out there' and 'inside', 
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between its being at the same time 'found' and 'created'. The spectator 
can use the film object in a non-exploitative and creative way, in a 
process where film and spectator are separate but interactive. 
The spectator is already in a state of preparedness for making the film 
her own scenario by her movement into the domain of potential space, 
which is made possible by her capacity to play, her wish to accept the 
film's fictional world and by the very act of going to the setting of the 
cinema. The spectator cannot play if she sets up defences against 
engaging with the film - for instance for its 'non- reality', its 
'sentimentality' or 'silliness'. That is, she has to be prepared to want, as 
Freud puts it, 'to withdraw from the pressure of critical reason' (Freud, 
1905, p. 175). 1 If she is unwilling, for instance if she feels unsafe in doing 
so, then the spectator will not play but will reject the film; it is often 
observed by film studies teachers that films which can engage an adult 
or a child may embarrass a college-aged student. Freud comments: 'the 
power of criticism has increased so greatly in the later parts of 
childhood and in the period which extends over puberty that the 
pleasure in liberated nonsense only seldom dares to show itself 
directly' (ibid). In Winnicottian terms the movement into the psychic 
domain of potential space is refused by the spectator. 
If she does make this move, however, the spectator may take a greater 
risk than that of 'engaging in liberated nonsense' (Freud, 1905, p. 175). 
She needs to be able to tolerate, or indeed be excited by, the possibility 
11n jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious Freud discusses the use of jokes and 
'nonsense' as the adult derivatives of children's play. (Freud, 1905). The crucial 
difference between his view and that of Winnicott, it seems to me, is that Freud 
perceives the 'adult' forms as substitute for the child's playing whereas Winnicott's 
approach is in terms of a continuity from child to adult playing and his becomes a 
broader formulation than Freud's. 
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that taking part in a film play can lead to her 'takeover' by the film and 
by her own unconscious before she is able to organise her defences. In 
this sense playing may put her in a vulnerable position. 
Like the child at play, the spectator 'manipulates external phenomena 
in the service of the dream and invests chosen external phenomena 
with dream meaning and feeling' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 51). Events on 
screen come to be 'used' and invested with aspects of her own inner 
world. The spectator who psychically moves into the film-space takes 
up a playing position which will involve her in continually 
reconstructing the film as it also takes place in front of her; she will be 
making her film. The process of playing can continue after the film is 
over, when the spectator may use it to 'play' with other people or 
alone; for children this might involve make-believe games based 
around the film characters and narrative; for adults, talk (gossip) and 
daydreaming. 
As a derivative of the transitional phenomenon, the spectator's playing 
is marked by ambiguity: the film, and whatever play the spectator 
makes of it, has the attribute of being both 'true' and 'not true' at the 
same time; since the film is both discovered and created by the 
spectator she therefore seems both to have and not to have some 
'control' in the process. The spectator is also, reciprocally, continually 
reconstructed by the film and the distinction between herself as subject 
and her part in the film-play can become unclear. That place in the film 
for the spectator might be as a fictional character; narrator/enunciator; 
author; observer; and these positions will fluctuate and may also 
coincide simultaneously. As a preliminary look at the playing spectator 
I analyse a segment from Citizen Kane. 
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The spectator plays: two shots from Citizen Kane 
Two shots from Citizen Kane (1941) show the well-known moment, 
characteristic of the film, where a photograph of the staff of The 
Chronicle, rival newspaper to Kane's Inquirer, 'comes alive'. 
In the first shot Kane and his newspaper colleagues, Bernstein and 
Leland, are looking at the photo in the window of the newspaper office. 
Reflected in the window so that they seem to face the camera, they peer 
through the glass like acquisitive school children and comment on the 
quality of the staff and the paper's circulation, noting that it took 
twenty years to build up that staff. The camera draws back and holds 
the shot of the staff photo. A dissolve to the next shot reveals Kane 
standing in front of the 'photo' and the camera draws back to reveal a 
photographer: the photo has 'come alive'. Kane announces a time 
ellipse of eight years and that the staff are now working for him. The 
occasion is a banquet to celebrate Kane's birthday. The transition is so 
quick (and play on time ellipses are common in the film) that in so far 
as we are engaged in the narrative process we accept the illusion of the 
fictional 'reality' of the situation: the staff are indeed alive and working 
for Kane eight years on. Kane has acquired them as picture objects for 
his use. 
We are further implicated in the action in two different ways, within 
and outside the diegesis. Firstly we are 'included' in Kane's address to 
his diegetic audience, since we are placed 'in front' of Kane's audience 
as he addresses them off-screen 'behind' us. In this way we are invited 
to share in his triumph which is the more seductive for being a double 
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one, belonging both to an adult and to a child. Obviously Kane has 
fulfilled his adult business tycoon ambition of a successful takeover. 
But the juxtaposition of the two shots and the cinematic 'trick' suggests 
also an association between the adult's success and an infant's wish- 
fulfilment. Kane has got exactly and literally what he wanted, what he 
might have imaged for himself as he peered, with childlike desire, at 
the photo in the window. He possesses the photo - he owns the men 
in it - with the absolute power of giving life. His 'ability' to bring the 
photo alive by magic is like the wish-fulfilment of an infant who can 
omnipotently hallucinate its desire with no compromise with reality 
and no awareness of the difference between its fantasy image and the 
actual material world. Caught up in the operation of these two shots 
the spectator participates in the playing out of both the adult's success 
and the child's omnipotence. (And indeed the succeeding episode in 
the film most markedly demonstrates Kane's 'rise' and at the same 
time the inevitability of his 'fall' precisely because of his failure to 
compromise with the reality demands of the external world and his 
attempts to own and control other people. ) 
At the same time as being given a part in the screen action we are in 
the same movement placed outside it. It is the extra-diegetic spectator 
who is aware of the 'joke' of the photo coming alive (of which she has 
momentarily been the victim), for the diegetic audience is only 
included in the narrative's celebration of Kane's birthday in the 
following shot. As participant in the joke the spectator is addressed by 
Kane not as diegetic audience but as the film spectator. In this extra- 
diegetic address (and the cinematic reflexivity is marked also by the 
obviously false time ellipse) we become aware of a 'director', maker of 
the cinematic magic of the film, 'Orson Welles'. This is easily achieved 
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in this heavily authored film since Orson Welles himself plays Kane, 
and yet signs the film off as 'himself' as master-director, when he 
names himself and the actors at the end. 'Kane', the character of a 
businessman who can get everything he wants is, for the spectator, also 
'Welles' the film director or 'author' who can wield magic in the 
cinema. Both address us at the same time. The place where the 
spectator finds herself, though, is not at this point back in the 
auditorium watching herself watching the film, for the film has fully 
implicated her in its workings, both within and outside the action, on 
and off screen. She is given instead the place of Welles' the director, 
magician, joker, and stand-in now for the spectator. 
These two shots then, I suggest, construct a playing spectator who 
moves at the same moment between being within and outside the 
narrative fiction, as participant and activator. The lightning transition 
to an extra-diegetic allusion within the same narrative space allows the 
spectator to participate in a piece of audacious illusion-making which is 
both 'true' and 'not true' at the same time (the photo comes alive). 
Existing in potential space and presented with this 'bit' of complex 
cinematic 'illusion' the playing spectator both 'discovers' this 
cinematic moment of play, magic and illusion (positioned as cinema 
spectator who accepts what she sees) and at the same time 'creates' it 
(positioned as 'Kane' the tycoon and Welles' the director). The notion 
of a spectator at play, constructed by these rapid shifts of position in the 
space of these two shots, seems to me to fit the pleasurable, rather edgy 
energy (the 'precariousness' of playing) that is a characteristic of the 
whole film. 
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Making the film 
I have argued that this extract from Citizen Kane constructs a playing 
spectator who is sufficiently engaged to take a part psychically in the 
narrative action but at the same time sufficiently distanced to retain a 
sense of autonomy in relation to it. Most relevant is the coexistence of 
processes that draw attention to the film's operations and place the 
spectator outside the action but not outside the film's system 
altogether, and those which bind her into the narrative, particularly to 
the working out of Kane's wishes. The cinematic reflexivity invites the 
spectator to take the place of the film-maker at the same time as it 
reminds her of her own status as viewer, while the narrative situation 
gives her a stake in taking part and in continuing to watch. Overall it 
represents the precarious in-between position of playing, where the 
subject does not quite know 'where' she is. To take an active part in the 
playing, the subject needs to direct as well as to perform. In film studies 
terms, I will argue, she is positioned as 'author' and as 'speaker' of the 
film. 
The question of the identity, placing and function of the 'author' of a 
film was a central debate during the early 1970s that has still not been 
entirely resolved. John Caughie's collection of essays, Theories of 
Authorship (1981), traces the shifts in concepts of the author in film 
studies from the 1950s to 1970s: during this period the Romantic- 
derived notion of an individual consciousness who stamped his or her 
unique vision on a work became displaced by approaches to the author 
which at most were concerned with, for example, the figuring of the 
author in the texts that bore his name or with the notion of the author 
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'function' for public, institutional or personal use: this was a notion of 
the 'author' as a construct rather than as an individual. 
This change was particularly clearly marked in film studies, since the 
'author' of Hollywood cinema had only been 'discovered' (in the 
person of the director) in the 1950s by the critics of Cahiers du Cinema, 
in a move which had contributed to endowing some of these films 
with the status of 'art'. The interest in the director's creative 
responsibility for a body of films, expressed particularly through his 
mise en scene, was taken up in the work of the British journal Movie, 
which published articles on Minnelli as author of 'his' films (Cameron, 
1962; Shivas, 1962). In 1968, however, the notion of the individual 
author as the authoritative source of a text's meaning was dramatically 
undermined by Roland Barthes' 'The death of the author'; in film 
studies an analysis of John Ford's Young Mister Lincoln by the Cahiers' 
editors (1970) traced the film's unsaid, repressed preoccupations and 
thereby undermined the notion of an overriding 'whole', conscious 
vision of Ford. Film studies encapsulated in a decade the history of a 
century-and-a-half of literary studies, which was marked by the change 
in terminology from 'individual' to 'subject' and from an idealist to a 
materialist theory. 
However the notion of director as creator has continued to make a 
mark and, as Caughie notes, continues to provide a source of pleasure 
for the spectator, particularly through semi-popular criticism which 
classifies films by their directors (Caughie, 1981, p. 15). As I Pointed out 
in Chapter 1, this has been one way in which Meet Me in St. Louis has 
been offered for the viewer's enjoyment. 
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What is important for the playing spectator is a figure of the director as 
maker of the film that she can make use of for her own 'making' of the 
film. Caughie argues that the pleasure of recognition of the film as 
construct occurs wherever a stylistic feature interposes on the narrative 
so that we notice the effect; in moments 'of admiration and delight in 
performance' (Caughie, 1981, p. 204), the spectator places or finds the 
'author'. In a response to the debates around the author raised by the 
'Young Mr Lincoln' essay, Ben Brewster (1973) argues the case for an 
authorial sub-code in the film's system: in so far as a film consists of an 
interplay of different codes, then it may be possible to identify marks of 
the director/auteur in one sub-code among many running through a 
body of his films. In this way (as considered in Ch. 1) 'Minnelli's' films 
may be characterised by stylistic devices such as 'his' frequent and 
particular use of the moving camera or, as Elsaesser (1979) puts it, a 
consistent underlying theme about the struggle between the individual 
and society, marks which the spectator expects and enjoys. The figure of 
the director comes to represent for the viewer the source of the film as 
a created artefact and a location for the playing spectator's illusion of 
'making' the film even as she 'finds' it on screen. 
For Caughie, the spectator's recognition of the figure of author as 
maker moves the spectator into another position: he is 'dislodged' 
from the centred place where classic narrative has put him. However 
although he is 'put outside the film' he remains 'within the textual 
space' (Caughie, 1981, p. 204), like the spectator in the scene from Kane. 
Caughie discusses the pleasure of such moves in the relation of the 
viewer to the film in terms of her recognition of its 'performance'; of 
the playing spectator I would take this a step further and argue that, in 
the moment of recognition of the film as artefact, as she steps outside 
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the film's action, she also moves into the place of director, to take her 
place as the active and deliberate 'maker' of the film. 
For the spectator who comes to the film ready to play, the figure of the 
author within the film's system is not unconnected with her image of 
the director outside it, who is increasingly figured in popular cinema's 
attention to itself as cinema through spectacular technique, cross- 
referencing and generic self-parody. At the same time constructions of 
the director, who often today achieves considerable secondary 
circulation as only stars used to do, also invite a stake in the 
making/ constructing of a film. To identify with the director is to take 
the place of the 'someone' who has control in the Winnicottian sense 
of being able to 'make a mark' on the external world, in the way that 
Minnelli did with his given script. The playing spectator imports into 
her experience of the film her knowledge of the director and his films 
and is prepared to find, as she reconstructs the film during the course 
of viewing, the marks of its status as artefact, so that these may come to 
represent her own ability to play as she takes up that place. Reference to 
the author both as a figure within the film and as an image outside it 
involves a celebration of the creative process and of the film-maker as 
a source of the pleasure to be had from 'his' films. 
The reference to the external 'maker' of the film as an 'authority' on 
what is going on in his films may also, however, work the other way 
round, as Barthes insists in 'The death of the author' (Barthes, 1968), 
and restrict the possibility of the spectator making her own reading and 
therefore of playing. From this point of view the playing spectator does 
not need to know 'Why does the camera go up now? ' as Ian Cameron 
asks of Minnelli (Cameron, 1962, p. 50). On the other hand if such a 
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question were to occur to the playing spectator during the course of 
viewing the film it could accompany her sense of the unexpected 
pleasure of herself making this dramatic movement. How the 
information is used by the spectator determines whether her 
knowledge of the 'author' becomes a constraint (for Winnicott the 
'compliance' of the person unable to play) or an enjoyment of her own 
creativity. 
This placing of the spectator as 'maker' may be contrasted with an 
identification with the film's stars, whose image the spectator also 
'knows' from outside the film but whose status with regard to the film 
can be ambiguous; being both 'real life star' (itself a highly constructed 
image) and fictional character so that the distinction between film and 
the outside world falters. The merging of character with actor gives the 
viewer an external stake in the film but blurs the boundaries between 
life and fiction and is more likely to dissolve the sense of the film as 
'artefact', limiting the range of her moves through the film. 
Speaking the film 
Caughie explores the place of the-spectator and the figure of the author 
within the film as a relation to its enonciation, where both spectator 
and author/director are inscribed within the film's system of 
articulation. The term 6nonciation, which is adopted in film studies 
from the linguist Emile Benveniste, along with its complement, the 
'6nong6', refers to the act of speaking; as Nowell-Smith (1976) puts it, 
'enonciation , the statement ... means the act whereby an utterance is 
produced and 6nonce ... means what is thereby uttered in itself' (p. 27). 
Together they constitute the 'address' of a film narrative, with an 
assumed speaker and receiver who may both be marked linguistically, 
116 
most obviously in the first and second person. The enonce is what is 
said in a text, the enonciation the telling of it that points to the 
apparent 'speaker' of that text, not to be confused with the fictional 
narrator who is a part of, and articulated within, the enonce. 
The 'marks' of enonciation may be more or less apparent. Their 
seeming absence in a text gives it the status of histoire compared with 
discours where the marks of enonciation are foregrounded. 'Histoire' is 
marked linguistically by an apparent neutrality in its telling where 
there is no apparent speaker or receiver and therefore no enonciation. 
Histoire operates in the third person and, linguistically, is presented as 
'truth', however fantastic in relation to external referents it may in fact 
be. There seems to be no personalised source for the statement. As 
Nowell-Smith puts it: 'Histoire is always "there" and "then"' (1976, 
p. 27). 
This distinction has been used to characterise dominant narrative 
cinema which also seems to present itself as the 'truth'. This contrasts 
with discours where a narrative is clearly 'told' and the marks of 
enonciation are clearly signalled. If the viewer expects a narrative to 
seem like 'truth', the mark of its worth is judged to be whether it is 
'realistic' and builds up its diegetic world consistently enough for the 
viewer not to question its 'truth' and not to be jolted out of his or her 
illusion of the unfractured unity of film-narrative and of herself as 
subject (and, as Metz explores it in 'Story/Discourse: A note on two 
kinds of voyeurism', as voyeur looking on at a scene produced for and 
perhaps even from himself, Metz, 1982). In this system the film text 
and the spectator simply (it seems) 'are'. This was the illusionism that 
critics of the 1970s, following Brecht, were committed to dismantling; 
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films were to be perceived not with a claim to 'truth' but as clearly 
'produced'. 
In terms of the playing spectator, the film which foregrounds its marks 
of enonciation (which, as Caughie notes, may seem to be those of the 
apparent director/maker of the film but need not be) clearly makes 
available a place for the playing spectator as the speaker-maker of the 
film, as I shall go on to argue of the musical. However the case is also 
more complex; ways into the 'telling' of the film may also be seized by 
the playing spectator as she takes her pleasures where she makes them, 
in the way I have suggested that the spectator may make use of the 
objectified image of the female on screen that Mulvey (1975) postulates. 
Conversely the increasing self-reflexivity and inter-textuality of current 
films may be quickly absorbed as a matter of convention by the 
spectator without disturbing her acquiescence in the film system and in 
her part in it. 
The visibility of the enonciation becomes more marked in the case of 
irony where there is a gap between two simultaneous discourses, one 
of them whose point of reference is outside the text but still within its 
system of enonciation. A well-known example is the opening of Jane 
Austen's Pride and Prejudice (1813): 'It is a fact universally 
acknowledged that a man in possession of a good fortune must be in 
want of a wife. ' Linguistically, apparently articulated as fact, in the third 
person and passive voice, this statement seems to be histoire but this is 
put into question by the exaggeration of 'universally'. Whereas the 
apparent speaker/narrator, within the enongd, of this nonsensical but 
apparently generally held opinion, outrageously presented as fact, is 
given as believing in the statement, we, the reader, know that we are 
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invited to agree with a 'speaker' outside and beyond the text (the 
subject of the enonciation) and accept and collude in the unspoken 
mocking criticism of both the statement and the 'speaker' of that 
statement. This sets up the reader in a position of collusion with the 
superior enunciating voice (which we may well construe to be that of 
'Jane Austen') in a position of 'knowing' the real truth about the 
matter; and, I would argue, in a position of playing since we have to 
play around with the discourses in order to achieve this 'knowing'; in 
the process, we orchestrate our attitude along with the enunciator, to 
the forthcoming narrative. If, however, the reader were to remain in 
this position throughout the narrative her position would become 
fixed outside the action and her playing would shift to that of the 
distanced onlooker. Instead she also aligns herself with the characters 
of the fiction, within the enonce, and becomes implicated in the 
narrative. 
Meet Me in St. Louis is marked by frequent ironic moments that down- 
play the film as a 'romance' but contribute to its status as a 'family 
comedy' (Wood, 1979). Frequently the spectator is given a point of view 
which puts her in a superior, knowing position compared with some 
or all of the film's characters. These can work to deflate the 
expectations the film might have set up (although the spectator also 
quickly adapts to a different kind of playful expectation): for instance 
moments of 'romance' are deflated - usually by the inept responses of 
John Truett, the boy-next-door to Esther: the spectator is shown the 
'reality' of the 'terrifying' figure of Mr. Brokauff when Tootie throws 
flour in his face at Hallowe'en, in a quick camera move to his smiling 
face; the spectator comes to 'expect' that the phone call from New York 
will not bring the proposal that Esther expects for her sister, since the 
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build-up to it is marked by exaggerated acting and planning on her part 
and the film has shown her 'knowledge' about her sister's affairs to be 
consistently incomplete. The combination of such moments with 
others which, by contrast, fully implicate the spectator in the film's 
action and emotion, even in spite of herself, (as I explore in the next 
chapter) maintains the spectator of this film in a state of flux and 
movement. 
A clear and unusual example of an analysis which gives an account of 
the spectator moving between the enonce and enonciation is (as the 
title suggests) Nick Browne's 'The Spectator in the Text' (1975), an 
analysis of a short sequence from John Ford's Stagecoach where the 
travellers, new to each other, have dinner together. Browne 
demonstrates that the look of the central character in this sequence is 
undermined for the spectator by an 'implied narrator' presented 
through the scene's staging and editing. Through point of view shots 
the viewer appears to be given the controlling 'point of view' of Lucy, 
the respectable and intolerant young soldier's wife, whose look is 
validated according to the conventions of narrative cinema by being 
part of a shot-reverse-shot structure. That of Dallas, the 'good' whore, 
who together with the John Wayne character, also an outsider, proves 
her true worth by the end of the film, is, in contrast to Lucy, denied the 
reverse shot of her apparent point of view shot: we are given shots of 
Lucy looking at Dallas but not of Dallas looking at Lucy 
Unusually for dominant cinema, therefore, the visual point of view in 
this sequence is subverted by an implied commentary 'that things are 
not what they seem'; the spectator is invited into the enonciation 
(which is never stated) to take up the position of Dallas who never 
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owns the look but whose embarrassment and humiliation is 
sympathised with, as Lucy is condemned for her exclusiveness. If, 
however, the spectator does not take up the diegetic look (Lucy's), 
neither is she exactly given a position of the traditional psychological 
'ideal' spectator, who is simply placed outside the whole scene. Instead, 
suggests Browne, through a combination of editing and staging she is 
given a 'figurative' place which does not correspond with a literal place 
of looking, either within or from outside the diegesis; rather her place 
is of a 'commentator' able to make moral judgements. However the 
commentating place is apparently set within the fiction. 
This 'commentating ' place results from the 'rhetoric' of the sequence, 
which is most clearly set up by the ambiguous positioning of the 
spectator both 'with' Dallas, whose distress the spectator 'understands' 
but does not share, and at the same time with Lucy: the spectator is not 
so identified with Dallas that she re-enacts her distress, because she is at 
the same time in the place of Lucy, who is doing the humiliating. This 
analysis locates the spectator both 'in the text' and 'outside' it - but 
only there because of her other place inside it, which leads her to make 
these judgements. The effect Browne suggests, is finally, through 'the 
control of the point of view', to place the spectator into 'the moral 
order of the text'. Like the playing spectator, Browne's spectator is in 
several places at once - with the fictional viewer, with the viewed, 
and at the same time in a position to evaluate and respond to each. The 
filmic subject is a plural subject: 'in his readings he is and is not 
himself' (p. 472); the playing spectator is both character and maker, both 
moved by the film's scenarios and commentating on them. 
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Fantasy and playing 
The possibility of the spectator taking on the 6nonciation of a film 
without necessarily assuming its dominant viewpoint is explored in 
terms of gender in 'The sexual differentiation of the Hitchcock text' by 
Donald Grieg (1989), who draws on Barthes' analyses of narrative codes 
in S/Z, Bellour's analyses of Hitchcock and the account of the structure 
of fantasy by Laplanche and Pontalis (1968), which has been applied in 
detail to film studies by Elizabeth Cowie (1984). Grieg's major argument 
is that there is never a single enonciation in a text: firstly, because of 
the interplay of codes, which turns every text, however apparently 
'unified', into a text with multiple 'points of entry' and multiple 
enonciations; secondly, from the notion of fantasy as a psychic 
structuring, which enables the spectator to take up a range of 
identificatory positions in the 'staging' of a fantasy scenario. The 
apparent overriding source of enonciation of narrative cinema (the 
masculine and fixed position) can therefore be subverted by the 
spectator. The use of the model of fantasy in this way provides an 
alternative to the dominance of the male Oedipal trajectory which 
Bellour's analysis finds in Hitchcock's films and, further, as the norm 
in Hollywood cinema. 
Grieg's notion of fantasy is similar to the idea of the playing spectator 
in emphasising the spectator and film in dynamic interrelationship 
and the spectator's multiple positioning (p. 192) but it leaves less room 
for the spectator to 'make' the films she receives; in fantasy she cannot 
actively make her mark as she is 'allowed' to in playing. 
The concept of the subject that informs the application of fantasy to 
questions of film spectatorship is a Lacanian-derived subject of desire, 
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whose movement within the narrative is structured at an unconscious 
level; desire is an unconscious formation, grounded for Freud in the 
baby's wish for the lost object, originally its unity with its mother, and 
for Lacan, whose theory of desire is more complex, in the subject's 
primary 'lack in being' which is perpetuated through the splitting of 
the subject through castration that marks the origin of the speaking 
subject (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986, pp. 129-31). The essence of 
desire, as Cowie stresses in 'Fantasia' (1984), is that it can never be 
fulfilled; what the subject wishes is endlessly to replay its scenarios in 
the mise en scene of desire. The subject (spectator) is bound to the 
unconscious structuring in which she is 'caught up': impelled and 
overtaken by what she does not understand and cannot determine. 2 
Greig quotes from Laplanche and Pontalis: 'the subject's life ... is seen 
to be shaped and ordered ... by what might be called, in order to stress 
this structuring action, "a phantasmic"'. The spectator can enjoy the 
different positions set in play by fantasy but cannot change them. 
Unlike this concept of fantasy and desire, that of the transitional object 
introduces a bit of the external world; the transitional object is valued 
for itself, as a not-me, external object, not just for what it represents 
(the disappearing mother). From the beginning of its emergence by 
means of the transitional object, the subject's relationship to the 
external world proceeds in tandem with its relation to its inner world, 
introducing a variety of inner and outer objects and scenarios which 
continually co-mingle. 
2The discussion of fantasy in film studies is taken further in the following Chapter 
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Winnicott's concepts therefore assume that, through the use of the 
transitional object, a subject is emerging that is not bound to desire; 
playing begins to appear as an active, conscious activity, where the 
subject is able make its mark on the world from a very early stage and 
in this way the playing spectator is able to make use of the film as a 
derivative of the transitional object. This relationship to the film can 
indeed maintain the spectator's 'relative autonomy' that has been 
claimed for fantasy (Greig, p. 186). 
Depending on the film that she is watching, this autonomy can be 
maintained even where the spectator is not aware that she is playing. 
At moments of obvious surprise when the marks of the enonciation 
are foregrounded and easily discernible (as in the Citizen Kane 
example, above) then the spectator may be self-aware of her position as 
the child can be on momentarily stepping out of his playing to direct 
the next 'scene'. However, the child who is absorbed in playing is 
aware neither of the process nor of its part in it: similarly in Browne's 
analysis of the sequence in Stagecoach the spectator psychically moves 
place, makes judgements and allegiances, empathises and takes up 
positions, but without noticing herself doing so. The difference 
between this position and that of being unconsciously 'caught up in' 
the fantasy structure of the film is the difference in Winnicottian terms 
between the preoccupation that is 'akin to concentration in the adult' 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 51) and her 'take-over' by the film and her own 
unconscious which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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The Hollywood musical: a playspace for the spectator 
The Hollywood musical is a genre that offers itself easily to the notion 
of a playing spectator: both popularly and academically, musicals are 
perceived as creating a particular kind of pleasure for the spectator - 
energising, liberating, participative. Accordingly it is in the first place as 
a musical that I will argue that Meet Me in St. Louis makes available a 
playing position for the spectator, while its melodrama aspects work 
towards the breakdown of playing, the focus of the following chapters. 
However, while I will offer the musical as a particularly marked 
example of a playful genre, yet, as I demonstrated in my analysis of 
playing in Citizen Kane, it is not the only one; the playing spectator is 
also potentially a construct of any film-viewer encounter. 
I will argue that musicals offer a playspace for the spectator in three 
main ways. Firstly, whatever their plot, musicals are about 
performance - putting on a show, staging, play-acting, making rituals 
- and they therefore tend towards self-reflexivity, establishing a 
playful and knowing stance towards their status as entertainment. 
They also make available a place for the spectator to participate in their 
performance, as maker, performer and audience. Secondly, they 
present a heightening and transformation of everyday life that enables 
the outer world to be perceived as a transitional object endowed with 
aspects of the spectator's inner world. Thirdly, the musical numbers 
mark a move to a different mode of discourse from the narrative, 
which can represent a shift to potential space. 
Rick Altman (1989) divides the musical into three sub-genres: the 'fairy 
tale', the 'show' and the 'folk' musical. All have relevance to the 
notion of the playing spectator; the 'fairy-tale' musical transforms the 
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world of reality into that of fantasy and blends the two; the show (or 
backstage) musical invites the spectator into a performance; the folk 
musical stresses community togetherness and the inclusion of the 
spectator into that community. For Altman Meet me in St. Louis is a 
clear example of the 'folk musical' (Altman, 1989, ch. 8); however, it 
also has elements of the other two sub-genres. As he defines it, the folk 
musical celebrates, above all, a nostalgic American past - usually in a 
rural, sometimes a small town, setting. (In the film the city of St. Louis 
has the attributes of a small town - Mrs Smith says that "it doesn't 
seem very big where we live"). In St. Louis, a multi-generation family 
serves as symbol for a small cohesive community, the sub-genre's 
main celebratory focus. 
Altman proposes that all musicals are structured around a couple that 
the film will eventually bring together; in the folk musical the 
extended family becomes important not least because it 'facilitates the 
doubling of the youthful romantic couple with an older one whose 
relationship is regenerated during the course of the film' (Altman, 
p. 274): Esther obtains the boy-next-door and the final shot of the film 
shows them side-by-side, alone, their own desire and that of the film 
fulfilled. The continuity of the family becomes more important, 
however, than the couple itself: the coupling of the young people takes 
up less of the film's attention and carries less emotional charge than 
the conflict arising from Mr Smith's proposal to move to New York 
and his family's objection to it. The conflict is structured in terms of 
gender, the father's wish to 'escape' opposed to the women's 
determination to keep the family together, and is uneven, for Mr, 
Smith is pitted against all the rest of the family, including the maid and 
the grandfather. As Altman puts it, the male energy must be 
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channelled back into the community to ensure its continuity, since the 
folk musical essentially represents a confirmation and celebration of 
the creation of America through its settling pioneers. The place, in this 
case St. Louis itself, and the Smith family house, the setting or 
background for the whole film, are both, in the tradition of the folk 
musical, celebrated as the fulfilment of the family's wishes. The film's 
valediction shows the women of the family affirming: "it's all here, 
right here where we live, right here in St Louis", a celebration of the 
city which the opening number has already set up. 
The focus on the traditional community in the folk musical is reflected 
in its choice of songs and dance which often drew on, directly or by 
imitation, folk songs and folk dance: in St. Louis, the title song, the 
'Trolley Song' and 'Skip to my Lou'. Music, dance and ritual are 
presented as the natural expression of a spontaneous, open-hearted and 
simple community. 
t 
Altman traces changes in critical approaches to the musical in his 
introduction to a collection of essays on the genre written mainly in 
the 1970s. He notes early critical dislike of the genre which was 'more 
concerned to judge than to analyse' (Altman, 1981, p. 2), a stance which 
persists to this day, partly because of the musical's status as popular 
entertainment. However, with a growing critical interest in popular 
culture, film studies took the musical more seriously, analysing both 
its pleasures and its potential as a 'subversive' form': a rather 
ambivalent celebration of the musical persists even where, as in 
Altman's collection, critics have sought to de-mystify its appeal - 
Altman's own, more popular, illustrated book on the Hollywood 
musical (Altman, 1989) is a clear example of a dispassionate critic 
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turned advocate. 
The critical essays in Altman's collection present the Hollywood 
musical, whose history goes back to the beginning of sound in the 
cinema, as a distinctive form of mainstream Hollywood cinema in not 
adhering to the 'rules' of classic fictional film: the musical numbers 
disrupt the narrative unity and coherence constructed by the system of 
continuity editing, breaking the illusionism of an uninterrupted 
diegesis. Musicals announce themselves as discourse, foregrounding 
their 6nonciation, and as 'performance'. They offer a distinctive kind 
of pleasure dependent not so much on their narrative as on visual 
spectacle and the incorporation of song and dance numbers, which 
introduce into the films a non-representational discourse of a quite 
different order from the narrative system. Music and dance take over 
the characters, invade, but also seem to arise naturally from, everyday 
life, to transform and transcend the material world; and the musical 
film deploys a range of artful cinematic strategies to involve the 
spectator in that world. Altman also argues, however, that studies of 
the musical raise fundamental questions about all narrative cinema, 
for example 'the insistence on Hollywood's transparency (at the 
expense of intertextuality, reflexivity, and self parody)' (Altman, 1981, 
p. 6). In this sense the musical is conceived as an exemplum, rather 
than an 'aberrant', form; and it is for this reason that I can take the 
musical as a particularly marked but not the only example for the 
notion of a playing spectator. 
The spectator of the musical may be viewed in two ways: on the one 
hand she is construed as distanced and fragmented, aware of herself as 
audience, by the breaks in the narrative; on the other hand, in its 
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relationship to live vaudeville, the musical is claimed to implicate the 
viewer in its system to a greater extent than many other Hollywood 
films (for example, Feuer, 1982, Collins, 1981). This contradiction forms 
the basis for Jane Feuer's study of the musical, published in 1982; she 
explores the 'seeming paradox' that, although musicals are formally 
like modernist film and other art (for example she cites Godard's direct 
address, Fellini's presentation of multiple levels of reality and 
continuity between dream and waking life, and the surrealists), 'yet the 
Hollywood musical resembles none of these modernist works. 
Formally bold, it is culturally the most conservative of genres' (Feuer, 
1982, p. viii). 
Feuer's argument comes from the 1970s film studies' view, following 
Bertolt Brecht, that practices that subverted the conventions of realist 
narrative cinema, foregrounding *their enonciation, had the ideological 
potential to disturb the viewer's acquiescence in narrative cinema's 
presentation of the status quo. Feuer's project, however, is to 'reveal' 
how, in the musical, such practices work instead to bind the viewer 
into the film - to give her only the illusion of participating in the 
performance, through such devices as direct address to the camera and 
the use of popular songs to 'include' the film audience in the film's 
action. It is my proposal that this inclusion in the film is of a specific 
kind, constituting a direct invitation to the spectator to play, and that 
this is an aspect of its 'celebratory' stance. Even in the 'anti-musical' 
from the 1960s onwards, the celebratory impulse of the musical 
continues and the genre remains -intact. In this sense there might be no 
reason to suppose that the musical could be other than self- 
perpetuating and self-congratulatory, available for the spectator's 
pleasure, in ways which Feuer herself persuasively points to; her 
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argument that it is not a subversive form then seems redundant. 
However a different kind of 'subversive' possibility for the musical 
stems from its characteristic ambiguities that invite the spectator to 
play, since playing itself carries its own anarchic tendency. Playing is to 
be celebrated precisely because it can be liberatingly subversive of given 
categories and conventions. 
Making a performance 
That musicals are about making a show (creating play) is literally the 
case of the backstage, or 'Show' musical, as Rick Altman (1989) terms it. 
For example the musicals that Busby Berkeley wrote and the Warner 
Brothers produced in the early 1930s were about the hard work of 
putting on a show -a musical - in the face of the Depression and 
against the competition of the movies. Putting on a show is presented 
as hard work, involving relatively unglamorous actors depicting 
ordinary people with a high degree of energy, engaged in getting the 
money and doing the hard physical work necessary for the task. The 
labour of production is often highlighted in long rehearsals, which 
leave everyone exhausted, and in the effort of getting the show 
financed. The Bandwagon (Minnelli, 1953) and The Chorus Line 
(Attenborough, 1986) are later examples of the persistence of this sub- 
genre; all suggest the hard work but also the fulfilment of putting on a 
show. On the level of content alone, they suggest that playing is both a 
relief from and also a serious part of life. 
The pay-off for the spectator comes in two ways: firstly there is the 
presentation of the heightening of everyday life through the energy, 
excitement, camaraderie and romance of being engaged in the creative 
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process: characters frequently break into dance or composing on the 
piano or try out their singing, impromptu, and rehearsals form a large 
part of the films. Built into this is wish-fulfilment: people fall in love, 
relationships form, unknowns achieve success, often by a lucky chance 
(after all their hard work). Working-at-play is shown to bring its 
rewards. This aspect of these films is not unlike conventional narrative 
cinema: the spectator is invited to take part in a wish-fulfilment 
scenario with other 'ordinary' people like herself. The difference is that 
the plot - the activity the spectator is invited to take part in - is about 
creating a show, the process of playing itself. 
Secondly the spectator is given her own part in the show-making: Jane 
Feuer explores the means by which musicals attempt to replicate the 
popular vaudeville forms they largely replaced, in particular the ways 
in which they invite spectator participation: to play specific roles, to 
dance and sing along, to become part of the diegetic audience: to 
become performer and director. For instance the film camera/viewer is 
addressed directly in a song (against the 'rules' of narrative cinema), 
sometimes by means of a cut from diegetic audience to a shot that 
excludes the fictional audience and is addressed directly to the film 
viewer so that ' she 'becomes' part of the theatre audience; sometimes, 
though less commonly, by a direct address to camera, marked by the 
use of close-ups as well as linguistically (the spectator is addressed 
directly in the second person). At other times the audience is shown 
from the viewpoint of the performer in a point-of-view shot, so that 
the cinema spectator is given his or her position on stage. 
For Feuer the purpose of this audience involvement is to implicate the 
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spectator in the creative process and the whole apparatus of 
entertainment; this is furthered by taking the spectator backstage to a 
shot from the wings to see the 'reality' of the performer in the process 
of performing. St. Louis demonstrates how a musical can present itself 
as performance even though it is not ostensibly about putting on a 
show. Esther and Tootie perform the 'Cakewalk' song ('Under the 
Bamboo Tree')for their guests, and point-of-view shots include the 
spectator in the guest audience. Feuer (1982) points out that musicals 
often use such strategies to bring the viewer into the space and 
viewpoint of the film's internal audience (Feuer, 1982, p. 32); the Show 
is an extension of simple, folk fun for everyone, and participation the 
musical's promise to the spectator. 
Esther frequently 'presents' herself as if to an audience, either within 
the fiction or for the spectator. In each solo number she is framed as if 
on a stage, by a mirror, the porch, a window, and she visibly 'prepares' 
herself to perform. For instance, she deliberately stages 'Over the 
Banisters' as her seduction song, this time on the stairs - much used 
in this film, as in melodrama of the time - as the culmination of her 
attempt to woo the boy-next-door, at the end of a scene where the 
camera has followed the pair as they turn off the house lamps. This 
scene has been presented as more of a seduction for the spectator than 
the characters - instead of their being framed in shot-reverse close- 
ups, they have both remained in frame, their faces lit as they look up at 
the lamps, in an example of the film's careful and beautiful mise en 
scene. As Garland sings, her face in soft focus, she becomes the star and 
object of desire for the spectator as well as for the young man. 
However, like a number of scenes in the film, this ends in a deflation 
of the expectations that it seemed to set up, signalling an authorial 
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ironic commentary; John Truett gives Esther a hearty handshake and 
she is denied her kiss in a familiar move for this film of repression of 
her desire and a distancing from her point of view 3 The spectator has 
been moved between being spectator, performer and finally detached 
commentator of this scene. 
Where the narrative does not involve performance, the very existence 
of the numbers turns the film into a show for the spectator; for 
instance both the 'Trolley song' and 'Skip to my Lou' in St. Louis are 
'staged' by the director. The 'Trolley Song' is the least narratively 
motivated of all the film's numbers. It is entirely a set piece, staged, 
almost choreographed on a tram. It does, however, signify the film's 
status as a musical: in making music and in creating a sense of 
community, energy and heightened drama out of an everyday object 
and event - catching the tram - and in its narrative component - 
the man and woman seeking each other, culminating in the forming 
of a couple. (However their discovery of each other is played down and 
the couple even look embarrassed; this is an example of an unexpected 
note in the film and a reminder that it is not only a musical. ) 
'Skip to my Lou' accompanies a folk dance during the first party at the 
Smith's house, which marks Esther's first meeting with the boy-next- 
door. It is sung by an off-screen, non-diegetic chorus, as well as by the 
young people at the party as they'dance: 'It projects a folk quality 
through and through. Fiddle and ukulele lend a country flavour, 
bowed and strummed by the party goers in that communal effort 
3 In The boy next door', Chapter 5, I explore how the spectator is also put in the place 
of Esther's desire . 
which defines folk art' (Feuer, p. 10). The parents are absent and this is 
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the time for the younger generation group rituals, which set the scene 
for their coupling; the refrain repeats 'I lost my partner', the theme also 
of the 'Trolley Song'. Altman cites the dance as an example of the 
musical's focus on coupling: 
'the camera begins to sail over the heads of the dancing couples as 
if it were looking for something, ... as if it were ... trying* to 
comprehend the pattern underlying all this dizzying movement. 
Without warning as the camera is tracking up and back, it stops 
stock-still as if it had found an answer to its question, ... the 
camera's freeze coincides exactly with the separation of the 
whirling couples into two lines facing each other ... it has isolated 
sexual symmetry on which all activity in the room depends' 
(Altman, 1989, p. 73). 
Again the use of the tracking camera gives the spectator a 
commentating, 'director's position. 
Performance is evident in more than the numbers. Most of the 
characters are presented as putting on an act in their daily actions: for 
instance, Esther and her sister Rose preen themselves when they meet 
their beaux; Tootie performs throughout, from her first appearance on 
the ice-cart as she tells the carrier ghoulish stories about her dolls, 
relishing their effect; the grandfather tells stories on Hallowe'en night. 
The film is based around seasonal rituals, beginning with the ketchup- 
making, through making snow-people and holding parties. Only the 
mother is often presented as a non-performer and as 'genuine' (even 
when she sings) but she belongs to the family melodrama part of the 
film and has the different function of providing the maternal safe 
environment for the spectator to play (as I explore in Chapter 5). The 
film as performance can also be seen as an aspect of Minnelli's 
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authorial stance, with the spectator invited not just to perform along 
with the characters but also to participate in its knowing amusement at 
the characters' expense. 
Transformation 
In different ways musicals effect a transformation of everyday life into 
a space for wish-fulfilment - or for playing - most commonly within 
the song and dance numbers. 
Richard Dyer explores the wish-fulfilment tendency of the musical 
from a cultural/ ideological perspective in 'Entertainment as Utopia' 
(1977), arguing that it epitomises entertainment in general. If 
entertainment, as it is usually assumed to do, promises 'escapism' and 
'wish-fulfilment', Dyer (1977) asks the question: escapism from and to 
what? From these two terms he enumerates five 'lacks' in capitalist 
society from which the spectator wishes to escape: scarcity, exhaustion, 
dreariness, manipulation and fragmentation. As wish-fulfilment 
entertainment purports to make good these lacks, in the process 
creating for the spectator an experience of what 'utopia might feel like' 
(p. 177). In similar terms to Feuer, he suggests that the utopia of popular 
entertainment is not, however, subversive of the status quo, but rather 
manages to reassert it by addressing only those lacks in capitalism that 
capitalism itself can remedy. 
According to Dyer, therefore, the utopian sensibility is produced by the 
musical's offering to counter the lacks it sets up with attributes of 
abundance, energy, openness, intensity and transparency; where, 
mainly through the song and dance numbers, the spectator will not be 
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required to think, but to respond on an emotional and a sensuous level 
and, in this way, to enter the musical's utopian space. For Jane Feuer, 
the spectator can expect to be given 'a glimpse of what it would be like 
to be free' (Feuer, 1982, p. 84). Elsaesser writes of Minnelli's musicals 
that they express the individual's need 'for liberation' against 'the 
restrictive force of an individualistic morality' (Elsaesser, 1969, p. 24). 
All these attributes suggest for him the specific pleasure of the musical, 
which can be related to the privileged domain of playing where the 
player is not bound by rules of negotiable reality. 
Dyer draws a distinction between those musicals which present a 
utopia through the numbers which seem to contradict the film's 
narrative, and a smaller number, among which he cites. St. Louis, 
where the whole film offers a utopian vision, in this case, of a 
'remembered past', that Altman calls 'a St. Louis filtered through the 
transforming palette of an artist' (Altman, 1989, p. 277). In St. Louis the 
transformation promised by the musical has been effected before the 
film begins; the purpose of the plot is to ensure its continuity. In this 
sense the idyllic setting of the folk musical (which is not Dyer's 
classification) approaches that of the 'fairy tale musical', which 
contains an overtly magical or dream place, a sub-genre also favoured 
by Minnelli (for instance, Yolande and the Thief 1945; Brigadoon, 1954). 
Altman suggests that the musical's numbers' use of transitions to and 
from the diegetic and non-diegetic sound-track 'blurs the borders 
between the real and the non-real' (Altman, 1989, p. 63). For instance, in 
the 'Trolley Song', where an ordinary object is transformed into a 
setting for the lovers' search for each other and a celebration of 
community, diegetic sounds from the trolley (such as the 'clanging') 
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are co-ordinated into the non-diegetic singing of the off-screen chorus; 
in such ways is the spectator's attention moved in and out of the film. 
Formally, the song-and-dance numbers are marked as quite separate 
and distinctive from the surrounding narrative. In the early Berkeley 
musicals the chorus is transformed into formal patterns; in the later 
Minnelli musicals, for instance Brigadoon (1954) and The Pirate (1947), 
the numbers transport the characters and spectator to a fantasy, dream 
place. In St. Louis the shift from narrative to number is less marked. 
Where they are not signalled as intended performance, the numbers, 
like playing itself, are presented more seamlessly as a part of the 
emotional life of the characters: Esther sings of her desire for 'The boy- 
next-door'; Mr and Mrs Smith of their courtship in 'You and I'; Esther 
her seduction song in 'Over the banister'. 
Nevertheless, simply by being placed artificially in the course of the 
narrative, all numbers in a musical are obviously and clearly marked 
as a special discourse. They represent a different kind of experience, on 
a different plane from the 'reality' of the narrative. The codes of music 
and dance are perceived as being able to express emotions both more 
directly (in their impact on the spectator) and yet at the same time 
more obliquely than the language-based narrative codes. Dyer refers to 
Suzanne Langer's work in his discussion of the effect of music and 
dance: she proposes that 'music is an analogue for emotive life' (Dyer, 
1977, p. 178) in that there is a material correspondence between the form 
and rhythm of dance and music and the 'movement' of emotions, 
such as tension and relaxation, climaxes and resolutions. The reference 
to Suzanne Langer is not pursued and film studies has not found a 
means of accounting for the effects on the viewer of non-linguistic or 
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non-representational codes, but it draws attention to the impression 
and effect of energy, liberation and other affective features that those 
who enjoy going to musicals experience, specifically brought about by 
the 'unreal' presence of the numbers in the narrative and the 
consequent shift in discourse that for the playing spectator represents a 
move to potential space. 
A similar attempt to account for the effect of energy and liberation in 
the musical is Martin Sutton's argument in 'Patterns of meaning in 
the musical' (1981) that the dichotomy between the narrative and the 
numbers represents the difference between the constraints of the super- 
ego (the narrative) and the energy of the id (the numbers), 'providing 
the characters and spectators the opportunity to exercise imagination 
and personal freedom' (Sutton, 1981, p. 191). Sutton suggests that the 
resolution of the musicals, usually through marriage, which brings 
together the themes and concerns of the narrative and the numbers, 
aims to reconcile the demands of the reality with the pleasure 
principles and the repressive aims of the super-ego with the free- 
flowing energy of the id. However although Sutton's account draws 
attention to the effects of liberation and energy of the numbers 
contrasted with the constraints of the narrative, the id is not, according 
to Freud, a site for 'the imagination' which is to do with secondary 
elaboration; nor is the super-ego the source of narrative. 
Sutton goes on to suggest that musicals create 'play spaces' for the 
performing of the numbers; these 'transformations' have in common 
the element of 'play' [they are not] 'just points for expending pent-up 
energy but they provide opportunities for imaginative discovery ... 
space in the musicals becomes 'activated', giving 'the body room to 
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move and through this the mind room to expand':... it becomes 
'activated' (Sutton, p. 193). His description of characters' use of objects 
as 'props' for their extemporary performances recalls the infant's use of 
the transitional object and illusion: 'objects and settings from the 
everyday world of the surrounding plot are given a new meaning by 
their use within the number' (ibid). In describing the musical as a 
playspace, Sutton moves away from his distinction between the id and 
super-ego to introduce an element of the playfulness of the musical, 
which is more appropriate to the concept of the Winnicottian, playing 
spectator than the Freudian distinction he proposes. 
The notion of the musical as a playspace for the spectator gives a 
positive gloss to what Dyer terms escapism and wish-fulfilment. While 
a move into potential space is seen a 'relief' from the negotiation with 
the real world this need not mean that it is a flight from it, rather the 
means of assimilation of inner and outer experience. 
An example of two opposed notions of escapism is presented in the 
musical Pennies from Heaven (Ross, 1981). Set in the 1930s, about a 
seedy and unfaithful sheet-song seller with unrealistic ambitions and 
sexual desires which his wife cannot satisfy, it deconstructs the musical 
both in its plot ands use of numbers. It has two endings, one where the 
main character is hung for a murder he did not commit, the other an 
'alternative' happy ending, which is narratively unconvincing but 
emotionally convincing; the couple defy death and are reunited in 
fantasy. The musical numbers are revealed as embodying fantasies 
overtly rather than covertly (as is usual in traditional musicals) by 
substituting for the voice of the film's characters the voices of the 
original singers of the thirties' songs, 'revealing' them as 'unreal' and 
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an escape from the 'realities' of the narrative. This film is overtly about 
sexuality which the traditional musicals express covertly through the 
musical numbers: the hidden sexual desire of the virginal school 
teacher heroine is joyfully celebrated in two musical number 
sequences. The 'escapism' of these numbers therefore represents the 
hitherto unspoken 'truth' about her and the final effect is to validate 
sex in the way that older musicals validated 'love'. The two endings of 
the film therefore reveal both the objective impossibility of the fantasy 
and yet at the same time its subjective truth. In the paradoxical realm 
of the transitional area both endings are valid at the same time. 
Like all musicals, Meet me in St. Louis ends in an assertion: that St. 
Louis can provide all that the characters can ever want and that their 
wishes and those of the spectator have been fulfilled. The city of St. 
Louis becomes the utopia that, for Richard Dyer, the musical represents 
and plays out for the spectator. This is a large promise that for Jane 
Feuer fundamentally cheats the spectator. From her viewpoint, the 
bringing together at the end of the film of the two domains represented 
by the numbers and the narrative is a deception: the musical's 
resolution of problems through the dance sequences 'implies by 
analogy that movies fulfil our wishes in 'real life' (p. 76). 
For Feuer the pleasure of musicals is that they 'give us a glimpse of 
what it would be like to be free', but their deception is that they 
'foreclose a desire to translate that desire into reality' (p. 84). The 
concept of the transitional area and of playing introduces a quite 
different argument: that not only does playing, in this case of the 
spectator with the film, offer a beneficial experience precisely because it 
lies between reality and fantasy (which Feuer implies is a dangerous 
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confusion), but that also, by providing a means for the assimilation of 
experience, it enables the spectator better to meet the challenges of the 
real world when she 'returns' to it. From this perspective playing 
provides a 'safe' means of re-playing roles and relationships. More 
powerfully it can be a means of re-forming what is given - if the 
subject can experience a sense of autonomy and an ability to act on her 
environment through play she becomes nearer to being able to do the 
same in everyday life. 
This is a reiteration, albeit in specific terms because it comes from a 
psychoanalytical perspective, of a traditional view that cultural, 
aesthetic experience is beneficial in and for itself. In these terms the 
ending and the ostensible message of a film are less significant than the 
psychic processes that engaging with it sets up in the spectator. The 
function of entertainment, which takes place in potential space, 
becomes that of giving the spectator an experience of playing that she 
can take back with her to her negotiation with the world. 
Bertolt Brecht, whose influence lies behind Feuer's criticism of the 
musical, proposed, unlike her, that the purpose of his kind of theatre 
can and should be to combine learning and pleasure: he stresses that 
there is such a thing as 'pleasurable learning, cheerful and militant 
learning' (Brecht, 1964, p. 77) which is eagerly sought by those oppressed 
by the system in which they live; this is a view of the value of popular 
culture that was not taken up by the Screen critics of the 1970s who 
drew on Brecht. The notion of the playing spectator is congruent with 
the idea that 'learning' can take place through taking part in cultural 
activity and is as much related to feeling as to the intellect. The 
spectator's participation in the film-play of the musical can give her an 
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experience of liberation and activity; as I explore further in Chapter 6, 
the playing subject is able to act upon her environment in a way that 
neither exploits it nor allows herself to be exploited. 
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Meet me in St. Louis: the playing begins 
The following analysis from St. Louis completes the opening sequence 
of the film. By now, I argued in the last chapter, the spectator has 
moved into the space of the film and to her psychic domain of 
potential space. At this point a tracking shot has followed the cyclist, 
Lon the Smith's son, and moved the spectator from front to back of the 
screen, (into the space of the action) into the Smith's kitchen, where 
she will be given a place in the playing. 
Mrs Smith and Katy the maid are making ketchup, both dressed for the 
part in large aprons, leaning over a large, central pot, with large spoons, 
evoking a women's ritual. Ritually, playfully, each takes a taste, each 
pronounces it as lacking, but differently, so that a conflict is 
immediately introduced, but one that is figured in and contained by the 
ritual playing. The ketchup is judged: "too sour", "too sweet" and both 
women perform their part in a slightly exaggerated, certainly playful, 
although also an absolutely serious way. 
The playing at this point is like a story being acted out (recalling for 
instance, in its repetitive tasting ritual, The Three Bears), an 
impression reinforced by Lon's entry, as if with the intention of having 
his taste. The sense of playful conflict is heightened as we wait for each 
member of the family to continue the dispute; the conflict is playful in 
its ritualisation of a not very serious issue and we know that there is 
going to be no agreement (until Judy Garland comes in finally at the 
end of the sequence, and agrees fairly authoritatively with her mother, 
effectively resolving this moment. ) It is significant however that the 
father, marginal to this woman's world, does not have his taste (as 
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finally he does not have his way over the departure to New York). 
There is no reason, however, why the spectator should not have hers, 
as the child listening to the story of The Three Bears also has her part 
in the story. 
A hint of transgression. 
The younger daughter, Agnes, enters, in her underwear, with her hair 
wet, and wearing large, men's shoes. She breaks in on the ritual of the 
ketchup-tasting and takes up the film's title song, hummed by Lon. 
Introduced, by being sung by the extra diegetic singer, as belonging to 
the public domain in the opening, the song has now been taken into 
the private domain, - with a suggestion that there is no distinction; 
the family and St. Louis are one, as are the spectator and the actors. 
Agnes continues her acting with an over-done sneeze, as she performs 
'Meet me in St Louis' through the house, the camera tracking her 
movements, inviting us to explore the family further into the recesses 
of its home. In spite of the self-consciousness of her singing, her 
underwear has a 'naturalising' effect among the playing and the 
dressed-up (as Edwardian) characters; at the same time, however, it 
provokes a slightly prurient curiosity, as well as an element of surprise 
as she moves further inside the house, up the stairs, suggesting that 
this story will move - as every family story and history must do - 
into areas of much greater import than ketchup tasting. 
Again, the spectator is offered two places: the moving camera invites 
identification with its active, searching movement: as singer of the 
song, (already established from the credits) she now also sings along 
with the girl. The hint of transgression of the girl in her underclothes 
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is reinforced by the camera/child coming up against a closed door. A 
quick, smooth cut through to the other side of the door shows the 
grandfather shaving and the song is handed over to him, again as if 
playfully, like a child's song-game, marking the 'folksiness' of the film 
and naturalising the singing. Grandfather is also dressed up - and 
down - in his braces and a striped skull cap and is theatrically placed 
against a lit-up stained glass window. In this continuing hand-over of 
the song, (a common ploy in musicals) the spectator, too, is invited to 
take a part in the well-known song as she was, less obviously, in the 
tasting ritual. Grandfather, also not quite dressed, in his dressing gown, 
inspects and admires himself in a mirror; a point of view shot of his 
reflection implicates the spectator, for a moment confusing who is 
looking at whom. 
A quick cut takes Grandfather to the landing outside his room, still 
singing; this time the dance part of the theme number is introduced as 
he waltzes towards the backing camera with a towel and moves into 
his room to try on a red cap among several, again reflected in a mirror, 
poising himself theatrically in time to the music. The spectator has 
already been able to dance inwardly to the tune in the credits; now this 
dance movement is externalised as if from the spectator herself. (This 
focus on dress and dance is a forerunner of later scenes with 
grandfather, when, possessing the tuxedo which Esther's beau lacks, he 
substitutes for him and takes Esther to the neighbour's ball, as the film 
hints at an incestuous motif. ) 
Grandfather looks out of the window as the theme song is taken up 
again by the chorus, from outside, and we follow his gaze in another 
point of view shot, to a pony trap drawing up and the sound of 
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exaggeratedly cheerful young peoples' voices. The song dies out with a 
camera cut as, looking out of the window with Grandfather, we wait in 
anticipation, to see the star of the film. From having being moved 
from the outside to inside the house, the spectator now has a place 
inside it, looking out, her place in the family setting and scenario 
established. In a final move the camera moves outside and follow 
Esther (Judy Garland) into the kitchen to have the last taste of the 
ketchup. 
One way that a place is made available for the spectator in the film is 
through Minnelli's famous use of camera movement using a boom 
camera and a range of crane and tracking shots. In her detailed analysis 
of this opening sequence, Beth Genne constantly personifies the 
camera: 'the gliding camera now attaches itself to Lon ... the camera 
remains quietly at the far end of the room ... the camera hesitates for a 
moment, then decides to follow his glance' (Genne 1983, p. 251). The 
camera is presented as a character, playing a part, although Genne does 
not go further to implicate the spectator. I argue in this thesis that 
different kinds of movement, both material and psychic, are important 
to the notion of the playing spectator and Minnelli's varied use of the 
moving camera can contribute to the spectator's movement into and 
through the film. However more than one factor is necessary: the 
spectator's playing is only activated through the complex 
interrelationship in both film and spectator of technical, formal, 
narrative and psychic moves. 
By now, introduced so far only to the minor members of the family in 
terms of the main narrative, the spectator has been given different 
subject positions as the main themes (the fair, the family relationships 
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and rituals) are introduced: playing as active observer, as actor and as 
singer she has been taken up into the world of the musical, the 
dynamics of the narrative and the possibility of taking part in the 
scenarios underlying it. By the end of this short opening sequence she 
has taken up a place in the film's playing and is ready for further 
engagement in its narrative. 
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Chapter 4 THE BREAKDOWN OF PLAYING 
I shall say that behind any fiction there is a second fiction: the 
diegetic events are fictional, that is the first; but everyone pretends 
to believe that they are true, and that is the second; there is even a 
third: the general refusal to admit that somewhere in oneself one 
believes they are genuinely true 
('Disavowal, Fetishism', Christian Metz, in Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema, 1982, p. 72) 
The unconscious spectator 
This chapter deals with the next stage in this narrative of the playing 
spectator: the moment where her playing breaks down and she is 
overtaken and taken over by feelings which move her unaccountably 
and in spite of herself - for example, to tears. To be so moved is one of 
the lures of cinema for the playing spectator. The sensations as of being 
'overcome', of being 'in a dream' and of being 'lost' are all commonly 
expressed experiences of cinema-going which many seek in engaging 
with a film but which others carefully avoid. For the playing spectator 
the breakdown of playing is always temporary and can become a means 
of re-connecting inner and outer experiences through the bridging 
function of potential space. She has no need to 'avoid' the incursion of 
the unconscious. 
The playing spectator has opened herself to this takeover by willingly 
submitting to the film viewing experience and by her psychic shift into 
the transitional area where she can take up a place in the play on 
screen. For the playing spectator, the process of watching a film is an 
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active and participatory experience, where she herself partly creates the 
scene which apparently only unfolds before her. However, by her 
move into the transitional area, which she allows but cannot exactly 
will to happen, the spectator also invites the possibility of her playing 
breaking down and of a move to another psychic domain, where she 
ceases to take part as an equal and active participant and instead takes 
on a passive position. The film acts on her; moves her; positions her; 
and she becomes caught up in a psychic structure which she has not 
constructed and which she does not manage for herself. She reacts in a 
way that may seem quite out of proportion to the fact that she is 
watching a fiction which cannot materially affect her, and quite at odds 
with her intellectual assessment of the film (we may cry at 'bad' 
movies). This moment of the breakdown of playing signals the entry of 
the unconscious onto the scene of this thesis (having so far operated 
backstage) and, within film studies, the construction of a passive, 
unconscious spectator. From a Winnicottian perspective, this returns 
us initially to the Freudian and Kleinian view of the unconscious. 
In this chapter, I explore the breakdown of the playing spectator from 
two perspectives: through the return of the repressed, where the 
conscious spectator is 'overcome' by unconscious forces; and through 
the workings of fantasy, where the subject is caught up and dispersed 
into a fantasy or a dream scenario and withdraws into inner, psychic 
reality - her own and that of the film. In the following chapter, 5, 
'Replaying Loss', I will examine ways in which the spectator may 
replay unconscious experiences of 'loss', including, finally, the loss of 
subjectivity itself incurred in 'merging' with the film; in all these cases 
the precarious position of playing in potential space between inner and 
outer reality temporarily breaks down. 
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My analyses of Meet me in St. Louis in these chapters move away from 
its musical aspects to focus on its status as a family melodrama, 
introduced in Chapter 1 as the location of the playing-out of 
unconscious family processes; however the breakdown of the 
spectator's playing, like playing itself, cannot be confined to any one 
genre and can be triggered apparently unpredictably in the encounter 
with a film. 
The concept of the dynamic unconscious is at the heart of 
psychoanalysis and a major source of the twentieth century model of 
the split subject which undermines idealist assumptions of a unified 
consciousness: insisting that, alongside and behind our conscious 
awareness, there exists another psychic agency that is crucial in 
determining our relationships, behaviour and ability to experience our 
lives in ways which are satisfactory to us. Accepting the unconscious 
means accepting that we are not the owners of ourselves or our 
destiny, even on the individual psychic level. In film studies, it 
involves accepting that the film may act on us in ways that we cannot 
understand or control. 
Winnicott adopted aspects of both the Freudian and the Kleinian view 
of the unconscious as a part of his inherited psychoanalytical 
background. From Freud he took the central notion of repression in 
the formation of the unconscious, with the trauma of the child's 
acceptance of castration at the Oedipal stage and the construction of the 
punishing, authoritarian, unconscious super-ego. The unconscious 
exists as a 'repository of strongly cathected 'memories' which, although 
'forgotten' by their owner, continue to exert a determining influence in 
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his or her everyday life and are continually replayed in both 
relationships and fiction (Freud, 1915). With Klein and her followers 
the view of the unconscious shifts from such a concentration on a 
particular and rather late Oedipal stage to pre-verbal experiences 
around the parent/child triangle; Klein also emphasises the infant's 
earliest experiences, from birth, of extreme and conflicting feelings 
towards the mother/breast. By going deeper into the past, the 
unconscious becomes larger and more inclusive than the Freudian 
repressed unconscious (Mitchell, 1986, p. 25). 
With this emphasis on the importance of the infant's earliest physical 
experiences, bodily sensations and imagery of part objects - often of a 
terrifying and monstrous kind - find their way into accounts of the 
unconscious, which now stress its material content (Mitchell, 1986, 
p. 23). Elizabeth Wright notes of Winnicott's and Klein's unconscious: 
'Where Klein's narratives partake of the Gothic, Winnicott's might be 
regarded as having an absurd, Beckett like quality' (Wright, 1987, p. 
182). Klein's story of the unconscious, based on primitive, body-derived 
experiences and images may be more easily accommodated in accounts 
of the horror movie whereas Freudian-derived models, based on the 
primacy of the Oedipal drama, fit more obviously with film 
melodrama's account of emerging sexuality and Oedipal conflicts. In 
the melodrama, the spectator may be moved to tears as she looks for 
wish fulfilment; in the horror movie the breakdown of play would 
manifest itself as terror or disgust, mingled with their opposite, 
excitement. For Winnicott the repressed unconscious was to become a 
specific and limited formulation or entity. According to his widow 
Clare Winnicott, Winnicott de-centred sex as the core factor in the 
growth of the individual - 'perhaps it hadn't got the importance that 
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it had for Freud' (Winnicott, Clare, 1983, p. 178). Nevertheless she 
insists that, at the same time, it was also a concept he simply took for 
granted. In Human Nature (Winnicott, 1988), which is based on 
lectures that Winnicott gave to social-work students in the 1950s -a 
'lay' audience - he emphasises the necessity for him to present 
Freud's position on child sexuality as a basis for any understanding of 
human development from a psychoanalytical perspective. His account 
of the Oedipal stage is fairly orthodox, particularly on sexual difference 
and female sexuality where, while allowing for the possibility of an 
'earlier' female sexuality, he also re-states the role of penis envy in the 
girl's development and focuses on the boy in his account of Oedipus 
(Winnicott, 1988, ch. 1). It is, however, also the case that in his work 
generally Winnicott de-centres the father - and particularly the threat 
of the father - who emerges mainly as a shadowy figure in his writing 
and then mainly as a support for and in the background of the mother 
(Phillips, 1988, Ch. 1). 
Early in his work Winnicott states that, following Klein, he has 
replaced the distinction between 'reality' and 'fantasy' with a 
distinction between 'inner and external reality' (Phillips, 1988, p. 58). 
The notion of 'inner reality' which parallels Klein's 'psychic reality' 
avoids dispute about the reality status of psychic experiences, which 
Klein insisted on. In Winnicott's case, it also enables him to avoid 
making distinctions between conscious and unconscious psychic 
activity, so that he can move about easily in discussing all internal 
psychic activity whether unconscious or not. This becomes important 
in his discussions of potential space and play, where 'inner reality' 
becomes a broader notion than the Freudian or even the Kleinian 
formulation. 
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Whatever the model, the unconscious appears, in different ways, as 
both alien and inaccessible and yet also as a constant and pervasive 
presence in everyday life: lurking and ready to 'break through' in 
'slips', from the trivial to the disastrous, attendant each night in 
dreaming, current in fiction, impinging on relationships - the 
subject's history always inescapably present. It acts as a ghost-like 
presence in the subject's life, in parallel to his or her conscious 
experience. Cinema's peculiar ability to represent all experiences as 
having the same phenomenological status has been exploited 
throughout the history of cinema to negate the difference between the 
objective and subjective, reality and fantasy. 
In his book on Winnicott, Adam Phillips asserts: 'the unconscious is 
intrinsically unacceptable in classical psychoanalysis' (Phillips, 1988, 
p. 137). This might seem to discount the scientific endeavour of 
psychoanalysis, which presents the unconscious as an objective 
discovery, and as neither negative nor positive. Yet such a value 
judgement may be discerned in the model itself: essentially the 
Freudian unconscious is a subversive, anarchic force. While for some 
this may represent a form of liberation, that was not the case for Freud. 
For him, the ego is the agency by which the pleasure-principle 
demands of the id are modified by the reality principle, as the subject 
takes up a place in society. The id/unconscious is 'a chaos, a cauldron 
full of seething excitations' (Freud, 1933, p. 498), seeking nothing but its 
own satisfaction. Its operation is that of the primary psychic process, 
working by means of displacement through freely-flowing energy 
('mobile cathexis'), 'where one idea may transfer to another its whole 
quota of cathexis'; and by condensation, where the idea 'may 
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appropriate the whole cathexis of several other ideas' (Freud, 1915, 
p. 159). Its operations contrast to the controlled flow of the secondary, 
conscious process which works according to the laws of rational 
discourse: the unconscious opposes the anarchic pleasure principle and 
the primary process to the conscious, reality principle and the logic and 
coherence of the secondary process, a model as of an irresponsible child 
contrasted with a responsible adult. 
For Freud, it is not exactly that the unconscious is 'bad'; that view was 
left to those who strongly resisted the possibility of any such 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, his concept is of an unconscious that is 
essentially in conflict with the conscious system, and his project in 
therapy, precisely, was to help patients expose unconscious ideas to the 
light of rational discourse so that, like the Hydra's head, they atrophy 
and die. Although Freud was still insisting on the primacy of the 
notion of the unconscious in psychoanalysis at the end of his life - 
'consciousness is only a quality or attribute of what is psychical and 
moreover an inconstant one' (Freud 1940, p. 188), he, increasingly 
stresses the superiority of the conscious system: 'none of this implies 
that the quality of being conscious has lost its importance for us. It 
remains the one light which illuminates our path and leads us 
through the darkness of mental life ... our scientific work will consist 
in translating unconscious processes into conscious ones ... thus filling 
in the gaps in conscious perception' (ibid, p. 189). 
It would be too simple to see this model as one of constraint - the 
repressive force of culture and society internalised as the super-ego, 
defending and warding off the feared anarchy of the unconscious, 
bearer of the pleasure principle, striving for a place in the individual's 
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life but to be resisted for the sake of his place in society. Part of the 
rationale of psychoanalysis is that the over-rigorous attempt of 
inhibiting forces to keep down the unconscious only strengthens it or 
leads to an unsatisfyingly restricted life. 'Distrust' or 'dislike' may 
therefore seem too emotive a way of describing Freud's measured aim 
of understanding and transforming what is unconscious into 
conscious. Yet essentially his therapeutic aim was to cure the patient of 
the effects of the unconscious by facing the reality of its contents. 
This attitude to the unconscious would appear to inform both Wood's 
(1979) and Britton's (1978) essays on Meet Me in St. Louis. Both critics 
take on the task of analysing the film's unconscious in order to 
undermine the film's apparent, overt, project of celebrating the family, 
with its 'myth of togetherness at the end' (Wood, 1979, p. 6). Wood's 
reading, in particular, sees the family as 'the central medium for the 
transmission of neurosis' (ibid). His position is essentially that the 
unconscious of the film contains the 'truth' about the family, which 
the musical, celebratory veneer of St. Louis as a Hollywood product 
papers over. His essay purports to reveal the 'truth' of the film as if to 
'cure' the spectator of her illusions: (he also wishes to 'cure' himself, 
for he reports that he is deeply ambivalent about the family). 
For Wood, the film conceals the oppression of the women, the subject 
of women's melodrama. Britton demonstrates that, although the film 
seems to present the father as 'victim', it also shows him as a 
repressive, dominant breadwinner, forcing the family, and particularly 
the women, to fit in with his wishes. Images show the father as 
separate, shot alone, with the rest of the family, including the 
grandfather, in the reverse shot: male against female, individual 
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against the group. At other times he is shot in a dominant position 
from below, towering over his family, asserting his authority. His 
'defeat' is brought about by Tootie and becomes a matter of life and 
death. 
However, these accounts of the unconscious represent a partial view, 
in two ways: firstly, they do not contain the whole 'truth' about the 
family, which in this film is represented as a 'container' for its 
members' conflicts in a more positive way than Wood acknowledges 
- conflicts are not necessarily just repressed but are sometimes 
resolved or at least played out and defused. In this sense playing can 
become the means of re-connecting unconscious and conscious. 
Secondly, as I will argue in the next chapter, from the perspective of the 
Winnicottian spectator there can be a different stake in the fictional 
pursuit of the unconscious, for example, in seeking a 'return' to the 
pre-Oedipal maternal 'holding environment'. Wood's and, to a lesser 
extent, Britton's views of the unconscious in St. Louis insist on the 
deception of the viewer who finds pleasure from the film. However, 
audiences have continued to watch St. Louis, and the playing spectator 
may seek and happily allow the breakdown of playing through her 
involvement with the screen play. 
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The spectator is taken over: the return of the repressed. 
Winnicott describes the breakdown of playing for the child as the 
moment when 'the physical excitement of instinctual involvement 
becomes evident' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 39); the tension of such a 
moment may be de-fused by the child's crying. In this thesis, the 
spectator's unexpected tears mark an analogous process: the eruption 
from the unconscious into consciousness of what has been repressed. 
Although the unconscious can only be encountered through its 
derivatives and traces, it makes its mark, often by stealth but 
sometimes by force. In English, the psychoanalytic alliterative phrase 
'the return of the repressed' has a dramatic ring to it, in keeping with 
the idea of the activity of the unconscious, which is expressed by Freud 
with an anthropomorphic hint of a 'conscious' intention on the part of 
the repressed ideas to push through the barriers against them back into 
consciousness. Laplanche and Pontalis point to Freud's insistence on 
the indestructibility of the contents of the unconscious so that 
repressed material, 'the pleasure demanding satisfaction ... always has 
the tendency to re-emerge into consciousness' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1988, p. 398). The psyche becomes a battleground for the struggle 
between repressed ideas and the repressing forces of the ego, reinforced 
by the unconscious, punitive Super-ego; the purpose of analysis is to 
enable repressed ideas to emerge in, a regulated way so that they can be 
confronted and dealt with by the conscious person. As Freud puts it, 
'the ego struggles against our instigation, while the unconscious, 
which is normally our opponent, comes to our help, since it has a 
natural 'upward drive and desires nothing better than to press forward 
its settled frontiers into the ego and so to consciousness' (Freud, 1969, 
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p. 36; my italics). The repressed always returns 'by more or less devious 
routes and through the intermediary of secondary formations' 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 398). Film, like other forms of fiction, 
can serve as such a vehicle. 
Entering the screen-play and playing along with a film can set up the 
conditions that Laplanche and Pontalis cite for the return of the 
repressed: firstly 'a weakening of the Anticathexis, the system of 
defence working to maintain in repression the unconscious ideas'; 
secondly, 'a reinforcement of the 'instinctual pressure, the drive 
associated with the repressed idea'; and thirdly, 'the occurrence in the 
present of events which call forth the repressed material' (Laplanche 
and Pontalis, 1988, p. 398). 
Freud explores the weakening of the Anticathexis in his 
short but influential piece, unpublished by himself, 'Psychopathic 
Characters on the Stage' (Freud, 1942). Here he accounts for the 
pleasure to be gained from the theatre, which allows the expression, 
albeit disguised, of the conflict between repression and the repressed: 
he takes as his example Hamlet's Oedipal conflict, 'similarly repressed 
in all of us'. The play allows it expression but only deviously: 'however 
clearly it is recognised [by the spectator], it is never given a definite 
name; so that the process is carried through with his attention averted, 
and he is in the grip of his emotions instead of taking stock of what is 
happening' (p. 126). The playing spectator's lowered resistance allows 
repressed material to act upon him without it reaching consciousness. 
Applying Freud's formulation to film, we may say that, at first, the film 
spectator 'knows' she is watching a fiction- the film is clearly not, 
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although it may resemble it, the life of the world she has temporarily 
left behind. In a double twist, even as she suspends disbelief while she 
takes part in the playing so that she believes the film to be 'true', at the 
same time she is still 'deceived' into believing that it is 'untrue' and 
has nothing to do with her. She is 'deceived', in order to disguise the 
deeper truth that it may in fact resonate with the truth that lies in her 
unconscious and which has been repressed. 
Freud also argues that the spectator's defences are weakened by the 
'fore pleasures' of the form (Freud, 1942, p. 127). The spectator or reader 
is skilfully induced to greater participation in the forbidden repressed 
sexual scenarios by the apparently innocent formal and external 
aesthetic pleasures of fiction. With his defences lowered he is ready to 
submit to the hidden, 'unconscious' scenario, which, in any case, his 
own unconscious wishes to play out, so that it acts in 'happy co- 
operation' with the text. In these terms the famous 'beauty' and 'style' 
of Minnelli's films would also serve to lure the spectator into engaging 
with their unconscious substance. In addition, a more acceptable 
emotional-sexual situation presented for the spectator's obvious 
participation may overlay and hide another, forbidden one. 
Both of these kinds of lure are explored in Elizabeth Cowie's account of 
Now Voyager (Cowie, 1984). For instance, the 'forepleasures' of the 
repetitive visual 'clues' of parts of her clothes and body build up to the 
sight of Bette Davis transformed from an 'old maid' to a newly 
constructed object of desire for the spectator. Cowie also suggests that 
our identificatory tears at the famous ending, which is apparently about 
the Bette Davis character's renunciation of the man she loves in order 
to care for his daughter, serve to disguise the other identificatory (and 
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forbidden) wish-fulfilment ending: the delight of the child in having 
expelled the father and now in sole possession of the phallic pre- 
Oedipal mother 'with everything'. Our tears therefore serve as 
disguise, relief, the ending of tension, and the moment of fulfilment 
when our defences are down and our deepest fantasy wishes are 
realised. 
A similar unexpectedly emotional moment occurs in Meet Me in St. 
Louis in the scene when, after their quarrel about the move to New 
York, which has driven the rest of the family away, Mr and Mrs Smith 
are reunited at the piano and reconciled in the song 'You and F. The 
moment represents a lull and resting point between the tension of the 
quarrel and the re-establishment of the family unit when the family 
returns to the room as the song is ending. On the surface, and in terms 
of the film as a musical, the duet represents the reassertion of the 
couple in recalling the Smith's courtship (Casper, 1977). But in this 
scene Mr Smith is also represented as the little boy, rejected by his 
mother for his act of aggression but now reinstated in her affection. 
The playing spectator, who takes up different subject identificatory 
positions, may experience a complex mixture of the lover/son's 
feelings: as part of an adult couple, who recall the time when they had 
no children and whose romance was just beginning, but also in the 
disguised scenario, as the son who has got rid of the rest of the family, 
including the grandfather (father) and who has been forgiven by the 
mother. At this moment the son-lover has everything in the mother- 
lover who sings with him of romance and comfort. The spectator is 
moved not by the reconciliation of this ordinary couple but, taking the 
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part of the son/lover, by the hidden wish for the return of the pre- 
Oedipal mother-1 
Freud's thesis is that art has the ability to 'manage' for the reader a 
successful compromise between the return and the warding-off of the 
repressed through the deployment of its formal elements. Norman 
Holland, who introduces reader response theory from a psychoanalytic 
perspective in The Dynamics of Literary Response, explores the 
pleasure for the reader of having his or her fantasies both covertly 
expressed and at the same time overtly organised; he offers as an 
example the exquisite combination of the deep-seated fantasy and the 
highly complex form of, for instance, the 'Tomorrow' speech from 
Macbeth, which disguises but at the same time manages to express, in a 
way that the manifest content cannot, its primal fantasy (Holland, 1968, 
p. 107-10). 
The playing spectator allows the weakening of the Anticathexis by 
taking part in the interplay between herself and the film. By her move 
into potential space she invites the possibility of the return of the 
repressed and allows the film to work on her unconscious in the way 
that Freud describes in this essay. Her resistances are lowered and she is 
in a vulnerable- and perhaps also an excited- condition. 
At the same time, the very act of engaging with the film and the 
viewing situation itself may substitute for the second condition, for the 
return of the repressed, a 'reinforcement of instinctual pressure'. The 
example cited by Laplanche and Pontalis (1988, p. 398) is the onset of 
1This scene is explored further in the following chapter 
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puberty, when the subject, in a state brought about by physiological 
changes, may experience feelings and fantasies unacceptable to his or 
her present self-image. Winnicott defines the masturbatory element 
that may be involved in a child's playing and which, as 'the instinctual 
element', can lead to the interruption of play. 
That film-viewing may inexplicably and unexpectedly generate in the 
spectator excitement, shock, pleasure and disgust, marks of the return 
of the repressed unconscious, is evident both in public reaction to 
pornography and violence on screen and, of cinema more generally, in 
some academic psychoanalytic film-analyses of film's unconscious 
appeal. A good deal of this work involves an attempt either to 
rationalise away the unconscious appeal of cinema or, at least, to 
analyse it in order to come to terms with it. Part of the 'refusal' of the 
pleasures of Hollywood cinema in feminist critics, for instance, is the 
attempt to expunge the effects of what they see as Hollywood cinema's 
appeal to the male viewer's unconscious, perverse pleasures of 
looking: scopophilia, voyeurism and fetishism; Laura Mulvey's 
(Freudian) aim, expressed in her well-known statement, in 'Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' is: 'to free ... the look of the audience 
into dialectics, passionate detachment' (Mulvey, 1975, p. 315), through 
the creation of new cinematic practices. From a psychoanalytic point of 
view, however, the unconscious cannot be so easily dispensed with: 
Rodowick argues that Mulvey's thesis is a denial, by omission, of the 
possible unconscious pleasures of both the female and the male 
masochistic position (Rodowick, 1991, Ch. 1). 
The third condition given by Laplanche and Pontalis for easing the 
return of the repressed, 'the occurrence in the present of events which 
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call forth the repressed material' (Laplanche and Pontalis, p. 398) points 
clearly to the film encounter itself which constitutes an event that, like 
a 'crisis' in the subject's life, triggers in the viewer an unconscious 
reaction out of proportion to the event itself. 
In many cases however, the elements on screen that move the 
spectator may seem to be much nearer the surface. Scenes that remind 
us of our own situation give an illusion of familiarity and 
verisimilitude, suggesting the possibility that here we may find a 
playing out of our own scenarios. In this case the 'events in the 
present' need to address forcefully our conscious selves in order to 
trigger our unconscious response and the return of the repressed. 
Within the film viewing process, the conjunction of the film and the 
spectator events may then express, if not overtly expose, further 
reaches of our psyche, hidden scenarios. However what the film 
'reminds' us of, as Cowie explores in her essay on Now Voyager 
(1984)), may be most powerfully disturbing when it disguises a deeper 
and forbidden wish. From this psychoanalytic point of view, the 
familiar family quarrels and desires in Meet me in St. Louis overlay, 
express and at the same time disguise the film's repressed Oedipal 
scenarios. 
For some writers the spectator film relationship is essentially and 
fundamentally a relation to the unconscious. Metz's essays in 
Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (1982) are an extended analysis of film's 
transgressive and mysterious pleasures and an exploration of the 
spectators' ambivalent attitude to their own reactions. For Baudry, a 
fundamental attribute of the 'basic cinematographic apparatus' is that it 
invokes in the spectator a relation to the moving image analogous to 
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that of the subject in the Lacanian Imaginary at the Mirror stage 
(Baudry, 1986). 
In a dialogue, Raymond Bellour and Guy Rosolato explore the impact 
of the single image in a film: at this level, too, that of the image 
abstracted from the diegesis (on the editing table), they argue that there 
is a close relation of film to the unconscious: 'alone with this face, I was 
frightened. It suddenly became an extraordinary force'. Bellour calls 
this 'an experience which is fantasmatic and associative in an 
extremely direct fashion'; Rosolato relates the experience to the primal 
scene and to 'the importance of the visual in paranoia, that fixation on 
something which leads you into another "realm"' (Bellour and 
Rosolato, 1990, p. 206-7). 
Because of the conflict involved in the struggle of the repressed to 
break down the ego's equally determined (and also unconscious) 
defences, its return may be marked by its unexpectedness and force. 
Rational, coherent discourse falters and can no longer be sustained: the 
analysand falls silent- the seamless narrative flow of dominant 
cinema jars. This 'breakout' of the (imprisoned) unconscious is similar 
to that described by Freud as 'acting out, when the person behaves in 
pre-patterned ways, and is seemingly out of his own control. At this 
point 'action' or 'behaviour' may replace language: 'the subject, in the 
grip of his unconscious wishes and fantasies, relives these in the 
present with a sensation of immediacy which is heightened by his 
refusal to recognise their source and repetitive character' (Laplanche 
and Pontalis, 1973, p. 4). 
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In a film, the tight, highly structured narrative, where each event is 
motivated by another and the ending seems to serve as the resolution 
of all the narrative strands, falters under the weight of the unconscious 
discourse pushing its way through the surface. Like the analyst on the 
watch for the breakdown of the analysand's discourse, the analyst-critic 
of a film can find out and expose this hidden, unsaid and 
unacknowledged scenario in a way that is analogous to the analyst's 
look-out for slips, elisions or sudden halts in the analysand's narrative. 
The repressed has returned- or is about to do so- but is not yet 
assimilable into consciousness or speech. 
The idea of the form of a work 'breaking down', becoming incoherent 
or 'ruptured', has become familiar in film as in literary, studies. This 
involves two related assumptions: firstly that the text itself has an 
unconscious which 'wishes' or needs' to express itself and which may 
both underlie and contradict its overt message; secondly that this 
unconscious of the text can somehow communicate with the reader 
either as conscious analyst-critic, - a detective- who 'unearths' it, or 
as unconscious subject, who responds as one unconscious to another. 
In the case of the unconscious spectator, the unconscious of the film 
'works' on her without her being aware of what is happening to her or 
why, as in the examples above (Now Voyager and Meet me in St. 
Louis). As Freud puts it: 'it is a remarkable thing that the unconscious 
of one human being can react upon that of another without passing 
through the conscious system' (Freud, 1915, p. 198). The spectator is 
therefore 'unconscious' of both her own unconscious and of that of the 
film, which are working in alliance to weaken her Anticathexis and 
allow the repressed to return. Unlike the analyst-critic, the unconscious 
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spectator can only silently react and be moved. The detective analyst- 
viewer can 'understand' but is not moved and therefore, in her own 
way, misses some of the film's potential meaning. 2 
Both Britton and Wood act as detective-critics in their analyses of Meet 
me in St. Louis. In their terms it is the film's unconscious that reveals 
'the sexual energy which is repressed in a society based on family 
values' (Wood, 1979, p. 5), which the manifest film represses but cannot 
help but also allow to return. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the focus on family unconscious conflicts 
leads them to treat the film as a melodrama. Britton (1978) focuses on 
the Oedipal preoccupations of the film: 'castration' of the father in 
giving in to his family; 'incest' within the Smith family, notably 
between Esther and Grandfather, represented in his taking her to the 
dance instead of John Truett, as 'his property' (an event which Britton 
treats as a case of the female Oedipus complex); sado-masochism in the 
relationship between Esther and John Truett (the only time he shows 
any animated interest in her sexuality is when she hits him because 
she mistakenly believes he has hurt her sister- he asks for more and it 
is this scene that seems to be the confirmer of their relationship); 
parricide in Tootie's momentous (to her) 'killing' of Mr Brokauff, 
when she throws flour at him on Hallowe'en. 3 In all these examples, 
what Britton claims to be Oedipal unconscious themes are 'disguised' 
2 An outstanding example of the analyst critic approach is the Cahiers' rigorous 
analysis of 'Young Mr Lincoln', 1970', referred to in the last chapter on authorship. 313ritton's analysis has a more Lacanian slant than Wood's; he argues, for instance, 
that the family's opposition to Mr. Smith's projected move is an effort to uphold 'the 
law of the father' against that of, the actual father. 
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under 'innocent' manifestations; acting as analyst-critic he has 
'unearthed' and 'exposed' them. 
Nowell Smith explores the return of the repressed Oedipal themes in 
Minnelli's melodrama in an article published in 1977. Like the other 
psychoanalytic film writers of the time, he attempts to conflate issues of 
ideology and psychoanalysis through an exploration of the Hollywood 
depiction of the family within bourgeois society both of which repress 
their members. The Hollywood melodrama acts to repress, through its 
resolved ending (its 'closure'), the contradictions and 'excesses' 
generated by the films' exploration of its protagonists' sexual growth 
and progress through the Oedipus complex. In this way, the Hollywood 
melodrama enacts the subject's Oedipal journey which entails the 
necessity: 
to grow into a sexual identity within a family unit under the aegis 
of a symbolic law which the father incarnates: ... what is at stake 
is the survival of the family unit and the possibility for individuals 
of acquiring an identity which is also a place within the system, a 
place in which they can'be themselves' and be 'at home', in which 
they can simultaneously enter, without contradiction, the symbolic 
order and bourgeois society. 
(Nowell Smith 1977, p. 193) 
As Britton demonstrates, this represents exactly the trajectory of the 
young members of the Smith family to marriage within the family 
setting. Read as a family melodrama, the film reveals ways in which 
the demands of the family, representing society, may oppress its 
members. The film charts the emergence and containment of Esther's 
sexuality: at the beginning of the film, what Esther describes as her 
'bloom' - of which she says she has 'too much' - is marked in her 
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general energy, her breathless, glowing appearances, her preoccupation 
with her sister's beau and her attempt to manage her own and her 
sister's affair, as well as in particular images: her self-conscious staging 
of herself to sing of her desire for 'the boy-next-door'; her breathless 
encounters with him, while he remains po-faced and embarrassed; the 
sculptured bust of a naked woman set behind the two sisters as they 
sing in flowing clothes the title song at the piano. At the same time the 
containment and partial suppression of her desire is represented in 
specific moments and images, for instance in her painfully extended 
struggle, with her sister's help, to get into her corset; her longing for 
John Truett's first kiss, which he denies. The film hints at the 
suppression of sexuality and individual desire on the part of both the 
men and women within the family. 
Nowell Smith argues that melodrama's 'happy ending' involves the 
acceptance of castration and is achieved at the inevitable cost of 
repression. The 'sacrifice', that which is repressed, remains as 'excess', 
an energy that cannot be contained within the film narrative but, as in 
Freud's patients' conversion hysteria, becomes 'displaced' onto the 
'body' of the film, 'siphoned off' into the music and mise en scene. In 
this way, Nowell Smith accounts for those disconcerting moments in a 
melodrama where the apparent 'realism' of the story of a bourgeois 
family breaks down in scenes which commonly strike the viewer as 
excessive, overdone, and therefore lacking in conviction. Such 
moments, 'explosions of material that is repressed rather than 
expressed' seem, as Nowell Smith puts it, to be 'in the wrong place' 
(p. 193). This approach is similar to that taken by Britton in his analysis 
of St. Louis - that the ending of the film is an attempt to paper over 
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the unconscious conflicts and processes that the film does not fully 
succeed in repressing. 
Nowell Smith's article does not focus on the spectator because its 
analyst-critic's aim is to show how the melodrama films themselves 
cannot help but expose their own 'shameless contradictions' (Nowell 
Smith, 1977, p. 74), contradictions which are also those of the family in 
bourgeois society. But the 'hysteric' moments of excess also have an 
effect on the playing spectator. These can work in two opposite ways to 
cause the spectator's breakdown of playing: they either draw her 
further into the film's - and her own - unconscious; or they might 
work in a quite different direction, jerking her out of her acquiescent 
state away from the film, with the kind of embarrassed response that 
frequently occurs among melodrama audiences (those who are not 
weeping and, indeed, who may laugh defensively). In this case the 
spectator moves out of the transitional area to engage solely with 
external reality, where she insists on dealing with the film's status in 
terms of its 'realism'. 
The possibility of Hollywood melodrama invoking either of these 
responses- either a withdrawal from or a 'giving in' to the wished-for 
(and feared) impulse- is raised by two articles by Paul Willemen on 
the films of Douglas Sirk published in 1970/71, which reflect the strong 
influence of Brecht on film studies. Willemen's is not a psychoanalytic 
reading, rather he explores the possibility of the films subverting the 
audience's 'belief' in bourgeois society through Brechtian, distancing 
devices. The question that is crucial to Willemen's thesis, and which is 
addressed in a subsequent article on Sirk by Steve Neale (1976), is 
whether, as he suggests, the over-heightened moments have a 
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distancing effect on the spectator, or in practice do the opposite and 
draw her in further, to be moved and perhaps to weep. 
This question is relevant to a famous sequence in Written on the 
Wind (1956). The main, 'bad' protagonist (who would be the 
villainness in traditional melodrama), played by Dorothy Malone as a 
woman desperate for sex, dances, wearing a red, swirling dress, wildly 
and provocatively to the accompaniment of diegetic loud music from a 
record she has put on. She dances alone but her dance has a quality of a 
sexual orgy as she embraces a photograph of the man she loves (played 
by Rock Hudson), who, however, is in love with the film's 'good' 
woman character played by Lauren Bacall. From one perspective, 
Malone's acting and dancing and the mise en scýne are all 'excessive'; 
however they match the melodramatic action - the dancing is 
intercut by shots of Malone's father who, coming onto the mansion 
stairs to investigate the noise, falls down them with a fatal heart attack. 
This juxtaposition makes clear the fight between repression and the 
repressed, between the two generations and between the law of 
patriarchy and female sexuality. The conflict is marked by the 
characteristic Sirkian heightened colour, the abandonment of Malone's 
movement, the very loud music and the pace of the cutting. For the 
spectator, the mise en scýne indicates clearly that the daughter has 
'killed' the father, with whom she has just had a quarrel and who is a 
repressive force, particularly of her sexuality; although, according to the 
overt narrative, her father has died from a heart attack and the 
daughter is not even aware of him on the stairs. The editing and the 
mise en s&ne suggest that she is acting out her fantasy wishes and, in 
killing the father who is the instrument of her repression, enacts them 
for the spectator's unconscious. 
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This scene can produce contradictory effects; the spectator playing along 
with the daughter's excited and desiring dance may either be taken 
over by the deeper fantasy of killing (castrating) the father who 
attempts to repress the woman's sexuality and deny her power - or its 
obvious 'excess' may produce the distancing effect that Willemen seeks 
so that the spectator is jolted out of playing. The analyst-critic would 
then take over, repressing again the unconscious spectator, and ending 
the playing. Such scenes may jolt the spectator out of an unthinking 
acceptance of the rest of the narrative, as Willemen proposes; on the 
other hand, their 'excess' may speak to the spectator of the psychic 
reality of the ostensible 'ordinariness' of family lives as high drama 
dealing with life and death matters. As Laura Mulvey points out, 
Hollywood melodrama can expose family and societal conflict explicitly 
and overtly, 'touching on sensitive areas of sexual repression and 
frustration' (Mulvey, 1977/8, p. 75). 
The melodrama part of Meet me in St. Louis deals overtly with the 
conflict about the family's move to New York and with its young 
members' growth into sexuality, courtship and mating. However the 
unconscious processes that underlie and underpin these conflicts are 
disguised by a variety of ploys. The melodrama is hidden within the 
musical, and its drama and danger is frequently offset by comic, 
deflationary and ironic moves. The Oedipal themes are disguised for 
the critic to dig out; however their effect on the spectator works 
through and in spite of the disguise. As with Sirk's films, Minnelli's 
heightened mise en scene can function as the location for displaced 
tensions and wishes, his colour, lighting and sound and visual images 
working as metaphors for the unconscious state of mind of his 
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characters, as the House of Horror and the snow people sequences (both 
analysed below) demonstrate. 
In particular, throughout the film the unconscious family conflicts and 
wishes are acted out in the character of Tootie. As a child, she can talk 
apparent nonsense that actually reveals the truth - she is constantly 
preoccupied with horrific death and dying - and can expose others' 
deceits and motivation. In her playing, particularly with her dolls, she 
charts the family's progress through its life and death conflict over the 
proposed move: her dolls are killed, brought to life, buried alive. On 
Hallowe'en night, in her play-act 'killing' of Mr Brokauff, she acts out 
the family's wish to castrate (kill) the father. In her performing and 
singing, she acts out the individual's attempts to break out of societal 
and family conventions and restrictions in, for instance, 'I was drunk 
last night Dear Mother' and 'The jungle mating song: under the 
bamboo tree'. Tootie's role as representative of the family's 
unconscious becomes particularly clear in the sequence where she kills 
the snow people. 
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Meet me in St. Louis: Tootie kills the Snow People 
The sequence in Meet me in St. Louis where Tootie 'kills' the snow 
people, the final scene of the Winter episode, marks the climactic point 
of the family conflict about the move to New York and leads to a 
resolution of the problem set up by Mr Smith's decision to leave St 
Louis in the previous episode. I examine it here in terms of the return 
of the repressed and the breakdown of the spectator's playing. 
This section is preceded by two scenes which have confirmed Esther's 
relationship with John Truett the Christmas Eve ball, which has ended 
with the hand-over of Esther to John by Grandfather, who has just 
called her 'his property' and confirmed his relationship with her by 
taking her to the ball to the enjoyment of both. The hand-over is 
crystallised into a bit of cinematic 'magic': a tracking shot sees Esther 
disappear behind a large Christmas tree in a waltz with her 
grandfather, and emerge from it with John. The gliding movement of 
the tracking camera, accompanied by a slow waltz, helps to include the 
spectator in the movement of the representation of the effortless, 
unfractured continuity from generation to generation. The wordless 
shot communicates a feeling of the 'fitness' of the magically achieved 
transition - which (for the playing spectator) is also marked as an 
amusing cinematic joke. 
However, this family continuity is threatened by the Smiths' 
impending departure for New York in the following scene, when John 
Truett proposes to Esther outside her home in the snow. The scene, as 
Esther says ('I never thought it would be like this ... ' ), is not quite the 
consummation she and the spectator might have wished. The couple 
173 
speak of events not being able to take their preordained course (going 
to college and 'coming of age' before getting married and leaving 
home), which is shaken as they have to try to 'grow up' before they are 
ready. Their uncertainty is exposed in John's wavering assertion that 
"we are of age ... well almost" and Esther's sudden doubts about 
leaving her family ("even if we did go to New York we could work 
something out couldn't we? ") followed by her suddenly running off 
into her house leaving John Truett looking on, from front of screen. 
He makes as if to follow her, and calls her back, but is left standing, 
puzzled. Esther's words and action, and indeed the whole scene, have 
also confused the spectator; it looks as though it should have been a 
conventional film proposal scene but both characters look awkward 
and embarrassed. As Esther runs off, the spectator does not know what 
she wants - does she actually prefer to go to New York with her 
family rather than marry John? Clearly the only way of resolving the 
situation is for the move to be cancelled; and, in the film's status as 
musical romance, the generic expectation is that this will happen. As in 
most traditional narrative the ending is assured, the route to it, only, in 
question. 
A camera track, and a cut, following Esther's move back into the house, 
reveals Tootie sitting at a lattice window, "waiting for Santa Claus", 
who won't be able to find the family in New York. Esther joins Tootie, 
her role to comfort her, as older sister/ surrogate mother. The scene is 
shot with a dramatic and pleasing chiaroscuro effect, heightened by 
Tootie's white nightdress and Esther's red ball gown. In this film the 
continuity of visual pleasure for the spectator offsets a lack of 
continuity in its narrative drive. 
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Two reverse shots from the window to the outside remind us of what 
is now at stake; one is to John Truett at his window as he raises a hand 
and turns off his light, increasing the shadows in the girls' room; the 
other to the family of 'snow people', standing in a horseshoe shape in 
the garden. 
We were introduced to the snow people, which the Smith family and 
friends were just finishing building, at the beginning of this episode, 
when the familiar greeting-card seasonal scene was, in comparison 
with the previous Hallowe'en opening, lit up, and the picture came 
'alive' for the first time outdoors, to a cheerful, populated snow scene. 
The Smith family, having been well established as a unit, both in its 
conscious manifestation in the first episode and its unconscious in the 
Hallowe'en opening, has now moved out of its house to include its 
associates, neighbours and potential extension, the young people's 
likely partners. The camera's by now familiar movement forward to 
the group has again moved the viewer into the scene, where everyone 
seems to be included in the playing, throwing snowballs and giggling 
about dressing up the snow people. The question of dressing up leads 
to the question of who will take whom to the ball. The other children 
have their problems too: Kate, the maid, who has acted before as 
mediator, arranges that (presumably until the 'right' people are teamed 
up, which is achieved at the ball) Rose and her brother will go together, 
as later Esther will go with Grandfather. The family stays together until 
the new pairings are established. 
Arranged in a horseshoe, the snow people, seen through the window 
from Tootie's viewpoint, have a strong presence, very white and very 
solid, of different sizes, some dressed up in hats, scarves, walking 
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sticks .4 They are clearly emblematic representations of the 
family, but, 
like a transitional object, also firmly exist in their own right. Seen in 
this shot from a distance, all together, in dramatic half-light, with an 
oddly surreal effect, their phenomenological status rather unclear, they 
appear like projections from our own psychic space. From this 
perspective, through Tootie's look, they now seem to belong to her - 
and so partly to us, the spectator looking at them with Tootie, through 
the window. They are Tootie's/our imagos, 5 cathected with family 
fantasies: dream images connected with memories of a abundant 
Christmases (as a playing of the tune The First-Noel accompanies our 
look). Representing people, they may seem, to our fantasy, cold and 
lonely out in the snow. As artefacts, creative products of the family, 
which is in conflict and which does not give her what she wants, they 
provoke Tootie's destructiveness. 
Tootie turns to Esther and affirms (as she has done before) that she will 
take all her dolls to New York, even the 'dead ones'. Esther reminds 
her jokingly that she cannot take the snow people - it would "look 
pretty silly" to try. 
Before Tootie reacts to this trigger, we have a showpiece by Garland: the 
number 'Have yourself a merry little Christmas', with the camera on 
Garland's lit-up, face, first in profile, with Tootie also in shot, and then, 
at the climax of the song, alone, looking off-screen (we might think 
4J James Naremore comments that the snow figures look 'disappointingly fake' and that 
this 'diminishes' the emotional force of Tootie's actions (Naremore, 1993, p. 87); which 
from the point of view of my argument is not of course the point. As fantasy objects from 
they look very (sur)'real' 
5 Laplanche and Pontalis (1988) define an imago as'unconscious prototypical figure 
which orientates the subject's way of apprehending others; it is built up on the basis of 
the first real and phantasised relationships within the family environment' (p. 211). 
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towards John, last seen in that direction), in close up. The words of the 
song speak of a hope that does not seem to fit the actual situation but 
whose function is apparently to comfort Tootie: "Next year all our 
troubles will be miles away ... as in the olden days, faithful friends will 
be near to us once more... some day soon we will be together. " They 
are as relevant to Esther's problem as to Tootie's. The strength of the 
wish that these words express, the invocation of the mythical 'olden 
days'; altogether the assertion that everything will become all right and 
be restored, although "until then we'll have to muddle through 
somehow", combined with the star image of Judy Garland and the 
sense of being comforted by her, add up to the impression that the song 
cannot mean nothing: overall, the film's final promise, which the 
film's closure will reiterate, is of family togetherness. 
Tootie gives a cry (the song has not comforted her although it might 
have reassured and lulled the spectator), and runs off. Esther is tracked 
rushing out of the room after her, to downstairs, where Father appears 
to have been standing waiting, the wall behind him lit dramatically 
half in shadow, half in light. He expresses concern, as Esther passes 
him. No one else comes into this scene, which becomes a matter 
mainly between Tootie, the snow people, and finally her father. 
A cut shows Tootie outside, with the snow people, nightdress above 
her knees, as she seizes the walking stick from the largest of them, 
presumably the father, decapitates it (him) and two others, then 
violently strikes repeatedly at a small one (herself? ). As Esther comes 
out to her, Tootie keeps on striking, then cries: 'Nobody can have them 
if we're going to New York, I'm going to kill them'. With her dolls, 
which she has brought to life to take to New York, Tootie can deny her 
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loss, her omnipotent magical powers affirmed; lacking this 
compensation, 'killing' of what she loves is her only resort. 
This image of the young child in a nightdress in the cold, in the pale 
moonlight-like light, hitting out uncontrollably and very violently at 
an object/person, is one of the most likely-to-be-remembered of the 
film. It can serve, as Victor Burgin puts it, both as a private 'punctum', 
an image with connotative accretions of the individual's unconscious 
associations, which the spectator can use to go back into her own 
memories, and also as a public 'image fragment' which refers to the 
film/narrative, and can be used as a way of exploring the film's 
fantasies (Burgin, 1986, p. 86). 6 The image signifies the breakdown of 
playing for both Tootie and the spectator, and the turning-point in the 
narrative through Tootie's acting out, in physical action, of the family's 
feelings about the move. 
The snow people are also players in this scene, the object of Tootie's 
violence and beating - and as in Freud's 'A child is beaten'7 the 
spectator may well adopt the passive-object position as well as that of 
the active subject in this violent fantasy scenario. 8 For the spectator, it 
is oddly surprising and disturbing that the snow people stand there 
solidly and inert, without reacting at all: the omnipotence of the child 
who kills its parents is overweening and absolute, and does not invite 
retaliation. 
6 ßurgin's essay is discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter. 
7 The idea of a fantasy scenario offering different subject positions was referred to in 
'The spectator plays' Ch. 4 and will be taken up in 'Psychic reality' in this chapter. 
8I am using the notion of a passive/active opposition in two ways here: my central 
thesis is that the unconscious spectator is in a passive position in relation to the 
film/narrative when her playing has broken down. Yet within that scenario, as in a 
fantasy structure, the unconscious spectator, impelled by her unconscious wishes, may 
take up different positions, including the active and passive, male/female ones. 
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The violence of the scene is modified by the image of Esther kneeling 
in the snow, clasping Tootie as she weeps. Esther goes through the 
'adult' comforting gestures about the move - the family's ability to 
adapt to change and that "we'll all be together". This calms Tootie and 
introduces another unconscious wish of the child: to have its anger 
contained by the mother. We know, however, that Esther has her own 
reasons for not believing in what*she is saying so that her comfort is 
spurious and Tootie's act therefore somewhat justified. Tootie is still 
sobbing as the sisters are tracked walking back to the house. 
In this scene Tootie takes on the role of acting out her family's feelings 
about the move, which have so far been only expressed in words and 
disregarded - now that the move is imminent, more extreme protests 
are called for. In killing the snow family, Tootie may be killing her own 
family - because it won't do what she wants - but she is also simply 
recording that it is the move that will kill it. 
Tootie has emerged as the central exponent of the film's covert 
narrative, representative of the family's and the film's unconscious 
and stand-in for the unconscious spectator. With Tootie in the film, 
'excused' because she is a child, the film has little need for diversionary 
ploys to hide its unconscious. From the beginning of the film, the 
spectator has been included in Tootie's playing, as Tootie is included in 
the family narrative. By now we are familiar with her dolls, which she 
has buried and dug up, we have performed with her, told lies, and 
commanded the caring attention of the whole family. In playing along 
with Tootie, the spectator opens herself to the return of the repressed: 
Tootie both 'acts' and is deadly serious at the same time. The playing 
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spectator has been encouraged to take the part of the family against the 
father, and to identify with Tootie in different ways: with her 
subversiveness in allowing the anarchic pleasure principle to emerge, 
and, in this scene, with the eruption of her fury, despair and violent 
impulses: the physical violence functions as a cathartic release from the 
tension of the family conflict, which the spectator too wishes to see 
resolved. Throughout the film, Tootie, sometimes standing in for the 
spectator, operates on the edge between playing and its breakdown, 
managing unconscious eruptions and transgressions, toying with 
sexuality, intoxication, murder, death. 
In the attack on the snow people, however, the breakdown of playing is 
decisive, overcome by Tootie's violence as the last ditch protest of her 
fury at her helplessness and impotence and the concomitant expression 
of her fantasised omnipotence. At this moment of the return of the 
repressed, the spectator may also move to the passive position figured 
through the immobile snow people whose place we also take - in this 
scene there is an equally strong movement between force and inertia, 
activity and passivity, and the spectator participates in both. 
There is enough open snowy ground in the long shot of Tootie slaying 
the snow people to imagine the bare space that would be left if they 
were all destroyed. If the infant destroys the mother, a waste land is 
created in place of the potential space between mother and child. The 
absent mother leaves the infant surrounded by the emptiness it has 
itself created. Tootie's despair as she breaks down in Esther's clasp is at 
the momentousness of what she has achieved. However, she is saved 
in this narrative: her wishes are shared both by the rest of the family, 
minus the outsider father, and by the spectator; her rage is contained by 
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the film as a means of wish-fulfilment. Her outburst becomes a relief, 
the means of resolving the family conflict and the narrative. 
During this scene there has been a cut to a window in the house with 
father's face at it. This recalls the adult's reaction to the scene and has 
gives the spectator a point of identification as observer as well as 
participant - distancing her momentarily from Tootie's action, to 
identify with Mr. Smith's concern. It also recalls that he is the object of 
Tootie's anger and that his will be expected to be the next narrative 
move. The next shot shows Mr Smith inside the house in the 
children's bedroom, as he closes the window, sharply picks up a fallen 
doll, replies to Agnes that "everyýhing's fine" and walks slowly 
downstairs, the camera tracking his thinking as he goes. Esther and 
Tootie pass behind him, now at a distance in the background; in their 
absence we focus on Father as he sits in his armchair and leans forward 
while the opening phrase of the theme music, 'Meet me in St. Louis', 
plays three times, each more slowly than the last, as if pausing for his 
decision. Father leans back, strikes a match, burns himself - then 
jumps up, decision made (surely by this time the spectator knows that 
this will happen). He summons all the family from upstairs, seats 
them along a bench for his performance, parades in front of them and 
announces that 'we are not going to go to New York ... we'll stay here 
until we rot. 9 This discordant note insists on giving the father's point 
of view, usually neglected in the film. Father takes the centre place, 
taking on the female family's values as he recites (their) reasons for not 
going: "... you don't appreciate what's under your nose ... the grass 
is 
always greener on the other side. " 
9 For Britton this statement is an example of a revelation of the family's unconscious knowledge of the truth about itself (Britton, 1978, p. 20). 
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Tootie's achievement at getting her father to go back on his decision is 
a triumph of her fantasy of omnipotence. The fact that the spectator is 
'glad' and can experience Tootie's act as empowerment, and that such a 
change of mind is inevitable in the film's scheme of things, may 
indicate how far she has taken on Tootie's, the child's, position in 
contrast to the adult one she might adopt outside the film. In our 
unconscious we have power that, as adults negotiating the reality 
principle, we may think it judicious to renounce. 
The resolution is clinched by the stagy entry of Warren, Rose's suitor, 
to 'announce', in a dominant fashion, that they will get married. The 
whole family greet each other with 'Happy Christmas' and hugs, and 
begin opening their presents. In the foreground Father and Mother 
touch hands, mother smiling to reassure father that he has done the 
right thing. The children and parents are happily reconciled, the 
parents' relationship confirmed. The family unit is re-asserted, a 
benign repression reinstated, and the film can proceed towards its 
resolution in the next, final episode. 
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The spectator is confused: psychic reality 
I will now propose a different way of conceiving the breakdown of 
playing: rather than being overcome by the return of the repressed, the 
spectator moves from the transitional area of playing to that of her 
inner, or psychic, reality. In his description of the transitional area of 
potential space Winnicott glosses inner reality as 'personal psychic 
reality' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 102) as opposed to outer, shared, reality. In 
the previous chapter on playing I referred to the use of the notion of 
fantasy in film studies as a model for the spectator's fluid movement 
in relation to the film narrative and structure. Here I will consider it in 
rather different terms in relation to the notion of psychic reality; from 
this perspective fantasy provides a content, structure and language for 
the unconscious. 10 
Laplanche and Pontalis define psychic reality as 'everything in the 
psyche ... (the unconscious wish a, nd its associated phantasy ) ... that 
takes on the force of reality for the subject' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1988, P. 363). They point out that while Freud makes a fundamental 
distinction between psychic and material 'realities', at the same time he 
insists that, in their effect on the subject, it may not be useful to claim a 
greater reality status for one over the other: indeed, psychic reality is 
'whatever in the subject's psyche that presents a consistency and 
resistance comparable to those displayed by material reality' (ibid). Yet 
on another level a mark of psychic health is the ability to perceive that 
1DIbe word is variously spelled f /phantasy. Whereas 'phantasy' was originally used to delineate he specific psychoanalytic use of the term in contrast to the much more 
generalised 'fantasy, there has recently ýeen a greater tendency to adopt 'fantasy' for 
all uses of the word to indicate the fluidity of its boundaries. In line with this practice, I am therefore using 'fantasy' except when quoting. 
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psychic reality is not, in the end, the same as external reality: the 
mature ego who has resolved the Oedipus conflict and has taken up a 
place in society does not wish to kill its father and is able to find a 
'realistic' substitute for its mother. For psychoanalysis, the difficulty of 
attempting to relate inner and outer reality is precisely a question of 
having to come to terms with the opposing and often conflicting 
claims of both forces, both of which have their own validity and claim 
on the subject. 
For Winnicott, playing aids the process; the strain of relating the two 
domains slackens, and the subject can accept the paradox which she 
usually has to grapple with, that inner and outer, psychic and material 
reality are both true at the same time. The person for whom playing 
has become a generalised orientation to life can maintain the sense of 
this paradox in everyday living. The pleasure and danger of playing for 
the film spectator is precisely that it hovers between and partakes of 
both psychic and material reality. In general the playing spectator 
makes use of the film as a transitional object to move adroitly and 
happily between her inner and outer world. She may also wish - and 
at times she may be unable to avoid it - to move completely into the 
realm of psychic reality where her unconscious wish and the associated 
fantasy is played out - at which point her playing ceases. The ease 
with which these moves can take place is suggested in the emphasis, in 
accounts of fantasy, on its pervasiveness in the subject's personal and 
cultural life. 
Laplanche and Pontalis define fantasy as 'an imaginary scene ... 
representing the fulfilment of a wish (in the last analysis an 
unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or lesser 
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extent by defensive processes' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 314). 
This encapsulates fantasy's hybrid nature: the 'imaginary scene' may be 
conscious or unconscious; the unconscious wish is already modified by 
its associated prohibition in being formulated into a scenario. This 
formulation of the notion of fantasy makes it possible to represent the 
unconscious in a meta-language which can be applied as validly to the 
examination of cultural products as to dreams, in both of which fantasy 
is seen as providing a content and scenario for the playing out of 
unconscious wishes. 
Freud's main ideas on fantasy are taken up and elaborated in two 
seminal papers, one by a Kleinian, Susan Isaacs, 'The nature and 
function of phantasy' (1948), the other, in part a critique of Isaacs' 
paper, by Laplanche and Pontalis (1968), 'Fantasy and the origins of 
sexuality', which has been drawn on directly in recent film and 
literature criticism and theory (for example, Donald,, 1989; Fletcher, 
1986; Cowie, 1984). In general, Isaacs' approach is much nearer that of 
Winnicott in the way that she defines psychic and material reality. 
Both Isaacs and Laplanche and Pontalis emphasise the pervasiveness of 
fantasy in fictional products as well as in the person's psychic activity 
and relationships, but do so from different perspectives. They differ 
firstly and obviously in their conception of what fantasy is and how it 
functions in the psyche, but underlying this, less explicitly but crucially, 
is the difference of Klein's assumption that there is a subject in place 
from birth to fantasise. The difference in approach between Isaacs and 
Laplanche and Pontalis may however be less important than it seems, 
in that both papers emphasise, although in different ways, a continuity 
between conscious and unconscious and both seek to account for the 
origins and the original content of fantasy. 
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Isaacs' main focus is on 'unconscious fantasy' which she distinguishes, 
for instance, from daydreaming, characterised as a conscious activity: 
'Phantasies are the primary content of unconscious mental processes' 
(Isaacs, 1948, p-96). Fantasy is, in her well-known phrase, derived from 
Freud: 'the psychic representative of libidinal and destructive instincts' 
(p. 78), intimately related to bodily states. Fantasies 'have their origin in 
instinctual impulses and 'are active along with the impulses from 
which they arise' (ibid). Following Klein, Isaacs insists on the pervasive 
influence of fantasy on all aspects of the person's conscious life: fantasy 
is in place from the beginning of life and continues as 'the operative 
link between instinct and ego meýchanisrn ... adaptation to reality and 
reality thinking require the support of concurrent unconscious 
phantasies' (p. 77). The notion of 'psychic reality' and of the material 
effects of fantasy on psychic life, relationships and behaviour is 
emphasised throughout the paper: primary and secondary processes 
coexist from the beginning of life and 'fantasy plays a fundamental and 
continuous part, not only in neurotic symptoms but also in normal 
character and personality' (p. 91). The baby's primitive relationship to 
the mother/breast forms the blueprint for all subsequent relationships 
(including, I would add, that between reader and text). 
For Isaacs fantasies are experienced in the earliest stages of life as 
sensations, then as plastic images, and only subsequently, and not 
always then, in words. Like Klein and Winnicott she takes the relation 
and connection between representation and experience as 
unproblematic and taken for granted. This is signalled for instance in 
her account of the much quoted Fort-da game (described originally by 
Freud) of the baby who repeatedly threw away and retrieved a toy on a 
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string during the absence of his mother. For Lacan what is important 
about the game is its ability to represent for the child its mother's 
absence - the game functions as a play on absence and presence and is 
essentially about language and representation (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 
1986, p-80). For Isaacs the game marks the ability of the child to come to 
terms with its mother's absence through make-believe - she appears 
to take its symbolic function for granted and to focus rather on the 
function of the game for the child's psychic comfort and development. 
In this she draws on Freud's own interpretation that the boy is 
compensating for his mother's absence by fantasying that, in 
controlling objects that are still within reach, he can also control his 
mother's movements (Isaacs, p. 77). The child's omnipotence,, a feature 
of fantasy, comes into play, the strength of fantasy being the 
absoluteness of its hallucinatory wish fulfilment ('I want this therefore 
I have it'). 
By filling the unconscious with fantasy, Isaacs gives it a content and so 
makes of it a more concrete entity than the formulation of an 
unconscious which is decisively cut off from the conscious system. 
Juliet Mitchell, whose account of Freud is inflected by a Lacanian 
reading, compares Klein's and Freud's formulations: 'what we are 
witnessing in Klein's description is not the unconscious as another 
scene, that gap which has its own laws, but an unconscious that is 
filled, replete with a chaos of phantasmagoria, an unconscious as full as 
the external world seems to be' (Mitchell, 1984, p. 396) -a Kleinian 
inner world of horror, a Freudian world of unredeemable loss. 
Whereas Isaacs focuses on the therapeutic and developmental function 
of fantasy-as-play, in the service of the developing ego, Laplanche and 
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Pontalis focus rather on its place in the structuring of the psyche. 11 
However they too, through a different route, insist on the 
pervasiveness of fantasy in conscious life, as a continual replaying and 
recirculation of desire for the subject. They replace Isaacs' distinction 
between 'conscious and unconscious phantasy', with that between 
'original' and 'secondary' fantasies (p. 28); this, they claim, is in line 
with Freud's consistent employment of the same term, whether he is 
discussing 'conscious' fantasy (for instance in day-dreaming or popular 
fiction) or 'unconscious' fantasy: the same 'structuring and 
mechanisms are at play from the deepest unconscious modes to the 
most public. They argue that the defining distinction is between the 
primary fantasy structuring which has its roots in the genesis of the 
infant's desire and sexuality, and the secondary elaborations of this 
primary fantasy which may be found in the dream and daydream as 
well as in public forms such as fiction or jokes. The 'purpose' of the 
secondary elaboration is both to disguise and at the same time to give 
access to the primary fantasy: to serve both as agent of repression and in 
the same movement to allow for the return of the repressed. For 
Laplanche and Pontalis, Freud's formulation of 'phantasy' (and the 
reason for his consistent use of the term) is as 'a privileged' point, 
'where one may catch in the raw the process of transition from one 
system to another' - the unconscious and conscious (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1968, p. 20). 
Although these authors point to different forms of fantasying it is day- 
dreaming, or reverie, (for Isaacs a conscious formation) that hovers 
most precariously on the margins of the conscious and unconscious, 
11 My account of this paper draws on Elizabeth Cowie's comprehensive explication in 
'Fantasia' (1984). 
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since it moves most easily and unpredictably between being and not 
being under the conscious control of the subject; the subject is 
conscious of the daydream, and to an extent can manipulate it, but is 
unaware of the determining, unconscious fantasy of which it is largely 
an effect. 
From the beginning, for these authors fantasy is a matter of 
representation: instead of the Kleinian monstrous 'psychic 
representatives of instincts' as the fantasy 'contents' of the 
unconscious, fantasy becomes a symbolic structure: in the authors' 
much-quoted phrase, the 'stage-setting' or mise en scýne of desire 
(1968,, p. 28). Instead of the loss of the object (the breast), the loss is that 
which is inherent in representation itself. The breast for itself, feeding 
and fullness, is no longer the issue; instead, the desiring subject can 
only seek satisfaction in endlessly replaying the drama of desire; the 
wishing and the staging itself are the purpose of the fantasy. As 
Elizabeth Cowie points out, it is not therefore the attainment of desire 
(from the Lacanian perspective, there is no such thing) but its 
enactment that the subject seeks (Cowie, 1984, p-80). This marks a shift 
from a view of reader/ spectator who seeks satisfaction and fulfilment 
to the one for whom any ending of the narrative is a disappointment; 
and for whom, strangely, the 'sad' ending may be more of a fulfilment 
in allowing tears, for example, as an acknowledgement that 
satisfaction is never the point - than the happy endings that try to 
mislead. 
In the end, however, perhaps rather unexpectedly, Laplanche and 
Pontalis do, after all introduce a 'content': the 'original fantasies' of the 
subject's 'origins', which they invoke by reference to Freud's 
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phylogenic hypothesis of the origins of the Oedipal conflict and his 
passing references to the 'primary repressed unconscious' to which the 
conscious individual has no access - and which may never 'return' 
because the repression predates the formation of the subject. Freud's 
invocation of a hypothetical past and a phylogenic inheritance is quite 
out of tune with the generally assumed materialist Freud and is 
generally now discounted (as Laplanche and Pontalis themselves point 
out). Neither was the notion pursued by Freud, nor taken up later, 
following Klein's focus on the infant's own body relationship with its 
mother as the basis for all subsequent intra- and inter-psychic relations. 
Yet a variation on this theme has been put back in place by this much- 
used contemporary account of fantasy by Laplanche and Pontalis, 
which sets out the fantasies which are 'originary' of the subject, which 
pre-exist all others, are the basis of all subsequent, secondary fantasies 
and are conceived as being at the very core of psychic reality: the origins 
of the subject, in the scene of parental coitus; of sexuality, in the 
father's seduction; and of sexual identity through castration in the 
Oedipal scene. The authors contend that it is only the phantasy 
structure that persists and is 'transmitted' - yet the structure cannot 
quite be divorced from its originating content; if the mise en scýne of 
desire is the model for fantasy, it is founded in and enacted through a 
story of three bodies, the parent-child triangle, caught up in a 
constantly shifting and dynamic interplay. If fantasy is a structure, it 
requires a content of events and characters to effect its staging: the 
continuing human drama of the emergence of the subject. 
It has often been noted that the further back a fantasy is taken, the 
greater the loss of subject identification: for instance, Freud's much 
drawn-on exploration of the many-layered fantasy 'A child is being 
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beaten' demonstrates a progressive loss of sexual and individual 
identity and finally a loss of subjectivity altogether As Laplanche and 
Pontalis put it, not only may the subject be represented in the fantasy as 
one of its characters, he may be (beyond and beneath that) 'caught up in 
the sequence of images ... in a de-subjectivised form ... in the very 
syntax of the sequence in question' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1968, p. 27). 
For these authors, the 'deepest fantasy ... is no longer addressed to 
anyone' (ibid), all distinction between subject and object having been 
lost. 
This rather elusive account of the subject's place in the fantasy scenario 
can be related to the spectator in different ways. In particular, as was 
explored in the previous chapter on the playing spectator, the 
possibility of the spectator taking up (by means of the possibility of 
finultiple points of entry') different identificatory positions in a 
narrative counters the thesis that the spectator must be 'fixed', 
particularly into gender identity, by classic Hollywood film. The notion 
however of the spectator as 'desubjectivised' altogether is different and 
takes us beyond playing to a point where the spectator is indeed 'no 
longer himself'; beyond a subject fixed in sexual difference; beyond the 
bisexual pre-Oedipal stage, to the point where there is nothing but the 
'wishing', a hypothetical point that represents the origin and 
movement of desire. 
As I explore in rather different terms in the following chapter, the loss 
of subjectivity can become one of the lures of cinema for the spectator. 
The fantasying spectator desires to be caught up in the wishing - she 
longs, repetitively, to play out her fantasying by taking part in a 
scenario where the players of the original fantasies remain the same, 
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the stories vary only slightly and which, unlike classic narrative, never 
end and never pause, endlessly re-looping. Here the spectator is indeed 
taken up by the pre-subjective state of wishing. A model for the 
representation of this psychic participation in film might be 
movement: within the frame, the movement of both the camera and 
of objects /characters; from shot to shot in the linear transitions of the 
narrative and images. From this point of view, our composite memory 
of the film may be made up of an impression of how it moves us 
through its scenario or its settings to take up different subject positions 
and to find different places and modes of feeling, always in flux as its 
fantasy structure does its work in alliance with ours. 
From the perspective of Isaacs' view of fantasy, on the other hand, 
which posits that there is from the beginning a subject to fantasise and 
objects with which to fantasise, and for whom fantasy is 'replete with a 
chaos of phantasmagoria' (Mitchell, 1984, p. 396), there is the possibility 
of participating in a regressive pre-linguistic 'psychic reality' of content. 
In this model the spectator's participation may characteristically be 
effected not so much through the narrative movement and scenario as 
through the imprint on our psyche of the cinematic image itself. 
An article by Michael O'Pray (1989), Surrealism, Fantasy, and the 
Grotesque; The Cinema of Jan Svankmajer' offers an example. O'Pray 
draws on Klein's approach to fantasy in his account of the Czech film- 
maker, to emphasise the materiality of Svanmager's work in its 
relation to the 'grotesque', a cinematic tradition which 'spills over 
forcibly into forms of representation - Gothic horror, Hollywood 
fantasy, sci-fi ... which rupture or exceed the dominant cinematic 
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traditions' (ibid p. 254). On this use of the cinematic image, O'Pray 
writes: 
... these film-makers are alchemists in the sense that they blend 
disparate materials in the service of fantasy; they endow the real, 
the very materiality of the world - its objects, surfaces and 
textures - with an aura of strangeness and the fantastic (p. 254). 
What may be most shocking, O'Pray claims, are images or symptoms of 
fragmentation -a reminder of the Kleinian infant's fantasy 
construction of part objects, prototypically the breast, as a defence in the 
face of its own aggression, which is similarly, and horrifically, 
represented in part object images. O'Pray offers the example of the 
objectivisation and fragmentation of the female image in advertising; 
but fragmentation is a more general characteristic of the cinematic 
image, in as mundane an effect as the close-up, for example. 
In my analysis of the snow scene in Meet me in St. Louis, I discussed 
the memorable impact on the spectator of the image of Tootie attacking 
the snow people. In its child-violence and the surreal quality of the 
snow family, it can produce in the spectator a shock similar to that 
ascribed to the films O'Pray discusses here. This image, not from an 
avant-garde but a mainstream Hollywood 'family' movie, may too be 
registered as a vivid 'materialisation' of the subject's unconscious 
fantasy, the wish to kill - to beat to fragments, with her stick - the 
objects she most loves. 12 
12 it is however also the case that Minnelli admired the work of the surrealists 
(Naremore, 1993) 
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Winnicott and fantasying 
I have argued here that in playing the spectator may at times move 
(and wish to be moved) into her inner world of psychic reality, to be 
caught up in its content and structure. Winnicott does not himself, 
however, take this view of fantasying ; or rather he distingushes 
between 'fantasy' and 'imagination' (explored in Ch. 6) and gives a 
particular meaning to the term 'fantasy'. In a late paper, 'Dreaming, 
fantasying , and living: a case history describing a primary dissociation' 
(Winnicott, 1971, Ch. 2), he places 'fantasying ' along with daydreaming 
and contrasts it with the 'imagination', which he relates to both 
'dream' and to 'reality': 'Creative playing is allied to dreaming and to 
living but essentially does not belong to fantasying' (p. 31). 
For the patient described in this paper fantasying is distinct from 
dreaming because it is associated not with 'repression' but with 
'dissociation', a mechanism of splitting of early infancy. In these terms 
repression is a relatively healthy mechanism - aspects of what has 
been repressed appear in both 'dreaming' and 'feelings belonging to 
life', with an enriching effect. Fantasying from the dissociation of a part 
of the ego from itself, on the other hand, is damaging because it has 
prevented the emergence of 'a whole person' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 29). 
The fantasying cannot be 'used' by the subject because there is never 'a 
whole person to be aware of the two or more dissociated states that are 
present at any one time' (ibid). This fantasying is different from both 
playing and 'imaginative planning' (where I see myself engaged in an 
activity which as a result I can actually carry out) because so much 
energy is located in the split-off state that there is none left for actual 
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activity. Dreams belong to the past, planning to the future, but 
fantasying happens in the here aýid now - except that from the 
observer's point of view 'nothing whatever has happened'; nor will it, 
precisely because 'in the dissociated state so much is happening' (ibid 
p. 27). 
The way in which Winnicott describes this state could be applied to 
passive film-viewing-as-pathology: 'she could see that this could very 
easily have led to her lying in a mental hospital ... immobile ... yet in 
her mind keeping up a continuity of fantasying in which omnipotence 
was retained and wonderful things could be achieved in a dissociated 
state' -whereas anything actually carried out was 'subject to 
imperfection and therefore no good' (Winnicott 1971, p. 28). 
In this sense 'fantasying instead of living', described as escapism by 
James Britton (1977), becomes a substitute gratification sought by film 
and video watchers. Winnicott points out that this form of fantasying 
activity may be very difficult, both for the observer and even for the 
participant, to distinguish from 'creative flights of the imagination' 
(p. 31). In watching a film we may not know where or who we are, or 
whether we are 'being creative' or 'escaping' (fantasying ); whether we 
are playing or whether playing has broken down. Winnicott gives an 
indication of the risk of 'meeting' the unconscious through fantasying: 
that it is possible to believe in it too thoroughly: 'in fantasy things work 
by magic: there are no brakes on fantasy, and love and hate cause 
alarming effects ... fantasy is only tolerable at full blast when objective 
reality is appreciated well ... the subjective cannot be enjoyed except as a 
parallel to the objective' (quoted in Phillips, p. 85). From this 
perspective, in watching a film it is important that we only suspend 
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disbelief in it intermittently and to a certain extent and that we are able 
to step out of the film-watching state as the credits roll up; on the other 
hand, on its own level (that of psychic reality), the film world is, and 
remains, 'real' for the spectator. For the playing spectator, the 
transitional area ensures that the boundaries between external and 
internal reality can be maintained as well as bridged; but in any case 
while play is taking place they need not be considered. 
For this patient of Winnicott's there was no third area of playing or 
transitional object, so that she was unable to link up inner and outer 
reality. 13 The essence of playing is activity; in her case there was none. 
In watching a film the playing spectator also operates on the margins of 
psychic and external reality and it is easy for the precarious link 
between the two to be broken, whether momentarily or sustainedly. In 
this case the subject is moved by fantasy scenarios which position her 
in pre-set ways and she becomes a passive, unconscious spectator. In 
the fantasy structuring these scenarios are programmed and, like film 
narrative, endlessly repetitive. To change them and to make them her 
own the spectator has to unlock them in the service of playing. 
13Winnicott does not himself discuss this patient in terms of the transitional area. 
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Meet me in St. Louis: 'The House of Horror' 
The following analysis of the 'House of Horror' sequence in Meet me 
in St. Louis takes up the issue of the relationship and movement 
between the transitional area; shared, objective reality; and 'inner', 
psychic reality, that Tootie acts out and the film enacts for the spectator. 
I will argue that the playing spectator hovers in this sequence on the 
margins, drawn back and forth between reality and the fantasy 
scenarios into which she is sometimes drawn, and that this movement 
becomes a part of her playing in the transitional area. 
I have presented Tootie as representative of the film's repressed 
unconscious, that underlies and sometimes forces its way into the 
apparently light-hearted surface that belongs to the film's status as a 
musical and a family comedy and romance and intrudes into the 
spectator's playing. Tootie herself, indeed, 'plays, from her first 
entrance on the ice cart, when she juggles her arch banter with the 
carrier with her talk of her dolls' lurid deaths. By the end of the next 
episode ('Tootie kills the snow people'), however, her character will 
have to carry the return of the repressed that will take control of the 
narrative, take on and defeat the power of the father, and break down 
the spectator's playing. 
Some of Tootie's world, then, is that of psychic reality, the child's, 
which has no reference to the external world and operates by its own 
rules, where fantasy scenarios are as psychically binding as any other 
freality'. However, within certain limits (defined by the film's status as 
a genre Hollywood narrative), a good deal St. Louis operates as if in the 
external world of the shared reality of daily living in the small 
community that comprises its world: the world of the adults or of those 
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accepting the adults' perception of things. The musical numbers and 
scenes have introduced a playing, 'other' discourse, where the usual 
reality boundaries do not apply, and which takes the viewer into her 
own potential space and the playspace of the film, and which has just 
been represented in the most energetic, 'staged' and unmotivated 
number of the film, 'The Trolley Song'. 
Now the work of this 'Horror' sequence for the film's narrative drive 
and for the spectator will be to begin to validate Tootie's point of view 
within psychic reality, where the family conflict, not yet introduced, is a 
life and death matter, belonging to the family melodrama aspect of the 
film. This 'House of Horror' sequence foreshadows and dimly parallels 
the snow people sequence. If the film is to ally the spectator with 
Tootie's point of view in the snow scene, the process must be begun in 
this less serious scene where Tootie's 'killing' is carried out by her 
simply throwing flour into the face of an elderly neighbour, Mr. 
Brokauff. For Tootie, however, this action has an import out of all 
proportion to its apparent reality. 
Minnelli relates how MGM considered cutting the Halloween 'House 
of Horror' sequence; it was Minnelli's favourite, both in his original 
conception of the film and in its execution, for its interesting 
cinematography and its offsetting of the film's sentimentality, and to 
his relief it was liked and saved (Minnelli, 1977, p. 140). This is an 
indication of how the scene is both on one level important to and at 
the same time an oddity in the film. In a film which is anyway episodic 
this sequence serves no apparent plot function at all. It is crucial, 
however, to the film's unconscious project. 
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The sequence opens the film's Autumn episode, with the seasonal 
greeting card device that introduces each episode showing a pale-tint 
Gothic-looking version of the Smith's house with a skeletal tree in 
front of it. Its appearance is a surprise, since it has followed on 
immediately, in a surprisingly quick cut, from the cheerful and 
energetic musical number the 'Trolley' song, the ending of the 
Summer episode. As the camera moves forward and the still card 
'comes alive' as, it did for the first episode, the light fades and the house 
is shown in the dark, with a number of its windows brightly lit. The 
tree's shadows have become thicker and more shadowy. For a 
moment, as the card surround disappears, the house is unrecognisable 
as the Smith's house, so quick has been the transition from the Trolley 
song to the greeting card, to the actual house, and so different is this 
image from the previous 'Summer' image of the house. There is a 
further jolt for the spectator as the genre seems to shift from the 
musical, set in bright light, to an apparent 'horror' image which Wood 
(1979) compares with the Psycho house. 14 The camera tracks forward to 
a lit-up window, accompanied by a slow version of the film's theme 
tune. 
In the first episode of the film the move forward into the house 
heralded the film's presentation of the happy, bustling Smith family 
making ketchup in their kitchen. The disorientating difference of this 
opening shot continues into the next, a superimposition of two masks 
over the lighted window, which, as the window fades, become clearly 
14The expressionistic look of the shot and the difficulty in reading it also recalls the 
more complex opening of Citizen Kane (1941), where the camera also tracks forward 
towards the house, and the music is interrupted as it stops. Minnelli particularly 
admired Welles as a film-maker. 
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defined, one as a skull, the other with blood coming from its mouth, 
both higl-dy lit by a candle in chiaroscuro effect and with nothing but a 
red cloth behind them: images of death, blood, fear. These masks are 
used to strong effect throughout the sequence. 
Masks are traditionally a disguise, and used throughout the history of 
theatre. But from the point of view of the repressed unconscious, they 
also reveal. In acting exercises, actors who put on masks can get 'taken 
over' by them and find themselves mouthing sounds and making 
movements and actions which they seem not to direct or intend, the 
mask acting as another entity or representative of the players' 
unconscious. During this sequence in St. Louis they foreground the 
contrast (but also suggest the connection) between their 'nastiness' and 
the innocent-looking faces of their child-wearers in a reversal of the 
norm which expects a civilised veneer to hide the primitive depths. At 
this point the masks are presented to the spectator directly, without 
mediation, without a body wearing them and apparently without a 
narrative motivation, like part-object images speaking to the primitive 
unconscious. 
The image is immediately 'normalised', however, as the camera 
moves back to reveal Rose in shot with the two young Smith sisters, 
Agnes and Tootie, and the spectator is reoriented and put back in place. 
Rose is dressing the girls for Halloween: Tootie is having a false nose 
and a bowler hat tried on, Agnes is in a large black hat with a spiky 
decoration used to spiky visual effect in the following scenes. This 
transition from the unmediated image of the mask to dressing up sets 
up the sequence's movement between psychic reality and playing. 
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The two children are talking about a neighbour, Mr Brokauff, building 
him up into what they claim is a 'true' villain. As they talk about his 
poisoning a cat, and as a punch line, his whisky bottles, they are quickly 
making themselves believe their own story-telling. Rose manifestly 
pretends to play along with it, hei exaggerated pretence inviting the 
spectator to collude with her playing: the spectator is in position of the 
adult Rose humouring her little sister - the dialogue is shot from 
Rose's point of view, camera from behind her shoulder. However as 
the children's expressions show increasing signs of their believing 
their own story, the spectator is also caught between Rose's acting and 
their more serious playing. 
A rapid dissolve to the kitchen recalls the film's image of comfort and 
abundant nourishment. Kate is icing a large cake in the foreground 
and, behind her, Mrs Smith helps. Kate continues the Hallowe'en 
playing by pretending to be deceived by the appearance of the two 
children in their masks as 'boys'; they announce themselves as two 
ghosts, one 'horrible', the other 'drunken'. One of them has 'never 
even been buried'. The issue of burying, digging up, burying alive, is 
one of Tootie's major preoccupations, a reminder from the character 
who represents most the family's and the film's unconscious, of 
repression and its return. Rose comes in, reaffirming the make-believe 
and the adult humouring of the children, as she tells them to 
remember to replace the item a neighbour has put out for them to 
steal. Grandpa, as often, takes on an intermediate role between the 
adult and the child; from off-screen, he makes a 'ghost' sound, and on 
entry makes a joke for the adult spectator as he pretends to Agnes not 
to have heard it. But a moment later he says seriously, "You wouldn't 
catch me out on a night like this without elaborating; given no 
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other information or reaction the spectator is only offered that of 
Agnes who looks genuinely frightened. Grandpa goes on to give 
apparently serious advice about how to 'wet the flour' the girls are 
going to throw at those they visit to make it harder for the 'victim' to 
get it off: Grandpa and the children are in collusion in their playing, 
which for the moment they all take seriously; the spectator wavers, 
both inside and outside it. 
The camera tracks the girls out of the house and there is a further 
striking momentary unmediated view of a mask (which actually hangs 
loose round Agnes' neck) through a window pane, apparently 
disembodied, moving alone, of its own volition. The girls are 
accompanied by slow staccato music which is slightly playful and 
slightly ominous at the same time - it both supports and counters the 
spectator's 'adult' rezFding which tolerates but does not believe in the 
girls. 
The film's other tendency to placp the spectator along with the girls' 
subjective experience continues outside the house, in the dark, as the 
girls go to join the Hallowe'en fire. They walk towards camera, alone, 
Agnes's mask glowing, with the spiky shadows of the tree behind, and 
children! s shouting in the background, off screen (as yet unidentified). 
As they come into close-up, only the masks, no longer their faces, are 
in view. At several points in this sequence such a slightly extended 
walk, or later a run in the dark, adds to a sense of danger, foreboding 
and isolation. 
A cut to a huge bonfire shows a crowd of children, shouting and 
screaming, throwing parts of a house, doors and window frames onto 
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it. Two girls dressed up in men's long coats rush towards camera, 
(cross-dressing is marked in this scene where roles are uncertain) then 
stop abruptly as they, and the crowd behind them, back off at Tootie 
and Agnes's approach; a cut to Tootie on her own shows her scared 
face, lit up very white, in the dark. 
As Agnes comes into view, she is wearing her mask for the first time 
and for a moment is not recognisable. Even the much older children 
are frightened at the sight of the girls who have to reassure them by 
announcing their identity. Throughout the sequence the music 
registers the ambiguity of the spectator's position: at important 
moments of drama where the girls'Yeality is presented seriously on the 
image track, cheerful, mocking dance music refutes it. In this section, 
however, glissando violin music reinforces the image of the children's 
fear. 
The older children are also dressed up in masks and lit up by the fire. 
Shot from Tootie's point of view, they talk loudly and pass objects over 
her head, refusing to allow her to throw the large objects onto the fire: 
'You're too little'. The scene appears uncontrolled and wild. 
Hearing the repetition of the need to 'take the Brokauffs ' which 
everyone appears to be afraid to take up, Tootie suddenly offers. 
Refusing advice 'to go home', her white, intense and convinced face in 
close-up, she says again: 'I'll take the Brokauffs '; her conviction 
encourages belief and is taken seriously. She is challenged to 'throw 
flour in their face' ('or else'), asserts her independence by using her 
own flour - and sets off, viewed from behind, moving away from 
camera until she becomes a small figure in the dark: a distancing view 
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which in this case encourages not irony but concern. (The bag of flour 
disguises the true seriousness of her undertaking. ) 
In this noisy, riotous, firelit scene where all children are disguised as 
adults, the Brokauffs are taken seriously as frightening and Tootie's 
mission is to 'kill' them. Throughout the following scene Tootie seems 
to be totally and intently serious about her mission, not playing a role 
as she often does in the film. The game is real for her although it may 
not be for the film. 
A cut shows Tootie walking towards camera, away from the crowd, 
alone, her body half lit up, half in shadow, the fire in a stylised cone of 
flame behind her. She jumps exaggeratedly as she comes to a shape 
which turns out to be a horse. Her walking is extended a little longer, 
long enough for the spectator to register it as significant; and the Gothic 
feel of the image is emphasised by leaves flying around her. As she 
walks, the music mocks her, for instance by halting momentarily as 
Tootie (and the music) 'jumps' at the sight of the horse. As she walks 
towards camera however the spectator is also invited to fear for and 
with the small bizarre figure in a Gothic setting., 
Her walk is interrupted in a cut to a view of a house, less ornate than 
the Smiths, but similarly dark with several windows highly lit. From a 
distance, just visible, there is a face at the window (as there will be in 
the snow people scene). 
Tootie gets nearer, hides by what looks to be a tombstone and creeps up 
to the front door. A quick cut shows a stylised image, framed like a 
tableau through the window, of Mr Brokauff reading a paper, his wife 
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in the background and a large white dog to one side all as though 
frozen in an American primitive painting. Tootie nearly runs away,, 
then takes her flour and rings the bell, at this point shot from behind 
in a low angle shot that makes her look very small in front of the door 
which opens to reveal Mr Brokauff's legs. 
Suddenly the mood shifts, as the camera position changes and Tootie is 
shot from inside the house and behind Mr Brokauff, somewhat from 
his point of view (the spectator probably does not adjust to it so 
quickly), as she says 'I hate you Mr Brokauff' and throws the flour. For 
this instant, the climax of the sequence, the spectator is held between 
Tootie and the adult point of view - which in the next instant takes 
over as he makes a (pretend) roar, wipes his face, looks down at the dog 
- and the camera follows his look to see the dog eagerly eating the 
flour and back to Mr Brokauff smiling benignly. 
The child's view is reasserted as Tootie runs fast back to the fire, again 
taking longer in the tracking shot than if the scene were made in a 
series of cuts, giving the spectator time to register the force and 
duration of her running. This is her triumphant moment, her 
initiation. She has 'killed' Mr Brokauff, is acclaimed by the other 
children as 'the horriblest of them all', and allowed now to feed the 
fire. 
The spectator has both been taken into her world and has been kept 
outside it (Tootie did not stay to witness Mr Brokauff's reaction). The 
spectator 'of course' knows that this whole sequence is make-believe, 
put in mainly for adult enjoyment of spectacle and of observing 
children's make-believe. At the same time another space is given her 
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where such a common-sense adult reality is undermined and Tootie's 
outlook taken on: Tootie's inner psychic world is also real and is 
demonstrated to have material effects when, in the next episode, her 
killing of the snow people prevents the family's move to New York 
and changes the course of the narrative. 
This sequence disturbs the playing spectator in a number of ways: in 
the opening shot of the 'house of horror' it upsets expectations of 
narrative and generic continuity so that the spectator does not quite 
know where she is, or how she is to react - the secure playspace is 
shaken and with it the spectator's ability to play. Her playing is 
however re-established and continues in a number of moves: firstly, 
the whole sequence involves acting, role play and humour. Secondly, 
the spectator is offered different positions within the fiction - moving 
between the adults and the two young girls in the first section, between 
Tootie and the children round the fire (whose view of Tootie changes) 
and Mr Brokauff. The main shift in spectator position, however, is 
between the film's narrating ironic and deflating enunciation and 
Tootie's point of view. Changes in the camera's point of view and the 
contrast between music and image mark the contrast between Tootie's 
inner and external reality and move the spectator out to the onlooker's 
humorous and ironic viewpoint. At the same time, Tootie's encounter 
with Mr Brokauff, the House of Horror, the masks and the transformed 
landscape offer the spectator a disturbing if fleeting encounter with 
psychic inner reality cut off from playing. 
This sequence moves the spectator in a series of repeated moves to and 
from playing and the possibility of its breakdown, veering edgily from 
one state to the other. The chief effect for the spectator is of a certain 
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unease; we are not consistently sure of where we are or what is 
happening, and, in particular, we are no longer quite confident about 
the playing and comedy that the film has previously established. In this 
sequence our belief, along with Tootie, that she has killed Mr Brokauff 
is undermined by 'reality', but it pre-figures her later killing of the 
snow family which we are invited to believe in without such 
qualification. 
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The spectator dreams a film 
The spectator's move into psychic reality is at its most sustained when 
the viewing process induces a psychic state that is similar to that of 
dreaming: the playing spectator is transformed into the dreamer and 
she seems to 'dream' the film. For Freud, dreams are the most sure and 
routine path for the return of the repressed, the clearest evidence of the 
existence of the unconscious and the means by which he studied its 
operations (Freud, 1901). In film studies, the notion that watching a 
film is like dreaming suggests that, by inducing in the spectator a 
dreamlike state, film also provides a route to the unconscious, not so 
much through its content but through its psychic operations and effect 
on the viewing subject. In becoming the dreamer the playing spectator 
undergoes a psychic shift into a different viewing mode. 
In film studies the comparison between film and dreaming has 
recurred, rather as though it were a matter of general experience, 
throughout film history, as if on the assumption that it is a common 
and strong impression that watching a film can feel like, or at least 
recall, dreaming. Altman, (1977, p. 524) cites Muerhofer (1916) onwards; 
Donald (1989, p. 3) recalls the now familiar notion of film as the 'dream 
factory' and wish-fulfilment in the work of Hortense Powdermaker in 
the nineteen forties. In attempting to account for this connection, 
Altman refers to the philosopher Suzanne Langer's tantalisingly brief 
but suggestive attempt to compare the operation of film with dream in 
the appendix to Feeling and Form. Here, in two pages, at the end of an 
ambitious exploration of the relation between art forms and emotional 
experience, she characterises film as creating 'a virtual present - an 
order of direct apparition', (in contrast to the 'past' of narrative fiction) 
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... 'The spectator of film takes the place of a dreamer' (quoted 
in 
Altman, 1977, p. 525), the images of the film-track unfolding in front 
him as a dream seems to do for the dreamer. 
Metz explores the relationship of film with dreaming, day-dreaming 
and fantasy in a series of five short, connected essays, 'The fiction film 
and its spectator', published (though not in English) a year before his 
much more influential 'The Imaginary signifier', which appeared in 
Screen in 1975. Whereas the main thesis of the latter essay concerns 
Lacan's distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic order, 
these earlier essays explore the 'spectator in the Imaginary' (Metz, 1982, 
p. 6). 
Having set up the fundamental and obvious difference that the 
spectator is awake and'knows he is at the cinema', whereas the 
dreamer is asleep and 'does not know that he is dreaming' (Metz, 1982, 
p. 99), Metz goes on to explore the similarities between the two states, 
and a good deal of the essay is therefore concerned to demonstrate that 
this 'obvious' difference must be modified. Firstly, he cites the 
conditions of film viewing in the cinema: the dark, isolated and 
passive situation 'induces a state of narcissistic withdrawal'; the subject 
turns in on himself, away from external objects and 'puts himself in 
the position of a certain toleranc6 for the conscious manifestation of 
the primary process' (p. 107). This is the position that the spectator 
invites by going to the cinema. Secondly, Metz assesses the state of the 
spectator: he claims that, after all, the spectator is not always 'quite 
awake'. At certain moments of 'fleeting intensity ... the subject's 
consciousness of the filmic situation as such starts to become a bit 
murky' (Metz, 1982, p-101) and at these moments there arises 'a 
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dreamlike confusion of dream and reality' where the spectator gets 
nearer to 'true illusion', a 'brief psychical giddiness from which he has 
the impression of waking up' (p. 103), because he has 'dreamed' a bit of 
the film. In a passage that recalls Winnicott's account of the baby who 
has the illusion that it 'creates' the mother's breast at the moment it is 
presented, Metz speaks of a 'paradoxical hallucination... a slight 
unsteadiness in the play of reality-testing' and concludes that 'the 
subject has hallucinated what was really there, what at the same 
moment he in fact perceived, the images and sounds of the film' 
(p. 104). 
Metz suggests that the greatest similarity between film viewing and the 
dreaming state occurs at the moment when the regime of each begins 
to break down - when the spectator stops being aware that he is 
watching and when the dreamer knows that he is dreaming or is even 
able to redirect the dream's narrative. (Films too sometimes offer us 
the opportunity to 'redirect' the narrative: the double ending of 
Pennies from Heaven (1981), for instance, claims to offer the spectator a 
choice between the 'realistic' (pessimistic) ending of the protagonist's 
death or the alternative lovers happy-ever-after ending. ) 
At these moments the opposition between sleep and wakefulness is 
modified: the dreamer's illusion of the 'reality' of his situation (which 
Metz points out is usually total) wavers, while the spectator's ordinary 
awareness of himself in the cinema disappears, to be temporarily 
replaced by an illusion that the events on screen are indeed taking 
place; at this point he 'dreams or hallucinates' the film. 
210 
Metz's statement that dream is the only non-neurotic place for the 
primary process slowly evolves into his suggestion that film also has 
that function. Overall the economy of film viewing, which constructs a 
spectator veering between external and internal, psychic, reality, has a 
tendency to take the spectator into the domain of the primary process, 
which can 'establish, outside the divisions imposed by reality, the short 
and magical circuits that the impatient wish requires' (Metz, 1982, 
p. 126). This is an elaboration of the well-worn notion of film as wish 
fulfilment. 
If the fundamental similarity between film and dream is in their 
deployment of moving images, it is in our memory of them that, with 
the major defining internal-external difference between them 
abolished, they are most alike. Firstly, in remembering, all images, 
whether they were originally internal or external, become subjective 
phenomena. Secondly, the relative degree of secondarisation and 
narrative coherence of film compared with dream counts for less than 
the fact that we recall images from both film and a dream in a highly 
selective way. We use these images and fragments for our own varied 
and changing purposes and they slot into our memory along with our 
other experiences. If we choose to pursue them, we can use them as a 
way of discovering, by free association, more about our unconscious 
reactions to a film and its significance for us. 
In his essay 'Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo', Victor Burgin, who is 
committed to an understanding of psychoanalysis as a 'theory of the 
internalisation of the social' pursues the cultural meanings to which 
his memory of a film image may lead him. After watching a film, all 
that he retains is an 'image or short sequences of images', which he 
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compares to a film still: 'The film still a material entity; the mnemic 
image, a psychic entity' (Burgin, 1986, p. 86). 
This exploration leads him into an exploration of theories of 
representation in Renaissance painting, but he returns to where he 
began, to a look at an analysis of some film stills by Barthes, who 
contrasts a shared, culturally mediated response with an image with 
the 'private, unpredictable', and involuntary response that Barthes 
terms a 'punctum' (Burgin, 1986, p. 95). Here Burgin moves from what 
he distinguishes as a 'collective, preconscious' association to an 
evocation of individual fantasy: 'the sources of the emotion in 
memories circulating round the themes of death and sexuality, played 
out within the space of the family, which are the substance of 
psychoanalysis' (p. 86); the 'highly cathected image-fragment is the 
'representative of a narrative' (always, apparently, of the subject's 
personal history) and a point, marked by the unpredictable force of the 
response, of the return of the repressed. In an analogous process, 
Burgin goes on to trace his associations of a composite image which he 
found he had formed out of a 'superimposition' of images from 
Hitchcock's Vertigo; Burgin's shifting associations take him in and out 
of the film by different routes; as though with each entry he finds (or 
makes) a different film. The spectator can continue to work on the film 
- and the film work on her - in the same way as she might with a 
dream. The image of Tootie killing the snow people is an example 
from Meet me in St. Louis that has a similar reverberative power. 
As we extend the process of remaking and re-elaborating it, a film 
becomes, like a dream, 'our' film: (both our dreams and the film we 
dream are always unique). In the process of re-secondarisation the 
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unconscious source for the original eruption of the image into our 
minds disperses or gets absorbed into our psychic life as we make new 
objects and artefacts out of the fragments. Even in our reception of it 
we never experience the film as a whole, complete object but receive it 
in fragments, and receive it differently with every repetition. The 
'wholeness' of a film, like a dream, is a theory, a reconstructed 
afterthought. 
For psychoanalysis, the phenomenon of dreaming is an insistent sign 
of the permeation of the unconscious into our everyday lives: when I 
wake up, the images that 'come' to me may have come from my 
dream; but in this half-awake state, they may also have come from a 
film, perhaps the film I watched last night. We may also re-view 
(hallucinate, recall) images of what has actually taken place, 
particularly 'traumatic' images that we might wish we could forget; or 
we may visualise, and even hallucinate, fantasies, whether wished for 
or not. Whatever their origins, eventually all internal images come to 
have the same status. In his dialogue with Bellour, Rosolato describes a 
patient's intense and frightening experience of his memory of a cinema 
poster which, however, 'may have been entirely fabricated' (Bellour 
and Rosolato, 1990, p. 212). Bellou*r notes the ambiguity of the 
relationship between dream and film remembered recounting: 
... the wild and unmasterable experience provoked by the 
encounter with a particular face or with a particular relationship 
between two shots which suddenly disturb you. It's like a 
materialisation of one's relationship to the recollection of one's 
dreams, even if here one is actually dealing with a construction of 
real images whereas the dream is an attempt to grasp once again 
things which are in the process of being lost' (ibid). 
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For Susan Isaacs the peculiar sense of the directness and immediacy of 
mental images may be attributed to the psychic continuity between the 
image that we know, as adults, to be a mental representation of 
external reality and our primitive 'imago', the unconscious image of 
the earliest object or part object which includes its associated body and 
emotional fantasies. Whereas the adult's image has largely repressed 
its somatic emotional elements it nevertheless, by unconscious 
association, remains emotionally charged with the original bodily 
associations of the imago: (Isaacs 1944, p. 93). Impressions from both 
dream and film, either as a memory or as a trace of what we cannot 
remember, continue to live in our psyche and to permeate our 
conscious awareness, as a mark of the insistence of the unconscious. 
Metz's distinction is between the spectator who is fully aware of 'the 
filmic situation' and the dreamer, who will 'wake up' from the dream. 
The notion of potential space and the transitional area, however, 
introduces an alternative active engagement with the film: playing is 
an active process and the playing spectator makes her own film in the 
potential space where film and spectator meet. While the spectator 
dreams a film the playing spectator is in abeyance; in dreaming the 
film, its images seem to be projected from inside herself. When she 
'wakes' from her film, still dreaming, the experience is of coming to 
herself again after being absent, and playing can start again. 
For the dreaming spectator, the status of the film object itself has also 
undergone a change: from being a transitional object it has become an 
object that belongs entirely to inner, psychic, reality (Winnicott, 1962): 
the film-dream is an internal object, the dream space an internal space. 
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Asleep, the spectator can do nothing with the dream-film but when the 
dreamer /spectator awakes, whether during or after the film, she may 
use the new construct formed from the images and 'impressions' of 
the dream-film for her playing in the same way as any other 
transitional object. Indeed the dream-film used in this way may 
function as a particularly potent transitional object, as it comes strongly 
cathected from its status as an internal dreamt object. As the spectator 
reconstructs the film she has dreamt, it becomes her transitional object, 
reconnecting her with the external world and allowing her to play 
again. From belonging to psychic reality the dream becomes available 
for playing and Winnicott's claim that 'dreaming and living are of the 
same order' is realised. 
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CHAPTER 5 REPLAYING LOSS 
The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there. 
(The Go-Between, L. P. Hartley, 1953, p. 1. ) 
A loss is a loss is a loss. 
(Masud Khan on Psychic Pain, J. B. Pontalis, 1981) 
The infant ... [is] ... able to deal with loss without quite losing what is (in 
one sense only) lost. 
(Human Nature, D. W. Winnicott, 1988. )
The spectator suffers loss 
Although it is not always named, loss is a pervasive presence in the 
psychoanalytic story and as much a part of the unconscious as desire. 
As subjects we are caught in the impossible paradox that if we try to 
regain what we have lost we risk the loss of that subjectivity which has 
been achieved only through successive losses. In gaining his mother, 
Oedipus loses himself; the loss of. the object of desire and the acceptance 
of castration is the price that has to be paid for our place as subjects. Yet 
we continue to seek an end to loss and at the same time to re-enact it. 
In this chapter I will argue that the promise of film both to compensate 
for and to replay her loss is a further lure for the playing spectator as 
she is taken over by unconscious processes. Through re-playing loss 
she may assimilate and re-work it for her playing. Through the loss of 
her subjectivity, I will argue in the next chapter, she may also 'find' her 
Self. 
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I will explore the notion of the spectator's loss from different 
perspectives: as her desire for her lost object; as her wish to replay her 
loss; as her longing for her 'past' through nostalgia; and finally as the 
loss of her subjectivity in 'merging' with the film. 
The basic psychoanalytic loss takes place in fantasy but in relation to 
external referents. In 'Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety' Freud 
enumerates its stages: loss comes to be experienced as variations of the 
fear of separation in losing the desired object: at birth, through 
castration, in exclusion -'separation from the horde' - and death 
(Freud, 1926, pp. 295-6). For Freud, Oedipus and castration is always the 
fulcrum and defining instance. Here the losses multiply: the boy has to 
renounce his desire for the mother - and along with it, the femininity 
he may have imbibed from her -a loss accompanied by the 
consequent guilt and terror of reprisal (of the greater loss of castration) 
from the internalised father of the child's super-ego. For the girl it is a 
double renunciation, not only of her own mother but also of her own 
sex as, object of desire, and the masochistic acceptance in turn of her 
own castration - the renunciation of bisexuality and the possession of 
the penis/phallus. 
For Klein the inconsolable anguish and anxiety associated with the loss 
of the object comes from the knowledge that the subject itself has 
destroyed the object. At the primitive, body-based stage when the baby's 
experience is only of part objects (the good and bad breast, wholly 
giving and wholly refusing), it destroys the bad object in fury, but 
comes to realise that it has also killed the good object, experiencing at 
the depressive position that the two opposites are a part of one whole, 
the 'real' but still internal mother. Guilt and anguish at loss enters the 
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Kleinian scene much earlier than for Freud and it is a more pervasive 
issue for the subject. The attempt*at reparation, the restoration of loss, 
as well as the tendency to continue to retain in fantasy good and bad 
part objects, lasts a lifetime and there is no transitional object to defuse 
the process (Klein, 1940). 
A more pervasive loss for the adult comes from the need to sacrifice 
the pleasure principle for the reality principle, inner for outer reality 
and from then on the necessity for compromise and choice, signs of 
'maturity' that the psychoanalytic subject achieves only at a cost and 
never completely. As Winnicott puts it (to a lay reader), 'the reality 
principle is an insult' for the baby (Winnicott, 1986, p. 40) - and in the 
unconscious remains so throughout life. Winnicott's trajectory of loss 
is the baby's progressive, uncertain journey of separation from the 
mother before the Oedipal stage, and the decisive loss in that process is 
the failure of the 'holding' mother in infancy. 
Metz relates the loss of the object to cinema when he begins his long 
essay 'The Imaginary signifier' with an introductory note on the 
propensity of cinema (cinema as an institutional and psychic 
apparatus) to become established, in order to perpetuate itself, as a 
Kleinian good object, the idealised internal part object of desire which 
ls split off from the bad object. This is part of Metz's attempt to grapple 
with the continually intriguing question of the spectator's fascination 
with cinema, which can as easily shift to, or be expressed as, hatred for 
the bad object (Metz, 1982, pp. 9-12). Metz returns to the theme at the 
end of the essay in a brief 'Provisional Conclusion'; here he claims that 
in 'studying' cinema the critic has turned it into the bad object to be 
persecuted and destroyed: 'the good object has moved to the side of 
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knowledge' (p. 80). The greatest threat to the psyche comes not from the 
loss of a real person but of an internal object, a part of our fantasy; 
since, as Metz puts it, 'lost objects are the only ones one is afraid to lose' 
(Metz, 1982, p-80), the critic, like the child in the depressive position 
who realises that he has destroyed the whole object, not only the bad 
part, always attempts reparation, by the 'restoration to the theoretical 
body of what has been taken from the institution, from the code which 
is being studied' (ibid): the critic transfers his love for cinema to a love 
of theory. 
This is an apt and wry commentary on the activities of film buffs and 
critics but film itself does its own work of seeming to restore the lost 
object to the spectator. 
Reclaiming the lost object 
One of the most remarked-on phenomena of cinema is its 'reality 
effect', firstly, from its motivated, iconic signifying system: the moving 
photographic images resemble their referents in a way that verbal 
language systems deny (Metz, 1974). Then, more than any other kind of 
fiction, cinema manifests itself as fully present and absent at the same 
time. John Ellis explores the 'present absence' of 'the photo effect' 
(Ellis, 1982, p. 97) in terms of stars but it is true of all representational 
cinema. Penley emphasises that the 'dream effect' of cinema's 
impression of reality that Metz describes 'has less to do with the 
successful rendering of the real than the reproduction and repetition of 
a particular condition: a fantasmi*sation of the subject' (Penley, 1977, 
p. 588) - the spectator dreams or hallucinates the film, or is caught up 
in the Lacanian Imaginary, and in this state the images on screen form 
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a part of her psychic state. The spectator's sense of loss comes from her 
simultaneous experiencing, which is almost her hallucinated longing, 
of the presence of the film events combined with the knowledge of the 
actual absence and negation of what appears to be there (brought 
together by the subject's perpetual desire for what has been lost). Like 
Winnicott's tantalising mother (Winnicott, 1960, p. 147) the cinematic 
image offers and withholds satisfaction in the same movement: 
apparently fully present, it is in fact totally unobtainable. 
In his essay 'Film and Dream', Metz holds that the viewing situation 
encourages in 'a double reinforcement' the impression for the 
spectator of receiving images that seem to come from inside her at the 
same time as they come from the outside (Metz, 1982, p. 118). To take 
this further, if the images on screen seem to originate from the 
spectator's inner world, the film system continually both validates 
those inner objects as 'real' - because they exist out there on screen - 
and at the same time makes them available for the spectator's inner 
world from which they originated and where they rightly belong. 
While in the external world the spectator can have nothing of what the 
film seems to promise, in fantasy she can have it all, since the fictional 
objects have never claimed to belong anywhere but in her internal 
psychic reality to which (being part of 'her' psychically produced film) 
they are now returned. The film gives back to the spectator an internal 
object that she can retain for herself to offset the inevitable loss of the 
film-on-screen. 
explore this process in the following extract from Meet me in St. Louis 
where the work of the film will be twofold: to validate for the spectator 
the image of John Truett, as Esther's object of desire, and then return 
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that idealised object to her inner world. The effect in this playful film, I 
will argue, is to create 'two' John Truetts, the internal object of desire 
and the mundane but narratively necessary 'boy-next-door'. 
Meet ine in St. Louis: 'The-boy-next-doorl 
We catch a glimpse of the boy-next-door (John Truett) as the object of 
Esther's desire when both sisters, Esther and Rose, present and display 
themselves for him, surrounded, in a framing device frequently 
deployed in the film, particularly *for Esther/Garland, by the roses 
around the porch of their house. The girls' display of themselves is 
self-conscious - here, as often in the film, they put on a show as if for 
the benefit not only of the boy, but also for the spectator and 
themselves. Typical of many instances in the film, the situation is 
ironised and the spectator distanced by Minnelli's authorial voice. The 
point here is that the boy is indeed the 'boy-next-door', undeserving of 
the attention the girls give him -a very ordinary young man who 
lights a pipe as he is observed and seems (the spectator, like the girls, 
though, is not sure) to be unaware of their presence. He does not seem 
suitable as a romanticised, idealised object of desire, although he is 
admirably suited, in terms of the -family, small-town drama, to be 
Esther's 'real life' suitor once he is persuaded to take on the role. He 
appears to be unaffected by the sisters' presence, and, to their 
disappointment,, simply goes off into his house. 
After a brief comment on the situation, the girls enter their own house, 
with a reference to Esther's age by her sister: 'when you are as old as me 
you will know that boys are not the most important thing in the 
world'. The spectator is given to know that this is nonsense, since Rose 
protests too much and has done nothing except present herself for 
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sexual approval so far. Esther remains alone. She is about to transform 
for the spectator the boy-next-door into the internal object of desire that 
she is seeking. 
She moves to the window, front of screen, and looks out towards, but 
slightly to one side of, camera - although she is framed again, this 
time by the window, and this time as if for the spectator's view, she 
does not once in this scene look directly at the camera (in line with 
common practice in classic Hollywood fiction film, a 'rule', however, 
that is sometimes conventionally broken by the musical). 
A close-up, in soft focus, foregrounds her look. Who or what she is 
looking at becomes an issue - since the spectator is denied her glance, 
it is to be assumed that she is thinking about the boy-next-door, 
although we know that he has disappeared and is not in her line of 
vision. Soft focus adds to the impression that in looking out to middle 
distance, to a point that is not determinable by the spectator, she is in 
fact looking inwards to an internal object, the idealised object of her 
desire. 1 This vague idealisation of the boy-next-door is'expressed in the 
words of her song which is about her desire rather than a real person: 
My only regret is that we've never met, 
Though I dream of him all the while ... 
He doesn't try to please me ... 
... doesn't even know that I exist ... 
I just adore him. 
113ritton stresses the force of her narcissistic desire in this scene, for which he claims 
the boy is just a foil: Esther's 'object' is herself (Britton, 1978, p. 16). From an object 
relations perspective Esther's narcissism is transferred onto her fantasy, internal object, 
which, by the end of the scene has become a part of her psychic reality, of herself. 
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The actual boy-next-door by means of Esther's look inwards and by her 
desire (her sexual awakening, which is a major theme of the film) is 
becoming equated with this fantasy, unobtainable figure which belongs 
to her own psyche. He has become associated with a part of her dream 
and a focus for her wishes: 'I just adore him'. 
In this first solo of the film Esther/Judy Garland takes on the attributes 
of a star for the spectator, framed, with her face in soft focus. The 
spectator is offered the place of Esther's desiring: denied a reverse shot 
to locate her object (the actual boy-next-door having been dismissed) 
and frustratingly denied being ourselves the object looked at, there is 
no other place to take. We are invited at the same time to desire 
Garland as object and - more strongly, given the structuring of the 
look within the narrative which has encouraged the spectator to take 
up Esther's point of view - to take on her desire. The spectator's 
desire is therefore caught between that of Esther and her own for the 
star in a double movement where subject and object are reversed. 
The spectator is further caught up in this scenario of desire by the next 
move, as, with a rapid but unobtrusive tracking shot, we follow Esther 
round the room to look in a large mirror. Mirrors and reflections in 
narrative film easily and often create the impression of the possibility, 
usually promptly withheld, that the spectator will see herself reflected. 
In this case the image is immediately of Esther (although, in so far as 
the spectator has been invited to take her place, it also reflects the 
spectator), practically full-length. She looks at and self-consciously 
modifies the image (here we are shown both the girl and her image) by 
flicking her hair, posing herself to continue and formalise the waltz 
she has just begun. 
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At this moment, briefly, the spectator is being invited to take up a more 
distanced position as she notices and looks on at the self-conscious 
narcissistic display. On the one hand Esther has become the object of 
her own look, as has the spectator in so far as she is taking her own part 
in this narcissistic performance. On the other hand, at the same time, 
the spectator is invited to adopt an onlooker position, invited to smile 
tolerantly at the girl displaying herself; the film's ironic moments 
encourage a patronising view of"Esther. The movement of Garland's 
dancing and the swinging rhythm of the waltz; the non-diegetic 
orchestral accompaniment that brings in the outside world and makes 
public the private wishing; the camera's tracking movement - all 
work to include the spectator in the scene's activation of desire, which 
ends with its acknowledgement, as Garland returns to the window 
framed again by the curtain as at the beginning of the song: "How can I 
ignore the boy next door? ". 'He' is no longer out there but has become 
transformed by her wishing and self-love into an internal object. 
The 'boy-next-door' is a familiar icon of American cinema, part of the 
manifest promise of this film that home is best and will provide for all 
the subject's wishes. The point of his mundaneness is precisely that he 
can be universalised - he can belong to any girl (Britton calls him a 
tabula rasa); the more undefined the more able to be transformed by 
the power of desire into the ideal internal object, which the spectator 
can now securely possess. With this internal idealised object securely in 
place for the unconscious spectator, the film can move on to working 
out its family melodrama Oedipal themes, and focus on the need for 
the young people to take up a place in the family and society. The boy- 
next-door - his material disappearance is fortunate at this point - has 
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become invested with Esther's desire and, by extension, with the 
spectator's. There are now therefore two John Truetts. As the boy-next- 
door of the film he has no need to live up to the ideal because his 
figure has become invested with the desire of the players - of Esther 
and also of the spectator who identifies and plays in the place of the 
character on screen. The fantasy object is secure and the real boy-next- 
door can continue to play his roles of maintaining the family 
continuity when he will replace the grand(father) as Esther's beau, and 
as a butt for the film's teasing. The spectator now has a double view of 
him: the onlooker's playful, ironic and superior view of the boy-next- 
door and the other, where, equating him with an internal, psychic 
object, she takes on Esther's generalised wishing and accepts him as an 
object of desire. 
The coexistence of the two positions is characteristic of the film's 
shifting and fluid movement for the playing spectator. In being 
endowed with aspects of both inner and outer reality, the John Truett 
character takes on the attributes of a transitional object, both 'Me and 
not Me', able to be used and transformed variously by the spectator's 
wishing in the service of different kinds of playing. 
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Reclaiming the past: nostalgia 
The promise of cinema to summon up images of what the spectator 
has lost and to replay scenarios from her closed-off past is frequently 
represented as 'nostalgia', in an idealisation of a setting in the past. In 
psychoanalytic terms, one way of conceiving nostalgia is as a wishing 
and regret for the original lost object, the mother/breast, or, for 
Winnicott, the time of being merged in with her. In their account of 
Lacan, Benvenuto and Kennedy point to Freud's emphasis on'the 
nostalgia binding the subject to the lost object' and 'the impossibility of 
his (the subject's) repetitive attempts to find the lost object' 
(Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986, p. 128); at the heart of the experience of 
nostalgia is the knowledge of its inevitable disappointment. These 
authors point out that Klein, however, offered the possibility of 
restoring loss through restoration of the object; for Winnicott, even 
without restoration, loss can be redeemed and healed through the 
maternal holding environment which allows the subject to play. The 
memory and return of this provision, I will argue, is replayed in Meet 
me in St. Louis. 
The etymology of nostalgia refers to the wish to return home - 
homesickness. However nostalgia is marked off from homesickness 
(which assumes a real home to return to) by its peculiar quality of 
combining the wish to go back to the past with the knowledge, no less 
strongly registered, of the impossibility of that wish. The material past 
(another time or place) that nostalgia evokes is irrecoverable and the 
original psychic 'home'. irremediably lost. What is lost clouds the 
present - we say of persistent nostalgics that they cannot live in the 
present: destined always to attempt to recreate what has been lost, they 
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engage in a continual replaying of regret for the past, always trying to 
find its trace in the present. Certainly this quality of nostalgia, a 
yearning for something that can never be recaptured or a longing for a 
past that might, we imagine, have existed elsewhere, suggests the 
subject's myth of the original object. However it is notable that 
nostalgia is usually represented in terms of a physical place rather than 
in terms of an individual relationship, which is where the lost object is 
often pursued. 
A 'nostalgic' evocation of the past seems to have been a part of the 
original conception of Meet me in St. Louis. In his autobiography, 
Minnelli writes: 
The film he [Arthur Freed, the producer at MGM] had in mind 
was based on series of nostalgic pieces Sally Benson has written 
for the New Yorker, which were later published in book form as 
Meet me in St. Louis. Her childhood reminiscences were praised as 
a wonderful evocation of a past era, and Arthur felt a sentimental 
mood could be created. 
(Minnelli, 1974, p. 129) 
Minnelli adds that what convinced him to want to do the film were 
the children's fantasies about Halloween: he continues: 
... the burning of feet and slashing of throats, almost a wistful 
longing for horror, wasn't the sweet and treacly approach so 
characteristic of Hollywood. This was the type of fantasy that 
real children, raised on the grimmest of Grimm's fairy tales, would 
have. 
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His recollection, then, is of a wish to create 'lyrical evocations of an era' 
combined with a certain psychological realism. Of the script writing, he 
says: 
They took the very human values of the Benson work - the 
simple goodness of the time, the earnestness and purity of its 
people, the gentle humour and the laughs of recognition at their 
universality - and constructed a story out of an episode in the 
book. (p. 130) 
The effect of his brief account is a cavalier reconstruction of the period 
that makes nonsense of history and satisfactorily incorporates 'the 
horror' of the children's far-from-innocent fantasies into týe 'simple 
goodness of the time'. The film's nostalgic project is an idealised 
transformation of history and Minnelli continues his account by 
describing how he wished the sets to 'have the look of Thomas Eakin's 
paintings, though not to the point of imitation' (ibid, p. 131). Making 
due allowance for the fact that this was Minnelli writing - or rather 
being ghosted - nearly thirty years after the event,, this nevertheless 
sums up the general response to a film that is still frequently shown on 
television as a popular family movie at Christmas. Altogether this 
retrospective gloss, which does no justice to the complexity of the film, 
protests too much in eliding contradictions which the film itself 
hesitantly insists on. 
Andrew Britton and Richard Dyer explore some of the means by which 
Meet Me in St. Louis is made available for nostalgia. Richard Dyer, in 
'Entertainment and Utopia', argues that the film is one of a 
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comparatively small number of musicals which 'suggest that Utopia is 
implicit in the world of the narrative as well as of the numbers' (Dyer, 
1977, p. 188): whereas in many musicals the numbers represent 
escapism from the 'real' world of the narrative, 'Utopia' is everywhere 
in this film, embedded in the diegetic world of the city and the family. 
For the nostalgic experience, the film's utopian qualities represent 
what has been lost by history and the film offers to replay. 
For Britton the film presents St. Louis as a 'mythical place' where the 
Smith family, and the city itself, 'are separated off from the realm of 
production, in contrast with New York': the year of the St. Louis fair, 
1903-4, 'becomes the point at which 'city' can still mean community' 
(Britton, 1978, p-10). In an analysis of the opening sequence he suggests 
that the invitation to the viewer is to an 'at-homeness which becomes 
inseparable from family' inviting regression'not to childhood as it was 
then but to a cultural myth of childhood in the family as it ought to 
have been and might possibly have been' (ibid). 
Nostalgia in a film is usually represented as a place or a community, 
often presented (as in St. Louis) along with an extended family. This 
provides a structure and a setting for the spectator where she can find a 
safe place. For the individual, the wished-for setting may be perceived 
as his childhood home; collectively, the wish is often put onto a period 
in history when 'everything was much better'. 
The mechanism seems simple: if only I could recreate the home of my 
childhood, if only we could return to past values, if only the past could 
be restored, our incomplete present could be transformed. One 
nostalgic may be satisfied by the reassurance that everything could 
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have been all right ... if only ... and that it might be again. Others will 
sense the impossibility of their search, and for them, the true 
nostalgics, all evocation of the past will be coloured not only by the 
knowledge that nothing can be the same again but that all subsequent 
evocations of an apparently wished-for return to the past are marked by 
that first loss. The melancholy of true nostalgia comes from the 
knowledge of its impossibility. However apparently happy a state that 
nostalgia presents (essential to demonstrating how good the past was), 
its representation is overlaid with regret and with marks of its illusory 
quality. Even a representation of the material past can never 
compensate for the subject's original psychic, fantasy losses. 
There can be still more to the melancholy sense of the impossibility of 
nostalgia than an irrecoverable past. Representations of nostalgic 
scenes tend to reveal that what is presented is 'too good to be true', 
causing the nostalgic to suspect that not only is the past irrecoverable 
but that in truth it was never as good as it purports to be. We try to 
conceal this knowledge: hence our censoring of our memories of our 
childhood and the tendency of Hollywood cinema, which has a 
particular propensity for nostalgia, to insist on the 'real life' quality of 
its nostalgic offerings. The glamour of nostalgia attempts to conceal 
that what we long for in the past is something that we have never 
actually had: something has been withheld -a knowledge that in 
Metz's terms may turn the good film object into the bad for the 
spectator. 
A degree of maternal failure is inevitable and necessary in enabling the 
infant to become a separate person. All the same, in fantasy the subject 
continues to seek the mythical place and time where everything was 
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sufficient. One way of filling up the emptiness of insufficiency is with 
nostalgic substitutes for a mythical past; Jessica Benjamin relates the 
subject's determined insistence on the sufficiency of the past to the 
fantasy of omnipotence: 'a fantasy constructed in the face of 
disappointment of loss ... the attempt to get back what we never had 
but imagine we did'. The infant's refusal to accept that its importunate 
needs and demands are denied him persists in the adult's fantasy: 
'Omnipotence describes a defensive wish, buried in every psyche, that 
one will have a perfect world, will prevail over time, death and the 
other - and that coercion will succeed' (Benjamin, 1988, p. 256). 
The subject (and the entertainment industry) tries to convince himself 
and others that his memory or reconstruction is the truth - yet 
sometimes he cannot avoid suspecting the nostalgic object which in 
turn cannot always avoid revealing its inadequacies. Given the 
insufficiency which he is desperately trying to evade, the more 
desirable the presentation of the nostalgic scene the more the subject 
suspects that it cannot be for him. In this suspicion lies not only the 
regret for what is past but, with another twist, more poignantly, the 
half-acknowledged awareness that what is evoked can never be as good 
as the subject wishes or tries to believe. Nothing, the nostalgic feels, can 
rnake up for a past that has not taken place. 
Film may attempt to persuade the spectator otherwise. The Railway 
Children (Lionel Jeffries, 1970), set in Edwardian England with a child 
narrator, is about a family which maintains itself in spite of difficulty 
and recreates its home in a new 'poor', though delightfully idealised 
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rural, setting. 2 The mother is an idealised figure (though a 'modern' 
one who keeps her family by writing) who succeeds, with the help of 
the narrator daughter, in holding the family together during the 
father's absence, which motivates the course of the narrative. The 
father is a shadowy figure, outside the maternal environment, and his 
return at the end of the film signals its ending and marks the narrator's 
and the spectator's acknowledgement of the Oedipal triangle and her 
own exclusion from the parental scene: 'I think we are not wanted 
here'. The nostalgic object is reasserted and left behind, insulated and 
packaged in the past (of the film) as the spectator is returned to her 
place as subject in the Oedipal scenario, when the cast lines up to wave 
to the camera at the end. Nostalgia is put back in place - at the expense 
of history. 
The inadequacy of the past that nostalgia tries to hide may however 
force itself to the surface. For instance, The Go Between (Joseph Losely, 
1970) whose screen play is by Harold Pinter,, throws up starkly the 
failure of the nostalgic object. The main character, played by Michael 
Redgrave, has opened up his past and introduced the narrative by 
unlocking the correspondence between his mother and himself when, 
as a small boy, he stayed with his school friend in a large country 
manor and became the 'go between! for the illicit lovers (his friend's 
sister and a neighbouring farmer) who transgressed the barriers of class 
and sexual convention. The mise en sc6ne of the film offers a nostalgic 
evocation of Edwardian England, the beautiful young men and women 
21 am indebted to David Lustead's Kidshiff: Childhood and Cineina, Notes to accompany the season offilms programmed under the tide "Seen but not heard" at the ICA Cinema, November 1-14,1979, for its reference toThe Go Between as a flight to nostalgia and the suggestion (i  different terms) of a comparison f that film with The Railway Children. -" 
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blending with the English countryside. However the action is shown 
almost entirely from the viewpoint of the boy, overlaid by that of the 
Redgrave adult character whose presence is only registered through his 
opening words (in voice-over) and as he is glimpsed in fleeting flash- 
forwards during the course of the film. The failure of the nostalgic 
object stalks the story as it moves with increasing suspense towards its 
climax, the boy's traumatic loss of innocence and subsequent rejection 
by his substitute family, when, in a violent representation of the 
primal scene, he is forced to witness the discovery of the lovers- the 
suspense of the film is in the viewer knowing more than the young 
boy and even; we are given to understand, the narrator who is 
rediscovering his repressed past. 
What is specific about this film's representation of the past is that the 
boy's viewpoint reveals its strangeness and foreignness -'the past is 
another country'. Although the film has the look of the representation 
of nostalgia, it turns out to be the opposite: it denies the protagonist,, 
and by extension the spectator, the crucial element of serving as a 
return to a real or even a psychic home. On the contrary, the narrative 
hinges on the fact of the boy's social difference and his consequent 
exploitation by the family which is not his. His own impecunious and 
anxious widowed mother appears only in letters, and rejects his wish 
to return home. The nostalgic space is not given to us, we do not 
belong to it; we observe it at a distance through the eyes of the 
boy/outsider, often in long shots, and with blurred, distant voices. It 
exists out there, sufficiently strongly and beautifully for the 
boy/spectator to wish for it - and for a while, before his hubris, even 
to have the illusion of belonging to it (or rather, in fact, to the in- 
between terrain between the farmer's and the manor's land). At the 
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end of the film the hostility of the setting is represented by a violent 
thunderstorm, leading up to the discovery of the lovers and the boy's 
expulsion. By the same token, the setting itself is shown to be a deceit; 
the 'beauty' of rural Edwardian England is in fact the site of family and 
societal deadly divisions, with a strongly Oedipal current. 
Each of the two mothers of Vie Go Between in different ways fails in 
her maternal function, the one through her jealousy of her daughters, 
the other by abrograting her responsibility and sending her son away. 
For Winnicott, however, firstly the 'good enough' mother, then the 
transitional area, can mend nostalgia's gap; if the potential space of the 
maternal setting has been 'filled in with creative playing' (Winnicott, 
1971, p. 107), with the mother known to be present but not otherwise 
needed, then the past might be given up as the infant gives up the 
transitional object, which is un-mourned because its function has been 
played out and there is no need to return to it. Once the capacity to be 
alone is achieved, the present can be enough. 
The linking of nostalgia with a physical setting recalls the stage when, 
in Winnicott's model, the infant is just beginning to emerge into 
subjectivity through the use of potential space. Not yet fully separate, it 
remains within the maternal 'holding environment'. Winnicott's 
essay 'The capacity to be alone' (1958) presents an image of a baby who 
can play safely because it knows its mother is within its domain: it has 
the experience of being alone 'in the presence of someone' (p. 33). 
Although the baby is already separating itself out through the use of 
transitional objects, it is still playing and exploring within the potential 
space between itself and the mother: a delightful pre-Oedipal mix of 
bodily satisfactions, freedom and security. This emphasises not so 
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much the mother as an object as the environment or setting she 
provides, a potential space where the child can play but is not yet 
required to be fully separate. 
For the adult, nostalgia offers to fill the gap left by the abandoning 
mother (who must always fail the child in this way) by providing a 
setting as a substitute for a holding environment for the fragile subject, 
and replaying the earliest process of separation. 
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Meet me in St. Louis: the mother at the piano 
As Minnelli's account of the film. hints (and Britton, 1978, insists on), 
the nostalgia in Meet me in St. Louis does not offer a 'simple' escape 
from the present. Throughout, the family unconscious counterpoints 
the conscious narrative; the Smith family and, to a lesser extent St. 
Louis, is the site of a gamut of family, intrapsychic and societal 
conflicts. The 'wonderful evocation' (Minnelli, 1974, op cit. ) of life in 
Edwardian St. Louis, frequently demonstrates its darker aspects, 
particularly the constraints and oppression as the other side of the 
security and togetherness of the family. 
What redeems the film for nostalgia is its representation of a maternal 
holding space which provides for the spectator's enjoyment of 
nostalgia and allows for the exploration in safety of an element of 
psychic danger, as the playing spectator willingly opens herself to the 
unconscious. The security experienced in the maternal space comes 
from the promise that, whatever the dangers and conflicts, 'everything 
will be all right in the end': its pleasure from its provision of a 
playspace for the subject. In Winnicott's framework, this is not an 
illusion, a way of persuading the subject to accept an unacceptable 
situation, but a subjective truth about the achieved ability to accept 
what has been previously totally unacceptable, the mother's absence. 
From this perspective the film re-presents and reworks, the return to 
the past as a nostalgic setting (the pastoral, the utopian) for the 
spectator by its invitation into this safe maternal space. This is marked 
strongly in a sequence that I have considered before, 'the mother at the 
piano'. 
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The major threat to the family comes at the end of the Hallowe'en 
episode when Mr Smith announces his offer of promotion to move to 
New York. After the eventful evening of Hallowe'en, the family, 
represented by the women and the grandfather, appears to be settling 
down to cake and ice cream in its centre, the dining room. (The son is 
absent and this turns out to be a quarrel between the father and the 
women, including grandfather who is in the female position, at home 
and economically dependent. ) 
Mr SmitlYs return from work has already had an unsettling effect in 
the previous episode, where he voiced his exclusion from the real 
family at home which is also the viewer's circumscribable space: "Since 
when was I voted out of this family? " He had not been told of his 
daughter Rose's phone call from her hoped-for suitor in New York, 
and therefore interfered with her plans to take the call privately. The 
sequence, which began with family antagonisms, ended with the 
family regrouping at table, enjoying the meal and reasserting its 
togetherness in the face of the boy's apparent rejection of Rose. This 
second sequence has a similar structure: disturbance to the stable 
family, in both cases through the actions of the father-as-outsider 
disrupting the maternal, home setting, followed by its restoration. The 
threat this second time is much more serious and is only temporarily 
resolved by the end of the sequence; the next episode will take up the 
matter again and resolve it definitively with Tootie's killing of the 
snow people. 
I-Jis previous return saw Mr Smith asserting himself and his rights to 
be looked after by his wife and indeed the whole family. His power was 
signalled not just by the situation and the dialogue - he claimed his 
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right to override the wishes of the family for his own habits and 
comfort, the children call him Sir - but also by shots taken from below 
him towering above the women on the stairs. In both episodes he 
voices his position as wage-earner for the family. The film treats him 
humorously and with some sympathy, however; the family is 
ungrateful and he is shown as the outsider; he has not even, for 
example, had the chance to take part in the tasting ritual of the film's 
opening sequence. There is a hint of an undermining of his position in 
the family's mocking asides, a little slapstick as he is heard to fall over 
Tootie's skates, and, rather more substantially, in the way the family try 
to conspire against him over a phone call which ends in some bathos: 
far from proposing, the young man simply talks about the distance, the 
weather and the cost of the call. Here as elsewhere in the film, 
potentially serious matters are curtailed in a deflationary note. 
However, the much more serious matter, from the film's point of 
view, of the family's disagreements, has been resolved with 
appropriate though cheerful seriousness. 
This time, Mr Smith returns home in a conciliatory mood to present 
his bombshell to his family. Esther has just come in reeling from her 
first kiss from John Truett. Her exaggerated, dreamlike and dazed 
expression is emphasised by the 'Boy-next-door' music, played slowly, 
dragged out to match her' somnambulist look; it is a humorous 
entrance which the two youngest girls take up in sniggers and 
whispers. The spectator is included in both Esther's state - having 
previously shared in her desire for the boy-next-door - and also in the 
two sisters' slightly prurient mocking of it. Encouraged by the tracking 
camera and the con-dc and ironic devices, at this point and during the 
quarrel that follows, the spectatoý takes up a hovering position, settling 
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on one character after another and out again to the director/ onlooker's 
position. 
The father gives flowers to his wife, who asks him if it means that 
something is wrong. He is, she tells him, 'shaking like a leaf'. He is 
becoming increasingly like a child. He announces that 'the firm is 
sending me to New York'. He is misunderstood; his wife quickly 
assures him that they can live very well without him for a few weeks 
- an obvious truth. But he explains that it is a promotion and for 
good. 
Throughout this scene the father is shot alone,, the rest of the family, 
including Kate and Grandpa, in (changing) groupings, indicating their 
solidarity with each other, against the father. The father's 
announcement quickly disperses the family. First the two youngest 
leave, Agnes to 'pack' and Tootie to 'dig up my dolls from the 
cemetery' which will take 'at least a week'. Tootie's dolls and their 
death are a recurring motif in the film, introduced at her first 
appearance on the ice-cart. Whatever her words here might represent 
(a regression to babyhood, a determination to bring what has been 
repressed to the surface, a reactivation of her concern with being buried 
alive), all possibilities contribute to the sense of the enormity of the 
prospect, as well as, in our observer position, to the sense of her lack of 
proportion. The spectator is not inclined to laugh; Tootie is acted with 
considerable intensity and the concrete image of her taking a week to 
dig up her dolls signals the seriousness of the father's threat to the 
family. In the end it will be a similar desperate action, Tootie's killing 
of the snow family, that makes her father retract his decision. 
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The argument that ensues is absurdly irrational, full of 
misunderstandings, and the spectator is invited to react with a mixture 
of amusement and empathy. New York gets perceived as increasingly 
alien - no room for pigeons, tenements to live in, possibly no room 
for grandfather. The projected dislocation is rapidly shown to be 
disruptive of everything important in each of the family members' 
lives, particularly the projected pairings of the older children, the most 
important of the film's projects. The spectator is moved about, along 
with the tracking camera, in this quarrel, not invited to take up one 
side or another. The disruption of the family is indicated by the father's 
vain attempt to take on the mother's role in offering cake - which no- 
one,, not even grandfather, accepts - and one after another the girls 
and grandfather go out of the room and up the stairs, leaving the 
parents alone. 
There is a sudden switch of attention and change of mood for the 
spectator to something more serious in the following scene. From a 
noisy exchange where the spectator has rapidly switched places from 
one character to another, we are left in a much more intimate and 
intense position with only two people, who are here presented not so 
much as husband and wife as mother and son, the one who is left, 
misunderstood, unwanted, like an abandoned child. The father's 
isolation is emphasised by a shot of him in the foreground, fitting 
rather awkwardly into the left of the frame, and his remark to his wife: 
"Aren't you afraid to stay here at home with the criminal? " His appeal 
seems to be directed both at her and out at us, the spectator. The 
mother is placed well behind the father to the right, seated, and 
appearing much smaller, but lit up brightly in white, while the father 
and the rest of the room are lit in dark ochre. She looks rather 
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inaccessible, still and composed, he rather clurnsy. He is at this 
moment like a child appealing to the mother for sympathy and 
understanding. Probably for the first time the spectator is drawn to 
taking up the position of the father - no longer the powerful outsider, 
but the child, lost outside the maternal space, pleading to be reinstated 
in the mother's affection and to be included again. The spectator's 
adult, hovering, playing position is turning into the child's need to be 
held, above all to be included. We/he are not disappointed - as he sits 
in an armchair, she moves over to it and verbally accepts his decision, 
both as an acquiescent, giving wife, and as a mother assuring the child 
that not only he will get what he wants but that she will make 
everyone else also accept the situation. 
Father eats his cake, as mother moves off-screen, right. He is left in his 
chair beside a table on which stands a statuette of a woman draped, but 
with her breasts bare, and next to it a bowl of fruit: between the 
husband and wife, mother and son, images of nurturing and sexual, 
oral temptation. From off-screen, the mother begins to play the piano; 
as he moves over to her he points out that he likes to hear her play and 
has not done so for a long time; an invitation and reminder of a past 
when they were together and alone. She plays 'his' song -'You and I 
together'. He begins to sing, his voice cracks, she adjusts the pitch for 
him and the camera tracks him as he moves over to the piano, still 
holding his cake. He reaches the piano and starts to sing in earnest - 
'You and I together ... for ever'. The extra-diegetic orchestra takes up 
the accompaniment drawing the song beyond the couple. 
One by one, behind the parents who are still placed in the foreground, 
the rest of the family come downstairs, and the camera follows them 
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round in smooth curving movements to take up chairs which have 
been shown empty, waiting for them around the room. The spectator is 
included - an empty chair might be for her - and the orchestra 
accompaniment claims participation from outside the screen-scene. 
Everyone starts eating again. Estfier feeds Tootie. The children listen 
with respect to their parents singing their sentimental song and 
everyone is quiet (unlike the previous reconciliation scene which was 
marked by the family's noisy chatter, everyone talking at once). In a 
final cut to the parents singing of 'time goes on but we'll be, together', 
their intimacy hints at a primal scene in which the whole family is 
included; the father's position as a child turns it into a maternal space 
in which everyone else is also the child. The mother has orchestrated 
the reconciliation, in a space which includes images of food and sex, 
movement, colour, music and enough space and fluidity to include the 
playing spectator. 
Minnelli is noted for his camera movement: as Thomas Elsaesser 
writes, impressionistically of a similar, later moment in the film, when 
the father finally relents: 'in a very complicated camera-movement, 
Minnelli conveys the precise feeling of a rhythm recommencing, and 
the characters circulate once more through the house with gestures and 
movements that approximate to a graceful dance' (Elsaesser, 1969, p. 20). 
This scene is an example of Minnelli's ability to transform what he 
called 'the sweet and sickly approach of Hollywood' (Minnelli, 1974, 
p. 129) into an enactment of something more complex and serious 
through his mise-en-scýne. This is achieved particularly by the camera 
movement which moves us gently and rhythmically through the 
screen-setting, and by the singing, that brings the couple together and 
includes the spectator within the maternal setting. 
242 
Final loss 
The spectator's unconscious involvement in the film is at its most 
extreme when she 'loses' her sense of a separate subjectivity altogether 
and has the experience of being lost in, absorbed into, taken up 
completely by its world and its scenarios. This represents the spectator's 
most regressive relationship with the film, which becomes associated 
with the notion of 'merging' in Winnicott's thinking, and which I will 
take up further in the next chapter. Merging may represent the height 
of pleasure and comfort; it may also be associated with what Winnicott 
describes as 'unthinkable anxieties' and may be another reason for the 
spectator's refusal of the film. 
The final loss is that of losing one's own subjectivity: psychic death. 
Freud's attempt to come to terms with the final loss of death, whether 
physical or psychic, is seen in his measured invocation of the death 
instinct (the despair inherent in the concept itself arguably belies the 
reasonable tone) of 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', as finally the only 
way of explaining his patients' rekstance to cure (Freud, 1920): the 
organism's urge to 'return' to the original state of inertia and fusion 
(dust to dust). 
Pontalis speaks of the centrality of death, the ultimate loss, in Freud - 
both in his preoccupations, even obsession, with it in his personal life 
and as something that haunts his work but is also denied both before 
and after he 'invented' the death instinct. For Pontalis, Freud's 
disturbing insight is the pervasiveness of death-in-life 'a process that 
mimics death in the being's very nucleus [both in the individual and 
in society]: every psychoanalyst talks about death insinuated into life'; 
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the death impulse is both final inertia and destructive aggression 
(Pontalis, 1981, p. 191). He points also, however, to Freud's attempts to 
'mask' his death anxiety, to reduce it to 'no more than a form among 
others (weaning, separation) of castration anxiety which he turned into 
a pivot for all losses of the object', as a denial of earlier work on other 
intense, loss-related, anxieties to do with, for instance, 'ego/non ego, 
outside/inside, unity/fragmentation, ... oceanic feeling/ annihilation' 
(p. 192). 
Winnicott's forceful rejection of the idea of a death instinct was a nodal 
point of disagreement with Klein, who gave it a more central place 
than Freud had done. As Clare Winnicott puts it, 'he thinks death is a 
disaster, which you have to put up with because you're human' 
(Winnicott C., 1983, p. 177). Winnicott's work may be seen as the 
attempt so to build up the life process that the subject can defeat a 
psychic death and meet his final wish: 'May I be alive when I die' 
(Winnicott C., 1978, p. 19). While the possibility of the psychic 
experience of death remained a crucial issue for him, it is the 'lost' 
mother, who is absent too long to be remembered or recalled, or who 
fails in her 'holding' function, that can cause the infant's psychic death, 
not an innate instinct. 
In an essay published after his death, 'The fear of breakdown', 
Winnicott discusses patients who fear the ultimate breakdown of 
psychic annihilation: as he puts it, this breakdown is feared for the 
future, because it has already happened in the past, at a time even 
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before the subject had a place to 'put' the trauma (Winnicott, 1974). 3 
This is a time before the possibility of the potential space between child 
and mother which enables the baby to become a subject and to connect 
itself to the world of objects; there is no space, no subject or object, just 
a void, a 'falling', a vacancy. The further back in the person's history 
the analyst goes, the more primitive the feelings found there; the 
Oedipal conflict experiences are both deeply terrifying and exciting at 
the same time (hence their allure in fiction) but, as Winnicott expresses 
it in this essay, they are experienced by a relatively formed ego which 
can to an extent contain and handle them. For Klein, primitive body- 
states find expression in primitive images; for Winnicott (writing in 
another paper, 'The mother-infant experience of mutuality' 1969), the 
deepest layers of the unconscious are associated with one of his major 
concerns, that of the mother's holding or failing to hold the infant as it 
moves from merging with her to separateness: 'these babies carry with 
them the experience of unthinkable or archaic anxiety. They know 
what it is to be in a state of acute confusion or the agony of 
disintegration' (Winnicott, 1969, p. 260). Such experiences produce in 
the baby an 'unthinkable anxiety', which involves: 
1. A return to an unintegrated state 
2. Falling for ever 
I Loss of psychosomatic ollusion, failure of indwelling 
4. Loss of sense of real 
5. Loss of capacity to relate to objects 
( Winnicott, 1974, p. 89-90) 
3The editors of Psycho-analytic Explorations (Winnicott 1989) believe that this paper, 
published in the International Revie7v of Psycho-analysis in 1974, was probably 
written in 1963. 
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Winnicott is discussing extreme cases but as usual in his accounts of 
'borderline' cases the implicatiodis that traces of psychoses can lurk in 
anyone's psyche. At a later stage, the experience of loneliness that Clare 
Winnicott describes as 'being without a good object and feeling 
incomplete' signals the incapacity to be alone (Winnicott C., 1983, 
p. 176). 
Pontalis refers to Winnicott's patient facing 'her emptiness' who 
memorably but cryptically exclaimed: "All I have got is what I have 
not" (Pontalis, 1981, p. 152). Winnicott relates this insight to the absent 
mother of the pre-Oedipal dyad. Others, following Freud and Lacan, 
invoke as great a terror at the splitting of the subject - the original act 
of repression around castration that set up the unconscious: for 
instance, Juliet Mitchell writes: 'in splitting, the subjectivity of the 
subject disappears. The horror is about the loss of oneself into one's 
own unconscious - into the gap' (Mitchell, 1984, p. 393). 
However, as Freud's assertion of the death instinct reveals, the paradox 
of this fear of the loss of subjectivity is that, with only a slight shift in 
its terms, it can become its opposite: what the subject most desires. 
Lacan's much drawn-on, untranslatable and pliable term 'jouissance, 
(orgasm, bliss, enjoyment) exactly links sex with death, with mysticism, 
as all to do with the desire for as well as the fear of the subject's 
annihilation; in The Pleasure of the Text Barthes attempts in a series of 
fleeting, tangential explorations to create what his translator called 'an 
erotics' of reading (Barthes 1973, p. viii), to render in language the 
extremes of readers' unaccountable jouissance in their encounters with 
the text: 'Text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that 
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discomforts ... he enjoys the consistency of his selfhood (that is 
his 
pleasure) and seeks its loss (that is his bliss)' (p. 14). 
From Winnicott's optimistic perspective, the subject's wish is to go 
back to the state of earliest infancy when the infant is merged in with 
the mother: a state from which it is the persoiYs developmental 
destiny to emerge, through the transitional phenomenon, to the 
realisation of a 'Me' and a 'not Me', subject and object. Merging is a 
state before separation and before subjectivity, the breakdown of all 
internal and external boundaries. 
For the film spectator, merging with the film represents the final point 
of her engagement with it, beyond playing and even beyond the 
breakdown of playing. The loss of subjectivity -that involvement in 
film-watching might entail -I didn't know where I was - may veer 
from extremes of pleasure of fusion and merging with the film object 
to complete self-absence. 
The screen is blank and the spectator quiescent, waiting to come to life 
as the film begins. The possibilities of the significance of the empty 
screen are explored by Peter Benson following the psychoanalyst 
B. D. Lewin's account of the appearance of dreams-on-screen in his 
patients,, and particularly of the dream appearance of an empty screen. 
Lewin's interpretation is that the screen is a reminder of the look of the 
mother's breast as the baby rests against, satisfied it after feeding; in 
these terms, the empty screen represents 'the furthest limits of our 
regressive fantasy, dissolving in original unity with our mother' 
(Benson, 1990, p. 377). 
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At this viewing moment, there are various possibilities for the willing 
spectator. She may play. On the other hand the playing spectator may 
remain dormant and allow the film to play on and through herself as 
the unconscious spectator. She may begin by playing, as Meet me in St. 
Louis invites her to do, and then 'lose herself in the film - from 
which she will in due course awake and 'find herself again. At this 
moment of take-over the spectator does not know where or who or 
even if she is. She returns to the place where she began, representative 
of the point of merging with the mother, her original resting place, 
before separation. The conscious spectator continues the work of 
reading the film, and is not asleep or given over to a state of non- 
subjectivity. But it is different for the coexisting unconscious spectator,, 
who has been taken over by the film, beyond playing, to the point of 
merging with it. There is only the film, I as subject have disappeared 
into it. I, who can no longer speak T, am moved by and through the 
film: it is myself. 
In this and the previous chapter I have traced the emergence and 
construction of the unconscious spectator, who is moved without 
knowing why or how and may be taken up by the film so completely 
that she stops playing and even loses her separate subjectivity. I have 
considered ways in which the film viewing process addresses the 
unconscious spectator and ways in which it continually shifts the terms 
of her loss, creating a dynamic between loss and recovery, between 
conscious and unconscious and between playing and its breakdown. I 
have explored the breakdown of playing and the experience of loss as 
one of the lures of cinema for the spectator. However the defining 
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characteristic of this position is that the spectator is not 'herself'; she is 
'lost'. In the next chapter I look at how, from this position of take-over 
and loss, the spectator may also 'find' herself. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE SPECTATOR FINDS HER SELF 
SLEEP 
Let down your tap root 
to the centre of your soul 
Suck up the sap 
from the infinite source 
of your unconscious 
And 
Be evergreen 
(D. W. Winnicott, date unknown)l 
The breakdown of the spectator's playing has been posited so far 
mainly in terms of the Freudian view of the subject and the 
unconscious. From this point of view the spectator is lured into an 
engagement with the film by her wish both to play and to be 'taken 
over' by her unconscious and. by' the film. Winnicott, however,, 
without abandoning the Freudian system, also evolved an alternative 
model of subjectivity which included a notion of a True Self or Self, 
and a related model of the unconscious which I will term the 'creative 
unconscious': an unconscious that serves as a resource rather than as a 
hindrance to the person's conscious life. He expresses this explicitly in a 
talk on 'The fate of the transitional object' given in 1959, where, he 
states, 'transitional phenomena do not pass, at least in health', but are 
continued in 'cultural pursuits' (Winnicott, 1989, p. 57). In this talk he 
refers to. the three areas of the psyche, the inner, the outer and the 
transitional. In a rare statement on his view of the unconscious he 
says: 
IThis poem is quoted in Clare Winnicotes'D. W. Winnicott: A reflection', (Winnicott, 1989, p. 17) 
What are the three areas? One, the fundamental one, is the 
250 
individual or inner reality, the unconscious if you like, (not the 
repressed unconscious which comes very soon but definitely later). 
The personal psychic reality is that from which the individual 
"hallucinates' or "creates" or thinks up or "conceives of". From it 
dreams are made though they are clothed in the materials gathered 
in from external reality 
(Winnicott, 1989, p. 57). 
Increasingly Winnicott's concern was not so much to deal with his 
patients' repressed unconscious conflict as to help them to experience 
this 'individual reality' through the adult's forms of playing. 
In this chapter I will extend my examination of the spectator to 
encompass this different view of the nature of the subject. From this 
perspective I will propose that the importance of playing for the 
spectator can be understood through the ways in which she is able 
rnake use of her film object to obtain an experience of her (True) Self. 
This offers a way of reconciling rather than opposing the playing and 
the unconscious spectator and introduces a different element into the 
spectator's engagement with a film: through playing, and through the 
apparent loss of her subjectivity into the film, the spectator may in fact 
'find' her Self. 
Tracing this process of the spectator's experience of the (True) Self in 
this chapter will involve an exploration of the creative unconscious, 
an elaboration of the spectator's experience of 'formlessness' in her 
engagement with the film and a consideration of her use of the (film) 
object. Winnicott did not produce a systematic account of a theory of 
the subject and his statements on his view of the nature, origin and 
location of the Self and on how he distinguishes between what he 
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called the Self and the True Self are inconsistent. This chapter will 
therefore include consideration of the work of two other 
psychoanalysts of the British School, Marion Milner and Christopher 
Bollas, who extend his ideas in different ways: Milner, who was 
Winnicott's contemporary and colleague, makes explicit her view of 
the unconscious as the source of creativity; Bollas, a psychoanalyst 
working in England today, influenced by Winnicott, pursues the issue 
of the origin and manifestation oi the True Self, and elaborates 
Winnicott's work on 'the use of an object'. Both writers include the 
notion of fusion, or merging of subject and object, in their thinking. 
The appearance of the notion of the Self in Winnicott's work 
differentiates it sharply from classical psychoanalysis and brings his 
view of subjectivity closer to the Jungian and Humanist psychologies. 
It is particularly removed from the Lacanian-derived, materialist view 
of subjectivity usually deployed in film studies, which posits, in the 
words of Kaja Silverman, that if it were possible 'to probe to the 
deepest levels of the human psyche, we would find not an identity but 
a void' (Silverman, 1992, p. 4). The suggestion that we get from 
Winnicott's changing view of the nature of the subject is that in that 
void we might, instead, discover the Self. 2 
The question of the relation of the psychoanalytic meaning of the Self 
to its traditional usage is taken up by Pontalis (1981) in two essays on 
Winnicott, one an introduction to his French translation of Playing 
and Reality (Winnicott, 1971). Pontalis explores the English 
2A different way of representing this is to propose that it is, precisely, the experience of the'void' that is valued; in a discussion of 'Psychoanalysis and Buddhism'Nina Coltart speaks of the liberation of the realisation that all things ultimately are 'without self (Coltart, 1992, p. 170). This is partly a matter of terminology. 
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psychoanalysts' use of the term 'Self' as having no exact equivalent in 
French. (In English the two terms, the Subject and the Self, distinguish 
exactly the difference between the older view of the transcendental, 
unified and apparently unproblematic Self and that of the Subject as a 
material part of discourse. ) As Pontalis puts it, rather sharply, in a piece 
which is in fact sympathetic to Winnicott's work: 
(The Selo is like a concept which has been dismantled by 
psychoanalysis; three quarters of a century of analytical 
experience undermines the illusion of a totally monadic subject, of 
a person totally sure of belonging to himself ... one should rather 
talk of a return of the 'repressing' rather than that of the repressed: 
a return masked by nostalgia, a nostalgia for the good old Self, 
which would have been lost through too much analysis 
(Pontalis, 1981, p. 127) 
This returns the reader to the fundamental tenet of psychoanalysis of a 
subject inevitably and irrevocably split through the existence of the 
unconscious. Pontalis therefore firmly rejects an essentialist position, 
for example, Harry Guntrip's 'person oriented' therapy, 3 whose focus, 
Pontalis claims, 'by a series of shifts'becomes 'a retreat to the whole 
person' (Pontalis, 1977, p. 134). Pontalis refers rather to the Freudian 
notion of the Ego encompassing the Self as a 'set or even a gestalt with 
the function of inhibiting the primary processes' (p. 136). In this case the 
sense of Self related to a satisfactorily functioning ego would be that of 
a person in charge of his or her life, operating successfully in the world, 
and able satisfactorily to regulate and mediate conflicts between the 
reality and pleasure principle - someone, for instance, who has 
3put forward for example in Psychoatialytic Dwory atul t1w Self, I (Guntrip, 1971). 
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reached the end of a successful psychoanalysis. On this basis, repression 
is after all a necessity and the end of therapy may indeed be to 'return' 
to the repressing; just as, in an analogy between analysis and film 
viewing, the end of a classic narrative film closes itself off from the 
world of fantasy it has temporarily opened up for a clearly structured, 
rule-governed purpose. 
However the difficulty with a tendency to conflate the concept of the 
ego and the Self is twofold: firstly that, since the Self is a term that 
classical psychoanalysts do not use while many others do (as Winnicott 
points out, in his review on Jung, see below), its meaning cannot be 
restricted to another term which is specific to psychoanalytic discourse. 
Secondly, the concept of the ego as a relatively rational and a mediatory 
agent as Freud formulated it, does not, as Freud himself said, allow for 
a range of experiences - for instance, aesthetic or creative - which 
seem to belong in a different psychic realm, and which, in the end, his 
psychoanalysis cannot account for; Winnicott may be seen to be trying 
to fill that gap. As Pontalis puts it: 'he who uses the word "Self" does 
not situate himself on the same plane as he who uses "ego". The first 
plane directly concerns life, the fact of living' (Pontalis, 1981, p. 144). 
However, the solution that Pontalis proposes to the question of the 
meaning of the concept, which is, after all, a philosophical issue, is, 
essentially, to by-pass it, with the comment that the Self is 'a subjective 
phenomenon which either emerges or is lacking, rather than a 
structure of the person or the person himself' (p. 136). 
This move allows for an acceptance of the concept of the Self in the 
therapist's work with patients without taking on the baggage of an 
essentialism which Pontalis clearly wishes to avoid. (Of Winnicott's 
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use of the term 'True Self' he says, it 'is not well chosen ... [because] ... it 
invokes the quest for the soul': 1981 p. 139). Pontalis writes as a 
psychoanalyst whose field of enqýiiry is the psyche, whose data is 
subjective and whose role is therapeutic: 'to be a living person is ... a 
task ... which is always in need of invention for humans; a 
contradictory task if one thinks about it but one which gives humans 
individual tension and mobility': it comes from 'repeated encounters 
with others ... for what ... defines life is that it is "transmitted"' 
(p. 145). 
Pontalis however takes the issue further and concludes that the 
problem of the Self should be envisaged from a wider perspective, in 
which he includes Winnicott's account of the True and False Self. 
Under what conditions does what happens to an individual 
become meaningful and alive for him? ... I do not think it is a 
return to the ineffable subject. True and false are not to be 
understood as inherent qualities of the individual. They are not 
subject and predicate. They designate movement in a relationship. 
After all could we not say that the paradox of the analytical 
relationship is that I need another, not another ego but a neuter I 
cannot see, to find myself. 
(Pontalis, 1981, p. 147) 
The experience of a sense of Self here becomes conceived as the 
experience of a mysterious and amorphous interlocutor for the subject, 
an extension of the analytic - and by extension, of the film-viewing - 
process and discourse: Pontalis's formulation of the sense of Self is of a 
psychic 'transaction' and 'movement'. 
Nevertheless, the notion of at least a potential for an essential Self 
continues to make a mark, if a wavering one, in the work of 
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Winnicott, and is taken further by Milner and Bollas. The focus on the 
psychic life of early infancy, in which Winnicott followed Klein, 
already entails an assumption of an earlier subjectivity than that 
posited in the Freudian or Lacanian model - possibly from before 
birth. 4 For example, although Winnicott describes the state of 
'merging' as a state 'when ... there is at least a theoretical stage prior 
to 
separation of the not-me from the me' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 130), this 
primary state is difficult to imagine. While it suggests an apparent 
negation of conscious subjectivity - since there is no separate subject 
and object - yet it is difficult to imagine a state of consciousness, 
which is what Winnicott seems to be arguing, without a subject to be 
conscious. Similarly, the very terms in which he expresses the baby's 
merging with the mother, as subject and object, as well as the way he 
conceptualises earliest infancy in general, imply some kind of 
subjectivity at that stage. The phase of non-differentiation is 
consistently expressed in terms of merging with another (the mother) 
and the infant's development in terms of forging a separation between 
subject and object. From a developmental point of view therefore -a 
perspective which was always central for Winnicott - the subject 
seems to be there-in-waiting, its trace there from the beginning, with 
some kind of consciousness, although it is not yet self-conscious in the 
sense of possessing an 'I'. 
This becomes evident in the account of the transitional object whose 
function is to ease the difficulty of establishing and negotiating the 
distinction between subject and object. The distinguishing mark of the 
transitional area is precisely that there is already an object in play even 
4This is clear in Isaac's work on phantasy:, see Ch. 4 of this thesis 
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though it is an object endowed with elements of both 'Me' and 'not- 
Me'. The object is meaningful and valued for itself as well as for the 
mother it can represent. It resonates with the subject and at the same 
time connects the child to and provides continuity with the mother 
and the world of objects. Through its malleability, the transitional 
object provides the infant with a way of making a mark on the external 
world. All this suggests also a subject in place ready to use the object - 
although it is also true that the piocess of its use involves a further 
differentia ting-out of the subject from object. -5 
As Phillips puts it, Winnicott 'proposed an essentialist theory but with an 
essence that by definition could not be formulated except in the most 
rudimentary terms' (Phillips, 1988, p. 127). He sums up Winnicott's 
position: 'minimal definition allowed for maximal variety'. This lack of 
precision in his formulation allowed Winnicott to operate with at least 
two models of the subject, his own and the Freudian one he had inherited. 
It also enabled him to retain in his view of the Self the sense of a 
/movement in a relationship' to which Pontalis refers. The main focus in 
psychoanalysis, which has steered clear of an essentialist position, remains 
that of the Self as a process or a transaction: the sense of Self, which for the 
film viewer can be experienced through her relationship with a film. 
5 This difficulty is the basis of criticism of Winnicott from a materialist perspective: 'There is no such thing as pure subjectivity' (Lorenzer and Orban, 1978, p. 47). 1 have argued however that the notion of the transitional object makes Winnicott' s view of the subject much more complex than this comment would suggest. 
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Winnicott and the search for the Self 
Winnicott's view of subjectivity underwent a series of shifts which led 
to his position that 'gratification in regression is the result not of 
libidinal satisfaction but of the fact that "the Self" is reached' 
(Greenburg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 201). These changes in his view of the 
nature of the subject and the unconscious may be charted in the 
difference between his formulation of the 'True Self' as one term in 
the duality the 'False and the True Self', and his use of 'Self' as an 
independent term. In the three late papers from the 1960s that I will 
consider, Winnicott defines and elaborates his notion of the True Self 
and the Self, discusses different meanings of the unconscious and 
introduces the notion of 'formlessness' and the 'merged state' as a 
means of experiencing the Self. As always in his work he is concerned 
with the state and activity he designates as playing, the basis for the 
individual's experience of feeling 'real', which he increasingly comes 
to formulate as an experience of the Self. 
At different points in his work Winnicott refers to the Self either in 
terms of the well-being of psychosomatic integration, or, rather, as an 
experience that derives from the earliest state of merging or 
formlessness. 6 By the time of Playing and Reality, his last book, in 1971, 
the term 'True Self' has virtually been replaced by the 'Self' as a 
formulation that stands alone, not as a part of a dual term grounded in 
a pathological reference. 
6This represents two opposing tendencies in Winnicott: a focus on the body as the basis for the subject's development, relating to his medical and psychoanalytical background, and a tendency towards a mystical or even religious approach, as argued by Lambert (1987). 
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Winnicott considers the True and False Self (particularly the latter) in a 
paper entitled 'Ego distortion in terms of True and False Self', written 
in 1960. Here he emphasises that these terms are each related to the 
other, and that 'False Self can have a different meaning and function 
according to its manifestation as pathology or in health. By contrast, in 
a slightly earlier paper, 'The capacity to be alone' (Winnicott, 1958) the 
False Self is seen only as a pathological, defensive condition. 
In 'Ego distortion', Winnicott offers a deceptively simple and 
characteristically impressionistic definition of the True Self which is 
here described (although on this Winnicott was not consistent) as a 
very early formation: the True Self 'does no more than collect together 
the details of the experiences of aliveness' (Winnicott, 1960, p. 148); it is 
the source of and linked with the infant's first 'spontaneous gestures' 
or impulses which are allowed for and accepted by the mother: 'the 
spontaneous gesture is the True Self in action' (p. 145). Such are the 
bases for the individual's experience of 'feeling real', genuinely 
himself, authentic. Initially these experiences are linked to 
omnipotence, which gives the baby the 'illusion of creating and 
controlling the world', but through the mother's handling and the use 
of the transitional object, the omnipotence is given up as the baby 
becomes able to accept 'the illusory element, the fact of playing and 
imagining' (p. 146). 
The True Self experience depends on the infant's experience of the 
mother's holding: if the mother does not accept its initial 'spontaneous 
gesture', the baby's True Self may 'die' or be relegated to a terrible 
isolation and the False Self constructed 'in compliance'; Winnicott 
describes this as though the infant were being refused its own psychic 
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existence. The False Self constitutes the deep-rooted defence structure 
constructed when the baby is forced to recognise the mother as a 
separate object before it has been able to experience her as a part of 
itself. It has to adapt itself to her as an objective object, rather than 
being able to go through the process of gradual separation via the 
transitional phenomenon. The construction of the False Self means 
that the infant is denied the discovery of its own creativity. 
Thereafter different routes are possible, depending on the degree or 
fixity of the False Self, but Winnicott continued to stress the life and 
death need for his patients to 'find' their True Self. Winnicott also, 
however, posits a False Self at the other end of a continuum, that is not 
pathological but 'is represented by the whole organisation of the polite 
and mannered social attitude, ... a not wearing the heart on the sleeve. 
' 
The infant has given up'omnipotence and the primary process in 
general,, the gain being the place in society which can never be attained 
or maintained by the True Self alone' (Winnicott 1960, p. 143). This 
very different formulation of a non-pathological False Self also has a 
bearing on Winnicott's account of the True Self: the False Self is 
beginning to be designated as the subject's engagement with outer 
reality, and the True Self, therefore, as representative of the inner 
world, a notion that is developed in Winnicott's review on Jung, 
considered below. 
On the question of the relation of this psychic model to others 
Winnicott is inconsistent. At the beginning of the paper he tentatively 
links his division between the True and False Self to 'Freud's division 
of the Self into a part which is central and powered by the instincts and 
a part that is turned outwards and is related to the world' (Winnicott, 
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1960, p. 140), that is, to the id and the ego. However the False/True Self 
division is not a Freudian one and at other times, for instance in his 
review Winnicott relates the True Self, or at least the Self, to the ego. 
More generally, in his focus on the infant's development and on the 
mother-child relationship, he ignores this Freudian division. It is 
increasingly clear that Winnicott'is now working with a different 
model of the psyche from the classical psychoanalytical concepts he 
inherited, particularly that of the Freudian unconscious. However the 
model of the unconscious he was developing is an addition to rather 
than a replacement of the Freudian unconscious. 
Winnicott takes up the issue of the unconscious and the question of 
the Self explicitly in a wide-ranging and complex review, published in 
the International Journal of Psychoanalysis n 1964, of Jung's 
autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections. The exploratory and 
sympathetic tone of the review, particularly in its account of Jung's 
thinking on the Self, expresses Winnicott's interest; he uses the 
occas, ion to state his then controversial view that psychoanalysis 
should 'come to terms with Jung' (Winnicott, 1964, p. 452), as if taking 
on the task of attempting to heal the split between the two men that 
had divided the psychoanalytical community. To this end Winnicott 
explores differences in Freud's and Jung's personalities and in their 
approach to the psyche, marked by differences in terminology, and, in 
the process, his article shifts from an account of the Self as the 
True/False Self duality to a consideration of the Self as an autonomous 
entity. 
It is in this essay that Winnicott makes his famous remarks about 
Freud's 'flight to sanity': Jung's 'madness' is relatively non- 
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pathological, even something to be desired; he was 'mad' (with a 
psychotic, split personality) but 'recovered'; Winnicott has 'achieved a 
measure of insanity' through analysis, and Freud had made a 'flight to 
sanity' which 'we psychoanalysts are trying to recover from' 
(Winnicott, 1964, p. 450). Winnicott took seriously the need to accept a 
degree of what he called 'madness'; he stresses that one of the -) 
functions of artistic experience is to enable us to 'keep in touch with 
our primitive selves ... and we are poor indeed 
if we are only sane' 
(quoted in Clancier and Kalmanovitch, 1986, p. 30). 7 A'flight to sanity' 
is a condition that Winnicott countered in his insistence on the value 
of playing, illusion and spontaneity. 
What in the end distinguishes the two men for Winnicott is that Jung 
'started off knowing' from the start of his life, but 'was handicapped by 
his need to search for a Self with which to know' whereas Freud was 
always 'groping' (for knowledge) in his attempt to establish a 'science', 
a search he was able to carry out because he began with a 'unit self with 
which to search' (p. 454). It is not necessarily, however, that Winnicott 
is valorising Jung over Freud: 'we might prefer Freud's groping and 
his gradual failure to finalise anything'; and Jung's 'search for a central 
self turned out to be a blind alley' (p. 454). The Jung/Freud 
complementarity that Winnicott is attempting to establish could also 
be described as that between art and science; intuition and empiricism; 
emotions and intellect; or, getting closer to Winnicott's own 
formulation, play and work (always remembering that play can be most 
serious). 
7This argument of a refusal of total 'sanity' recalls Winnicott's dislike of Klein's notion 
of the manic defence of the depressive stage, which he considered was itself somewhat 
of a defence against enjoyment (Phillips, 1988, pp-55-61; 'D. W. Winnicott', ch. 1 of this thesis). 
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Winnicott's comparison of Freud and Jung ties in with his exploration 
of the True and False Self in this paper. He begins by presenting his 
familiar pathological account: in childhood, in reaction to his mother's 
depression, Jung split off his True Self and constructed the 'massive 
defence system' of his False Self; out of which came, however, the 
'forging of a life's work' (p. 452). Through his Autobiography he re- 
discovered his True Self which he 'always preferred' and which 'he 
could call his own' (p. 453). Winnicott makes clear that he does not here 
see the False Self purely as 'a defqnce system' and by the end of the 
article he equates the Jungian term - 'his extravert self" - with the 
False Self (p. 453): this shift is quite consistent with the way Winnicott 
has been describing Jung's False Self as that which enabled him to live 
so effectively in the world. At this point the difference between Freud 
and Jung that Winnicott is establishing might be described in purely 
jungian terms as 'extravert' and 'introvert', although Winnicott only 
uses the term extrovert: Jung 'prefers' his True (introvert) Self and his 
life's work has been an effort to find - or re-find - it. 
Winnicott makes a further shift from the True/False duality when he 
turns to a discussion of Jung's own account of the Self: 'it is possible 
that Jung contributed more than Freud to an understanding of what 
the word means or can mean' (Winnicott, 1964, p. 454). He 
distinguishes between the use of the term ego and Self (while 
acknowledging, in contradiction to the 1960 paper discussed above, that 
he himself might have seemed to use them synonymously). He points 
out that ego is a "'term", to be used with an agreed meaning' while the 
Self is a "'word" in daily/general currency, with a range of meanings'. 
Here, interestingly, Winnicott makes a distinction between the Self and 
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the True Self: 'by dropping his ... False Self and living according to his 
True Self,... he found a Self he could call his own' (ibid). Winnicott 
here defines another difference between Freud and Jung, which he 
generalises as a way of distinguishing two categories of individuals: 
'the search for the Self and a way of feeling real belongs to a large 
portion of the human race', while for those who have already achieved 
'unit status' the search is about 'the full and satisfying use of a Self that 
is a unit and is well grounded' (ibid). For Jung, Winnicott suggests, the 
point at which he 'found' his Self was marked by the moment at which 
he could tell a lie to Freud - he had a 'place to have secrets'. 
8 
Winnicott also stresses the fundamental difference between Freud's 
and Jung's concept of the unconscious. However he does not adopt 
Jung's concept of the 'collective unconscious', which he views as an 
attempt to disown and de-personalise the Freudian, repressed 
unconscious, the search for which for Freud was the point of 
psychoanalysis. For Jung - for a split personality - it was not possible 
to encounter the Oedipal conflict, let alone resolve it: 'it is not possible 
for a split personality to have an unconscious' (Winnicott, 1964, p. 453). 
In this paper, then, Winnicott refers to the 'Freudian, repressed 
unconscious' as: a fact; as crucial in psychoanalytical therapy; as a 
developmental achievement. But in this account, as increasingly in his 
work as a whole, it is de-centred and its 'absence' is a symptom of the 
absence of a 'unit self'. 
8 Masud Khan gives an account of a patient's 'secret' use of his waiting room which functions, he believes, as her potential space. In the same paper he also refers to Jung's 
autobiography which, he believes, gives an 'interesting corroboration' of his own notion of the relation of the secret to potential space (Khan, 1978). 
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However, in the end Winnicott also finds an aridity in Jung's search 
for 'the centre of his self' because, as he sees it, of its failure to come to 
terms with 'destructiveness and with chaos, disintegration and the 
other madnesses'. Jung's search is therefore viewed as 'an obsessional 
flight from disintegration' (Winnicott, 1964, p. 454): the centre of the 
self' is a 'relatively useless concept, closing off of a life of splendid 
endeavour'; [what is important] 'is to reach the basic forces of 
individual living' (ibid), which, he believes, in being creative, are also 
inherently destructive. Winnicott re-emphasises, as he does repeatedly 
in different ways throughout his work, that the 'searching', rather than 
any end to that search is the point. 
This process of searching is explored in a description of a session with a 
female patient, 'Playing: the search for the Self' (1971, Ch. 4), in which 
Winnicott explicitly formulates the search for the Self as a central 
concern for his patient, and brings out what he sees as the essential 
connection between playing, creativity and the Self. Winnicott 
describes the session in some detail as an example of what for him are 
the origins of creativity. The patient is able to use the session to reach a 
state that he calls: 
... a desultory formless functioning, or perhaps a rudimentary 
playing, as if from a neutral zone. It is only here, in this 
unintegrated state of the personality, that which we describe as 
creative can appear. This if reflected back, Ind only if reflected back, 
becomes part of the organised individual personality, and 
eventually this in summation makes the individual to be, to be 
found; and eventually enables himself or herself to postulate the 
existence of the self 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 64) 
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As his patient put it, 'looking-for is evidence that there is a self"; but 
for this woman who had always tried to meet others' expectations, the 
analytic 'holding' environment, the substitute for the original material 
'holding' of the baby, was essential to enable her to reach the state of 
'formlessness' without intense arixiety. The paradox of the 'looking' 
that Winnicott describes is that it can only take place when conscious 
and willed 'searching' is in abeyance. 
Winnicott's notion of 'formlessness' or 'unintegration' is associated 
with the state of merging of mother and baby. In contrast to 
'disintegration', which is the terror of breakdown for the adult 
(Winnicott, 1974), unintegration is 'unpatterned and unplanned' 
(Winnicott, 1988, p. 131), a state of relaxation where there is no control, 
defence or even structure, and where the person 'can safely and easily 
be in bits and pieces without the feeling of falling apart' (Phillips, 1988, 
p-80). Whereas for Freud the primary state of non-separation comes to 
represent the death instinct, the organism's urge to 'return' to the 
original state of non-organic inertia, for Winnicott it can be a repeated 
opportunity for reaching to one's roots and for a new beginning: 
'emptiness is a prerequisite for eagerness to gather in. Primary 
emptiness simply means: before starting to fill up' (Winnicott, 1974, 
p-181). The ability to tolerate 'emptiness' is a pre-requisite for the 
manifestation of the Self, which is actualised through playing, in the 
Winnicottian sense of creative living, carrying over the experience of 
potential space into everyday life: 
it is in playing and only in playing that the child or adult is able to 
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be creative and to use the whole personality and it is only in being 
creative that the individual discovers the self 
(Winnicott, 1971, p. 54) 
In 'Playing: the search for the Self', Winnicott also stresses the 
importance of the sense of 'I AM, I am alive, I am myself. From this 
position everything is creative(p. 56). He describes the process towards 
this as a sequence: 
a) relaxation in conditions of trust based on experience 
b) creative, physical, and mental activity manifested in play 
c) the summation of these experiences forming the basis for a 
sense of self (ibid, p. 56) 
This, I will propose, is the basis for the sequence of the playing 
spectator's engagement with the film. 
In spite of Winnicott's usual focus on the Self as a process or a by- 
product of creative activities, a model of a 'central' self, repudiated in 
his review of Jung, every now and again reasserts itself in his work. 
This is particularly the case in his paper 'Communicating and not 
communicating leading to a study of certain opposites' (Winnicott, 
1963), which seems to contradict, or at least to side-step, Winnicott's 
view of Jung's 'search for the self', written slightly later. This is a 
complex essay which has engaged the attention of commentators 
(Phillips, 1986; Davis and Wallbridge, 1981) and it is characteristic of the 
later Winnicott in its exploratory yet assured personal tone and its 
break with classical psychoanalysis. It brings together his concepts of 
merging, the transitional area and the Self. 
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Here Winnicott definitely posits a Self which is in place from earliest 
infancy and maybe even before birth. He draws explicitly on Jung's idea 
of the Self (via an account by Michael Fordham) as a part of the 
individual, already present in the merged state, which may seem to be 
'something that (in health) corresponds to the state of the split person 
in whom one part of the split communicates silently with subjective 
objects' (Winnicott, 1963, p. 184). This brings together the notion of the 
'True Self', part of the True-False Self duality, and the 'unit' or 
'central' Self that he discusses in the Jung review; he has found a place 
for the True Self in health as he had previously done for the False Self. 
This paper presents Winnicott's most explicit, and at the same time his 
most mysterious, account of the Self. Its central premise is that there is 
an aspect to every individual which needs to be kept as an area of 
inviolate separateness; there is a personal core of the Self that is in 
'permanent isolation' (p. 189). 
Winnicott's way in to this account of the Self is through thinking 
about communication. For an analyst, language is relatively decentred 
in Winnicott's practice and he wrote a good deal about the analyst's 
'silence' and, the uses of silence compared with interpretation (for 
instance, Winnicott,, 1963a). In 'Communicating and not 
communicating' he distinguishes between 'direct' communication and 
'indirect', explicit communication between two clearly separate subjects 
(the usual sense of the term). 'Direct' communication is non-verbal 
and 'silent' (yet there is no suggestion of telepathy, which is simply 
language-as-thought and involves an object-receiver). It pre-exists 
language and, in fact, belongs to the merged state where 
communication takes place with the 'subjective object', an object that 
belongs to the 'merged', pre-subjective state, which precedes separation 
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and the existence of 'the object objectively perceived', and even the 
transitional object. The subjective object, which in the merged state is 
the mother, is also a part of the subject and comes to represent the Self. 
It is not clear whether communication with the 'silent self [which] 
carries all the sense of the real' (Winnicott, 1963 p-184), derives from 
the mother's 'presence' in the merged state or from a pre-existing 
'identity' or 'potential' that belongs to the infant itself. The continuing 
difficulty with thinking of the state of merging is in its lack of an 'I', 
since it is only in the separated state, and in retrospect, that the merged 
position can be articulated. Winnicott passingly relates what he is 
exploring and trying to formulate to the experience of the mystic who 
can communicate secretly with subjective objects and phenomena, "the 
loss of the world of shared reality being counterbalanced by a gain in 
terms of being real' (ibid p. 185-6). He indicates the paradoxical nature of 
the experience by noting how, in talking of the secret, inviolate Self, he 
is referring to a stage that is earlier than and different from Kleinýs 
'internal object', which the infant, with its ego-boundaries already 
established, in a sense possesses. In the merged state, where there is no 
distinction between subject and object - so, that the two terms cannot 
yet be said to exist -'inner only means personal and personal in so far 
as the individual is a person with a self in process of becoming 
evolved'. The paradox of Winnicott's argument is that the 'subjective 
object', with which the person'silently communicates', is also a part of 
the Self, which is why it cannot be possessed. The essence of the 
mystical experience is that I, the Self, am also everything, that is, 
indistinguishable and non-separate from the object. 
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Without this contact with the 'silent' Self, the person is unable to feel 
'real' or that life has 'meaning'. For Jung, Winnicott believes, the 
failure of the maternal environment led to the split between his true 
and false Self and to his life-time'search to re-find his true Self 
(Winnicott, 1964). For those who are not split, who, like Freud, operate 
with a unit self, there is no need for the 'search' and they are able to get 
on with the business of living, their inner space inviolate. They have 
acquired the 'capacity to be alone' (Winnicott, 1958). Winnicott 
surnmarises this paper with this mysterious statement: 
I have tried to state the need that we have to recognise thds aspect 
of health: the non-communicating central self, for ever immune 
from the reality principle, and for ever silent. Here communication 
is not non-verbal; it is like the music of the spheres, absolutely 
personal. It belongs to being alive. And in health it is out of this 
that communication naturally arises 
(Winnicott, 1963/4, p. 192). 
The un-glossed reference to 'the music of the spheres' indicates 
Winnicott's insistence on his individual way of expressing himself as 
well as suggesting the combination of the purely 'personal' - the 
music of the spheres is only 'heard' inwardly - and the universal: the 
music also represents universal harmony. The compromise between 
direct communication with the Self and 'indirect, explicit' 
communication between actual people in the world is achieved within 
and by means of the transitional area. 
For the film spectator, Winnicott's account of the experience of 
formlessness and the merged state represents a quite different view of 
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'merging' with the film from that discussed in the last chapter as a 
'loss' of subjectivity. For Winnicott's patient in search of the Self (1971, 
Ch. 2, op. cit. ), formlessness is the state of the child safe in the holding 
environment that analysis is able to restore; for the film spectator it 
may be represented by the state of suspended animation in front of the 
empty screen, the moment of waiting for the film to begin, when it will 
become 'her' film, available for her playing. Being merged-in with the 
film is not a loss, to be resisted by the conscious and critical spectator, 
but a way of finding herself and the base from which playing can re- 
start: a passive state which leads not to compliance with the film's 
world view, nor to being caught up in its scenario, but to an active and 
participative interaction with it. The sequence for the spectator 
becomes circular: from her entry into potential and cinematic space; to 
playing; to its breakdown, to merging with the film; then back again, 
refreshed, to playing, and finally, at the end of the film, back to the 
external world of indirect, explicit communication. Since the film 
continually makes available a range of positions, and the spectator 
relates to it on different levels, all of these moves can take place 
together, simultaneously. Both spectator and film are multifarious, 
and, in the potential space between them, they can interact at any 
moment in different and unpredictable ways. 
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The unconscious and creativity: Marion Milner 
Winnicott explores the search for the Self through the experience of a 
'safe' formlessness in the unintegrated and merged state. Marion 
Milner's work is very similar in theme and approach but is more 
consistently explicit in positing a notion of a 'creative' unconscious that 
is a resource for the subject and that she connects with an experience of 
the Self. Throughout her work Milner is concerned with the 
experience of the artist and aesthetic experience, and her thinking 
applies as much to the receiver of an experience as to the maker: in her 
terms the fundamental experience is the same for both. Her 
incorporation of aesthetic and cultural activity into her psychoanalytic 
thinking can be read as an elaboration of Winnicott's theories on the 
adult's forms of playing. 
Milner's work as a psychoanalyst parallels Winnicott's in many ways; 
they were colleagues and they each make reference to the other in their 
writing about play and creativity, to an extent that their thinking 
sometimes seems to develop in tandem. In two papers on an 
appreciation of his work, 'Winnicott and the two way journey' (1972) 
and 'Winnicott and overlapping circles' (1977), she reflects on ways in 
which her work and Winnicott's overlap or differ and in the process 
clarifies and extends some of Winnicott's thinking on merging, 
creativity and the Self. 9 The major difference between their ideas on 
merging and creativity was that whereas Winnicott focused on and 
indeed 'discovered' the transitional area, Milner wrote in terms of 
9Winnicott refers to her several times in his collected letters as someone with whom he has an affinity. For instance he writes: 'She is the one who has reverie in her 
presentation of her ideas in our Society, and remember, although she is modest, she is 
one of the ones we have who have brains' (Rodman, 1987, p. 144). 
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either total fusion or separateness of subject and object: 'Milner was 
referring to a pre logical fusion of subject and object. I am trying to 
distinguish between this fusion and the fusion or defusion of the 
subjective object and the object objectively perceived' (Winnicott, 1971, 
P-38). Milner's writing was not aimed exclusively at psychoanalysts (she 
worked as a psychologist on educational research before becoming a 
psychoanalyst) and it shows a continual interest in the arts and the role 
of aesthetic experience in the development of the person. This flavours 
her approach which diverges more overtly than Winnicott's from 
classical psychoanalysis. 10 
Milner's early view of the unconscious is expressed in her first book, A 
Life of One's Own (Milner, 1934), written well before she became a 
psychoanalyst in the early 1940s. Here she records an attempt to 
discover, by close observation of her reactions to the minutiae of daily 
life, what gives her the experience of 'moments' of unexpected 
happiness in activity or encounters, in an extended account of what can 
be read, in retrospect, as an example of the experience of playing and 
potential space. As she put it many years later, these moments seemed 
to be the result of practising different forms of attention, including 'a 
whole body awareness' and a 'deliberate use of a wide rather than a 
narrow focus' (Milner, 1934, p. 236), which she relates to a notion of the 
unconscious. The 'Afterword' to the 1986 edition of A Life of ones 
Own, where she discusses reviews of the book, shows clearly that her 
view of the unconscious was a broader one than the Freudian 
1OLike Winnicott she was a member of the Middle Group in the British Society of Psychoanalysis, allied to neither Anna Freud nor Melanie Klein at the time of their split in the 1940s. As Kohon's collection (1986) demonstrates, the work of this grouping of Psychoanalysts makes that of Winnicott and Milner seem less divergent han when seen in isolation. 
273 
repressed unconscious and, in fact, she says that at the time of writing 
she had not found Freud's thinking particularly helpful. More than 
Winnicott, Milner expresses an affinity with Jung and finds his notion 
of the collective unconscious relevant to her thinking. Of a review by 
W. H. Auden she writes: 'I had discovered that the unconscious is not 
only the refuge of childish fantasies and fears but also a source of 
creative wisdom' [which] 'showed better than I did where I had to go' 
(p. 220). Earlier in the book she speaks of the unconscious 'not as a dark 
and gloomy place into which only psychoanalysts had passports but as 
kind of mental activity which was different from rational thought but 
none the less an existent reality, definitely something more than a 
storehouse for the confusions and shames I dare not face' (p. 207). In 
the light of such an unconscious, * she could be 'passive, content to 
watch and wait' (ibid). This description, which relates to her later 
account of fusion of subject and object, recalls Winnicott's state of 
funintegration'. 
In her last book, a collection of essays and papers covering her years as a 
psychoanalyst, The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men: forty-four years 
of exploring psychoanalysis (1988), Milner makes it clear that while her 
early view of the unconscious had enlarged to include the Freudian 
concept it had not substantially altered; indeed she is inclined at times 
to appropriate Freud to fit her own framework and language. For 
example, in an essay on Blake she writes: 'and Freud also is concerned 
with the growth of the spirit; he is concerned fundamentally with the 
growth of the power to love' (p. 186). Her concern with a creative 
unconscious and with what she herself defines as a mystical approach 
to the subject's relationship to the external world is a persistent and 
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overt theme in her work, much more than is the case with 
Winnicott. 11 
In On Not Being Able to Paint (1950), she relates the images she 
produced through free drawing to the jungian concept of the collective 
unconscious. The book was written for educators as a plea for more 
attention to be given to creativity in teaching, where she saw an over- 
emphasis on rational and scientific development. As in the earlier A 
Life of One's Own (1934) Milner's approach here recalls the transitional 
area, although On Not Being Able to Paint was actually published three 
years before Winnicott's famous article on transitional phenomena 
appeared in 1953, and, according to its Introduction, was conceived at 
the beginning of the war. Milner herself makes this connection explicit 
in a reference to Winnicott's concept and its relationship to her book in 
her introduction to the 1989 edition. 
The fact that Milner is writing for an audience of educators rather than 
psychoanalysts is evident in the book's approach and language: she 
uses such terms as 'creativity', 'spiritual' and the 'Self' and the concept 
of the unconscious as a 'storehouse of images' as a matter of course, 
and although she draws on her analytical orientation constantly, and 
sometimes explicitly, her approach is not clinical; she writes from and 
about her own experiences, which she does not necessarily 
contextualise, and about the importance in human development of the 
artistic impulse. 
"The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men includes a paper written in 1973: 'Some notes on Psy(ý! Oanalytic ideas about mysticism. 'She says a good deal about her own experiences and thinking, but can find few references to mysticism in other psychoanalysts - she finds two in Winnicott - except in Bion. 
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Milner's major preoccupation in On Not Being Able to Paint is with 
what she sees as a dynamic movement between the 'fusion' of subject 
and object and the habitual and 'rationally' perceived separation 
between them. She writes about the difficulty for her of painting and 
drawing (as an amateur) without its seeming rather mechanical, and 
recounts her exploration of her sense of her own creativity through a 
study of 'free', almost automatic, drawings which she produced every 
now and then, rather to her discomfiture, and through which she was 
eventually able to 'learn to paint' in a way that was satisfying to her. 12 
She discovered that the images'she produced had an unconscious 
significance for her, which she was able to grasp through free 
association. 
Like Winnicott, Milner is concerned with the relationship of the 
subject to her outer and inner world. To a greater extent than 
Winnicott, she writes fromý the point of view of the adult (herself) for 
whom the distinction between subject and object has been firmly 
established. However, as Winnicott frequently pointed out, certainty 
about this distinction is precarious and it is the necessity to face and 
deal with this uncertainty and what happens when she does so that 
forms the basis for Milner's thinking about creativity. Above all she 
discovers the need to allow the breaking down of the boundary 
between inner and outer in order to enable her inner world to have 
expression. For example, in looking at 'edges' -a painter's concern - 
she begins to perceive the indeterminacy of boundaries between 
objects, which gives rise to the thought that 'there could be a fear of 
12This account recalls Winnicott's 'Squiggle game'. Milner herself draws attention to WinnicOtt's use of the game between analyst and child-patient as a way of Providing a holding environment to allow the emergence of 'direct body awareness' (Milner, 1987, p. 282). 
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losing all sense of separate boundaries; particularly those between the 
tangible realities of the external world and the imaginative realities of 
the inner world of feeling and ideas; in fact a fear of being mad' 
(Milner, 1950, p. 17). At the same time, it was precisely the breakdown of 
these boundaries that enabled her to reach the sense of creativity and of 
feeling 'real' in her painting that she was seeking: the experience of 
'fusion', both with the real world of external objects and her own inner 
objects. 
At several points in this book Milner relates 'that moment of the 
primary state of unity, undifferentiation, between subject and object' to 
what Freud terms the 'oceanic' experience (Milner, 1967). This term 
was not Freud's own, and his treatment of the experience differs 
sharply from Milner's. In Civilisation and its Discontents he discusses 
with apparent perplexity the 'oceanic' feeling of 'oneness, which he 
recounts as described by Romain Rolland (named in a footnote added 
only in 1931), who regarded the experience as 'the source of religious 
energy and as a basic "religious" experience without the need for 
doctrinal beliefs' (Freud, 1930, p. 252). Although he describes the 
'feeling' sympathetically, as one of 'an indissoluble bond, of being one 
with the external world as a whole' (p. 252), Freud is perplexed because 
'I cannot discover this feeling in myself (ibid). He proceeds to explain 
it in psychoanalytic terms as the adult reconstruction of a residual trace 
of the original experiences of the infant ego unable to distinguish 
external and internal sensations. This is expressed in terms similar to 
Winnicott's account of the child being merged with the mother, except 
that Freud does not introduce the mother/object as the essential factor 
in the situation. 
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Freud pursues the subject's development from this experience of 
'unity' in terms of the pleasure and reality principles. He does not 
incorporate the experience of the oceanic feeling into his subsequent 
discussion about mares 'search for happiness' - or rather for the 
absence of unhappiness - as life's 'purpose'; which, in its broader 
sense, is an enquiry that Freud does not take on. For him the search for 
happiness is tied up with the attempt - doomed to necessary failure 
for the adult living in society - to live by the pleasure principle. Here 
Freud is reasserting the instincts as the basis of the human 
constitution. His only real move away from this, which is not 
developed in his work, is through the notion of sublimation of the 
instincts in 'psychic' work. In a passage which can be seen as a pre- 
cursor of Winnicott's theories on playing, and creativity, Freud says: 'A 
satisfaction of this kind, such as the artist's joy in creating, in giving his 
phantasies body, or a scientist's in solving problems or discovering 
truths, has a special quality which we shall certainly one day be able to 
characterise in metapsychological terms' (Freud, 1930, p. 254). 
This section of "Civilisation and its Discontents' marks a fundamental 
difference between Freud's and Milner's approach. She not only 
'understands' the oceanic experience but relates it firmly to an infantile 
body experience and, further, incorporates it into her psychoanalytic 
framework and practice. For her, as for Winnicott, a "purpose' of her 
work with patients is to help them rediscover their own creativity: 
by finding a bit of the outside world, whether in chalk or paper, or 
in one's analyst, that was willing to fit in with one's dreams, a 
moment of illusion was made possible, a moment in which inner 
and outer seem to coincide ... the ordinary sense of self had 
temporarily disappeared; there had been a kind of blanking out of 
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ordinary consciousness, a complete lack of self consciousness 
(Milner, 1950, p. 154). 
Gradually, painting has become a means for not having to decide 
'which was the other and which was oneself' (ibid). 
She explores the fears and the satisfactions of this experience. Coming 
to terms with the separateness of subject and object is essential for 
human development into maturity, involving a renunciation of 
security and omnipotence - everything is me so I can make it do as I 
want - and accepting aloneness and loss. At the same time, however, 
awareness of separateness may iriduce a sense of isolation and 
alienation. For Winnicott the transitional object is a way out; for 
Milner it is the experience of fusion, through cultural activity or a 
generalised, creative approach to 'everyday living, that is the 'way out 
of the human predicament ... that gave due recognition both for the 
need for separation and non-separation' (Milner, 1950, p. 68). Absolute 
separation suggests isolation, while fusion may suggest 'madness' 
through the loss of external reality. Painting offsets the impossibility of 
'on the one hand trying to live as a separate person ... and on the other, 
seeking for total merging and loss of all separate identity ... complete at- 
oneness with nature' (p. 79). In the 'Afterthoughts' to the Suppressed 
Madness of Sane Men, Milner discusses a refinement of her 
formulation of fusion in a comment by Michael Eigen of her use of the 
term 'undifferentiation' (the merging of subject and object): 'You are 
not talking about a merger between self and other but about a state in 
which both are there, and the same and not the same at once'. He 
prefers the term 'I-yet-not-I [which] maintains the ambiguity and 
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tension of our basic position' (Milner, 1987, p. 291). This phrase brings 
out, and helps to resolve (by maintaining the paradox), the 
fundamental difficulty of considering the merged state without 
conceiving of a subject to be aware of it. 
For Milner the gap, the split between inner and outer and between 
dream and reality can never permanently 'coincide'; but they can, 
through her art, 'interact' (p. 89). By the end of On Not Being Able to 
Paint, then, the process has moved beyond mere fusion with the object 
to something that is also an 'interaction'. Her painting enables her to 
create 'through the conscious manipulation of a malleable material ... 
the experience of outer and inner coinciding, which we blindly 
undergo when we fall in love'. She has reached the stage of being able 
psychically to move around the 'boundaries of one's spiritual identity, 
... which do not have to remain within one's skin' (p. 143) because she 
is now trying to paint both what she has put into the external world 
and what is already there: the external object is both separate from and 
a part of herself. 
Milner's acceptance of the paradoxical nature of the experience is 
expressed in the way in which she modifies Winnicott's view that the 
Self can only be found if 'it is reflected back' in the merged state. 
(expressed in 'Playing and the search for the Self, ChA, 1971, explored 
above). Winnicott's transitional object represents for her a 'two way 
journey; both to the finding of the objective reality of the object and to 
the finding of the objective reality of the subject - the I AM (Milner, 
1986, p. 251). She suggests that the Self can be 'recognised' without the 
need for an external reflection from an other ... it can be 'related to by 
the conscious ego discovering that it can turn in upon itself, make 
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contact with the core of its own being and find there a renewal, a 
rebirth' (p. 250); For Milner, the Self, which Pontalis glosses as the sense 
of an 'other, a 'neuter' for the subject to address (Pontalis, 1981, p. 147), 
becomes the 'inner core' of the ego's own being', which can be 
experienced both through cultural activity, whether as maker or as 
perceiver, and through 'emptiness' and 'merging'. 
Milner's paradoxical conclusion in On Not Being Able to Paint, is that 
although separate ego-identity is an illusion (I am everything, the 
subject is the object), at the same time, 'creativeness is something 
which comes from the free reciprocal interplay of differences that are 
confronting each other with equal rights to be different' (p. 115). The 
notion of fusion goes beyond passivity and emerges as an active and 
interactive process. To relate this to the film viewing relationship, it 
can be said that out of the spectator's apparently passive position, 
where playing has broken down and the spectator has lost her 
subjectivity into the film, emerges the possibility of a 'free interplay' 
between the spectator and the film, where the spectator both finds and 
puts into it a part of herself. 
In the Appendix to On Not Being Able to Paint Milner presents some 
of the strictly psychoanalytical theoretical thinking that relates to this 
work on herself. She adds to her account of 'fusion' the pre-anal stage 
where the infant feels ecstatically at one with all its bodily products in 
contrast with its later disappointment at the gap between what it 
produces and its feeling in doing so; for the artist, nothing will match 
up to his ideal conception. For Milner the way out of this 
disillusionment is in re-experiencing that early stage of 'fusion' where 
even the 'faculty of consciousness' itself was to be creative because 
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nothing is distinguishable between inner and outer' ... a stage at which 
'to open one's eyes was felt to be a fiat of creation, a saying let there be 
light which resulted in there being light' (Milner 1950, p. 153). This 
expresses precisely her notion of the creativity of everyday living, in 
the subject's ability repeatedly to 're-make' her world. 
In Melanie Klein's work, which Winnicott was to dispute, artistic 
activity has its origins in the infant's urge to restore the good object 
which it has itself destroyed: art is a ceaseless act of reparation, from 
guilt, from fear of retribution, from love (Klein, 1929). Milner's 
thinking has moved to an earlier state, before the depressive position, 
where, rather than restoring the whole object, the subject creates it for 
the first time. For the adult there always the possibility of reliving this 
moment: if we can move to the primitive, formless state, without 
anxiety, and tolerate the shifting of our habitual boundaries and even 
its intimations of madness, there is the possibility of continually 
recreating our objects, both 'made' and 'found'. This possibility of a 
moment-by-moment creativity exists no less for the film spectator than 
for the artist. 
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The True Self in action: Christopher Bollas 
Christopher Bollas takes up the theme of the search for the (true) Self 
as the expression of what is unique and what makes the individual 
'feel alive' which, he claims, is an important feature of the analytic 
relationship that had not been theorised before Winnicott. Like 
Winnicott, Bollas moves away from the Freudian primacy of 
interpretation and understanding in analytic work; he distinguishes 
'the need to know' from the 'need to become which has received less 
attention in analysis' (Bollas, 1989, p. 24). In his books The Shadow of 
the Object (1987) and Forces of Destiny (1989), he explores these issues 
through an examination of the relationship between the analyst and 
analysand: the analYsand'uses' the analyst as a play object, and as what 
Bollas terms a 'transformational' object in order to obtain an 
experience of the True Self. I will argue that this account of the 
analytical transaction can be used as a model of the film-spectator 
relationship, when the spectator too makes use of the film for her 
playing to obtain an experience of her True Self. This will bring me to 
the end of this exploration of the film-spectator encounter,, as, at the 
end of the film, the spectator moves out of her potential space back to 
the world of shared reality. 
Bollas attempts what Pontalis side-steps - an exploration of the source 
and location of the True Self in the psyche. It is difficult to do this 
without approaching the essentialist approach that Pontalis rejects: 
Bollas writes in terms of 'the unique presence of being that each of us 
is; the idiom of our personality' (Bollas, 1989, p. 9). He is more explicit 
than Winnicott in his definition of an 'inherited potential' (p. 8) with 
which each person starts out in life and which 'exists in experience 
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upon which it is fundamentally dependent for its articulation ... a set of 
unique person possibilities specific to this individual' (p. 9). He goes 
further than Winnicott by attempting to link the True Self into the 
Freudian notion of the primary repressed unconscious posited as a set 
of 'inherited mental formations ... analogous to instincts in animals, 
' 
with the suggestion that what he terms the 'idiom of the personality' 
might be substituted for the 'instincts' as its nucleus, and that this 'core 
of unconscious life'becomes a 'dynamic form that seeks its being 
through experience' (p. 12). There exists 'an unknown thought' even in 
the neonate which'brings this knowledge with him as he perceives, 
organises, remembers and uses his object world' (p. 10), which it can be 
the task of analysis to enable the patient to articulate. 
This attempt to incorporate a theory of the Self into traditional 
psychoanalysis throws up the difficulty of its definition within that 
framework (which is usually not attempted), and, to judge by the 
liberal use of 'perhaps' in this section, Bollas is not entirely convinced 
by his own argument, which is indeed presented only as a suggestion. It 
is an attempt to specify what Milner is content to leave as a vague 
notion of 'the inner core' of the person, and that Winnicott side- 
stepped by enlarging (more or less tacitly) his theoretical framework to 
include his two different, co-existing models of the unconscious- the 
source of creativity and the Freudian repressed unconscious. 13 
Like Winnicott, however, Bollas also insists that the True Self is not an 
essence which can in any meaningful way be 'found' as the end of a 
journey. Rather the 'joy' to be found in the expression of the 
131n'Fear of Breakdown', Winnicott also however refers to Freud's, other, unconscious, 'that is very close to neuro-physiological functioning' (1974, p-177). 
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individual's True Self, or personal idiom, comes from the moment-to- 
moment articulation and making of a life through 'the spontaneous 
gesture' - Bollas here adopts Winnicott's phrase: 'no human being is 
only true self ' (Bollas, 1989, p. 9). This 'articulation' may emerge within 
psychoanalysis through the 'uses the analysand makes of the analyst as 
an object', which Bollas examines from the point of view of 
Winnicott's late paper, 'The use of an object and relating through 
identifications' (Winnicott 1971, Ch. 6; Bollas, 1989, Ch-3). 
In this important paper Winnicott discusses both the infant and the 
analysand's use of the mother/analyst in its development of subject- 
object differentiation. Distinguishing between the 'internal' mother 
and the 'environmental', actual, mother, Winnicott describes two 
paradoxical stages. Firstly, the baby must be able to destroy its internal 
object as an expression of its omnipotence and control over its inner 
life. At the same time it is also crucial that the mother 'survives' by 
bearing the brunt of the child's destructiveness without retaliation. It is 
the environmental mother who literally survives and through her 
survival the child is able to relinquish the internal object over which it 
has omnipotent control, and substitute for it a knowledge of the object 
that is separate and no longer a part of itself. The crucial point for the 
infant is the move from omnipotence to separateness, for 'killing' the 
Object-which-survives becomes a way of establishing that it is indeed 
outside the child and, in the end (a point, finally, of considerable relief), 
not within its control. The object is itself, indestructible, outside and 
separate. By the same token, neither can the subject/child be destroyed 
by the other: no reparation is necessary, no retaliation is threatened. 
The child becomes a subject and an object among other subjects and 
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objects. This is the process which I will argue can be played out in the 
film-viewer relationship. 
The difference in this approach to artistic/ creative activity and Klein's 
insistence on art as the restoration of the object (Klein, 1929) is crucial: 
freely breaking and building objects, changing and moving them 
around, in sum, playing with them, becomes an activity for its own 
sake, not haunted by the guilt inherent in the need to restore to its 
original wholeness the loved but also hated object that the subject has 
destroyed. Winnicott's insistence on what he termed 'ruthlessness' as 
simply a vital element in primary creativity reflects his essentially 
optimistic approach to human beings and his emphasis on the 
importance of spontaneity and creativity. It is impossible to be 
spontaneous, to take the risk of making something new, if the subject 
is afraid of destroying both what he makes and those he encounters - 
spontaneous play in these circumstances becomes impossible, and 
'work' (the incessant work of restoration) an imperative. The use of an 
object as Winnicott explores it is the ability both to use it and then, 
when necessary, simply to give it up. 
Following Winnicott, Bollas traces how analysands use the analyst for 
playing. The focus shifts away from the patient /infant's need to destroy 
the object in order to prove its ability to survive, to the knowledge that 
the object is indeed outside and strong enough in its own right to be 
'used' - and similarly that the subject can be used as an object, 
reciprocally, by the other. This relationship is the opposite of the 
Winnicottian negative, the 'compliance' of the False Self through the 
infant's fear of the destruction either of the True Self or of the 
object/mother. The opposite of compliance in this case is neither 
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aggression nor manipulation: the use of an object is non-exploitative 
because it also includes the respect for the other as separate and not-me 
(although this realisation, as Winnicott insisted, is always partial). As 
Winnicott puts it, the subject is able to say, "'Hello Object! " "I destroyed 
you. " "I love you. "' (Winnicott, 1969, p. 86). In any intimate 
relationship the subject/object relationship persists and moves around, 
as each continually and reciprocally makes an object of the other. As an 
example outside the analytic setting, Bollas contrasts the use, in a 
sexual relationship, the couple makes of each other in mutual orgasm 
with the relating and caring of the rest of their relationship (Bollas, 
1989, p. 27). Without the caring the use is exploitative, but without the 
'ruthlessness', the erotic is diminished. 14 
Winnicott's account of the object in this late paper can be related to his 
earlier model of the transitional object - he himself refers to but does 
not develop the link in this paper. At the moment of the subject's use 
of the object in the way that Winnicott describes it (whether the object 
is mother, analyst or the film) it takes on the properties of a malleable 
transitional object, endowed with aspects of both the subject's inner 
and outer worlds, and the subject can make use of it for his own inner 
purposes. 
14Later in the book Bollas discusses the notion of 'subject relations', as an interplay between two equal subjects (p. 89). Jessica Benjan-dn (1990) also proposes a concept of two 
equal subjects in her discussion of the mother child relationship, which draws partly on Winnicott and partly on child observation studies. Her model stresses the'mutuality' 
of relationships but it leaves out of account the psychoanalytic force of the concept of internal objects and does not allow for the loving /destructive creativity that the 
concept of the use of the object involves. 
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The film object 
In a chapter entitled 'The psychoanalyst's multiple function', Bollas 
brings together Winnicott's view that the Self can be found through 
creative playing and his ideas on the use of the object. Employing 
Bion's term the 'analytic object' as 'the formulations generated by the 
psychoanalyst hat give birth to an idea that may be of use to the patient 
and analyst' (Bollas, 1989, Ch. 5, p. 93), he reconstructs the analytic 
process by which the analytic object is created and the patient achieves 
the sense that 'his true self has been released into further 
establishment and articulation' (p. 95). 
Within a structure that is bounded by a particular set of rules and 
practices (the analytic holding environment), the purpose of analysis is 
to enable the patient progressively to develop and articulate his or her 
'personal idiom; to enable the emergence of 'a sometimes observable 
universe of objects through which the patient moves', through which 
he or she 'may live the true self' (p. 109). Bollas follows Winnicott in 
stressing the importance of primary 'ruthlessness'. as a part of 
creativity, in enabling the patient to use the analyst in this way. The 
usefulness of the analytic relationship for the patient is that the 
analysand need not be 'careful of' the analyst; as, usually, the baby need 
not be of the mother. In the same way, the spectator does not have to be 
'careful' of the film and may safely deploy her ruthless creativity in 
'using' it for her own conscious and unconscious purposes, knowing 
that, in fact, there is nothing to be harmed; the film will still exist after 
this showing. 
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Bollas describes Winnicott's 'spatula game' as a parallel for the way the 
analysand uses the analyst's comments; in consultations with a mother 
Winnicott would place a spatula on the table in front of her baby and 
note its reactions. Bollas takes up the fact that after a first glance at the 
spatula the baby usually turned away from it, only returning to it after 
an interval to handle and mouth it. He describes what he sees as the 
psychic process taking place in this way: 
Perception of actual object 
Creation of internal mental space by looking away 
Psychic representation of the object 
Instincts now arrive through the internal object 
Holding of the internal object allows the external object to be used 
without anxiety 
The spatula is now a subjective object 
(Bollas, 1989, p. 95) 
Bollas elaborates this process further as he relates it to the patient's 
response to the analyst's 'comment'. If the comment is to be made use 
of by the patient, it, too, is received, and taken in to the 'pre-conscious 
holding area' where it 'evokes instinctual representations,, unconscious 
affects and memories, and then returns to consciousness after such 
inner work has occurred'; the comment now 'bears the patient's 
instinctual, affective and memorial print' (p. 96) and can be used both 
within the analytic relationship and for the patient's own conscious, 
and unconscious, life purposes. In this way, Bollas suggests, the process 
'enhances and maturates the psyche which 'grows and establishes a 
route for the patient's true self' (ibid). 
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The film-spectator encounter can be traced as an analogous process, 
relating to both the spatula and to the analyst's comments. 
Perception of actual object (thefilm, orfilmfragment) 
Creation of internal mental space by looking away (What Bollas describes as a 'pre- 
conscious' space will becomefor the playing spectator the potential psychic space that is 
activated as she begins to watch thefilm) 
Psychic representation of the object (The spectator makes a psychic representation of 
thefilm-fragment in order to create it as an internal object) 
Instincts now arrive through the internal object (Vie internalfragmentlobjeCt 
becomes linked witli and catitected witli unconscious memories andfantasies as psyc1lic 
representatives) 
Holding of the internal object allows the external object to be used without 
anxiety (Thefilm-on screen, separateftom the internalisedfilm-fragment, can continue 
to be usedfor the spectator's ftirther playing. There are nozv tivo : fllms', one on screen 
and one inside her) 
The spatula is now a subjective object (Thefilin image has now become a subjective 
object, a part of the spectator in the merged state) 
If the analyst's comments were about a cognitive idea, the receiver 
would be said to have 'processed' it, weighing it up, mulling it over, 
relating it to his or her world-view, so that it contributed to an 
expanded, new construction. Received within the specific setting of 
analysis, however, the comment gathers unconscious accretions; the 
same is true of the film experienced in the cinematic context. As with 
the spatula, the patient's use transforms the analyst's comment - or 
the film - into a 'subjective object' - an object, that is, which is now 
contained in his or her inner world and has even become a part of 
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himself, as, in the merged state, the mother is a part of the baby. An 
example of this in Meet me in St. Louis is the spectator's relationship 
to the 'Boy next door', (explored in Ch. 5 of this thesis in terms the 
return of the lost object) who, by the end of Esther's song, through her 
desire for him,, has become a subjective object, that is, a part of herself. 
How this analytic exchange can carry such import for the patient is 
explained both in terms of the transference, where the patient transfers 
onto the analyst his or her unconscious representation of his own past, 
and in terms of the analytic setting as a play-space, where 'patient and 
analyst are continuously engaged in a mutual processing of one 
another' (Bollas, 1989, p. 106). Within this space the patient may evoke 
from the analyst, and make use of, 'elements' that the analyst is able to 
make available, from both the psychoanalytic theories and models he 
draws on, and aspects of his own personality. As in any 
communication, the setting and context determine what is possible to 
be said and heard; the point about the privileged psychoanalytic setting, 
which that of cinema recalls, is that its content is about the 
patient/ spectator's inner world and is therefore peculiarly susceptible 
to unconscious processing. 
Bollas lists a range of concepts drawn from different psychoanalytic 
models as examples of what the patient might evoke and make use of 
in the analyst. These include the Oedipus complex, the Law of the 
Father, the ego ideal, potential space (Bollas, 1989, p. 104). In addition, 
Bollas believes that the analyst should make available such elements of 
his personality or 'mood' as are evoked in him by the patient through 
the counter-transference at any one moment in the analytic encounter; 
coming from the counter transference, these in any case already 
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'belong' to the analysand. In this way the patient may unconsciously 
play on the parts of the analyst's experience, personality or reaction he 
needs in order to construct his own scenario and script. It is crucial, as 
Winnicott insists in his account of the spatula game, that the analyst 
allow the process to take place in its own time and at its own pace. 
To make an analogy with the film-spectator relationship, the 
'analytical' elements to which Bollas refers become elements which 
'belong' to the film and the film viewing process. Only some would be 
of relevance - evoked - in the spectator at any one time. The 
I personal' elements become those which are specific to unique 
moments in the film spectator encounter. 
If, then, the 'elements' that the analyst is able to make available to the 
analysand are related to those that a film may make available to the 
spectator, then those that Meet Me in St. Louis, as an example of a 
Hollywood fictional film, might provide include (to draw on what has 
been discussed in this thesis): 
Publicity, narrative structure and content, and genre: These elements 
make the film available to the spectator on the basis of creating and 
meeting expectations as she comes to the cinema to obtain a particular 
kind of experience, ready to use it for her own purposes. St. Louis is 
now established and publicised as a 'classic', re-shown to celebrate Judy 
Garland as star; Minnelli as director; Christmas; the Hollywood 
Musical; and nostalgia, which by now includes not only the film's 
subject matter but also a sense of the history of cinema. 
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The fundamental importance of narrative in Hollywood cinema is 
taken for granted as a basic premise in film studies. Narrative mirrors 
ways in which we construct our lives - through chronology, cause 
and effect, a sense of motivation, and of beginnings and endings, 
climaxes and resolutions. As Bordwell and Thompson put it, in a text 
which is used as a film studies 'primer', in contacting a film 'the 
spectator picks up clues, recalls information, anticipates what will 
follow, and generally participates in the creating of the film's form' 
(Bordwell and Thompson, 1986, p. 83). These authors however write 
from a formalist point of view and do not enter debates about the 
unconscious spectator, for whom the film narrative's unconscious 
structuring may also parallel her unconscious scenarios. 
The narrative content of a film is often the viewer's first point of 
contact with it and that to which popular writing on film attaches 
major importance. What a particular film is 'about' is important for 
#seizing' the spectator, for whom, on the level of verisimilitude, the 
stake is to find in the film characters or situations which have parallels 
in her own life. On the unconscious level such points of comparison 
are not at all obvious and the point at which amaturalistic mimetic 
approach is limited: the overt, manifest story disguises the hidden 
unconscious content. This may bind the spectator even more strongly 
to the film. 
The perception of the film in terms of genre offers particular pleasures 
of familiarity. As a musical St. Louis offers, as Richard Dyer cogently 
puts it, the experience of what 'utopia might feel like' (Dyer, 1977, p-177, 
my italics). In its guise as family melodrama, on the other hand, it 
offers a replaying of family relationships and processes, both conscious 
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and unconscious, and of the spectator's wishes, both those which are 
allowed and those which may be. forbidden (the first mainly though the 
two elder sisters, the second through Tootie). The coexistence of the 
two genres in St. Louis enables the spectator to 'use' the film in two 
different ways: to 'play' in potential space and to move into the 
domain of the unconscious. In playing, the spectator is fully engaged in 
the activity but is not 'caught up' in the film's and her own 
unconscious structures. She moves securely within the boundaries of 
transitional space which maintains boundaries between the inner and 
the outer world. However these boundaries are not fixed and the 
playing is influenced by unconscious manifestations that add to the 
repertoire of the uses that the spectator may make of the film, in the 
same way that the analysand makes use of his own and the analyst's 
unconscious in the analytic encounter. 
The characters, the actors as stars: these (notably in St. Louis, Tootie and 
Judy Garland) may be so cathected by the spectator, that, in the case of 
the star, the spectator is engaged before the film begins, and in the case 
of the character cumulatively as it proceeds and persistently in its after- 
effect. Both individual characters and the film as a whole can serve as 
transference figures on whom the spectator can transpose her own 
history. 
The cinematic image and movement: the film image can be vividly 
remembered, heavily cathected and internalised. The fundamental 
cinematic characteristic of the moving image can work on the spectator 
to encourage fluidity in her positioning in the narrative and to set up 
the formal movement as a psychic one. 
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The spectator, too, brings her own 'elements' to the encounter. To take 
examples that have been drawn on in this thesis to consider the 
spectator's experience of St. Louis, these might include: 
Memories and wishes, personal and cinematic 
Familiarity with the codes of cinema 
Expectations and perhaps a knowledge of a particular film 
A willingness to 'enter' the potential space 
The wish and capacity to play 
The wish to be moved and to 'lose herself' in this or any film 
There need to be points of congruence -a 'fit' - between the film and 
what the spectator brings to it for the cinematic encounter to take place 
and for the spectator's usage of it to be set up and develop. When this 
takes place it opens up the possibility of moments of 'surprise' for the 
spectator (for Winnicott an important element in analysis), as if of a 
new discovery. 
As an example of such a moment both of congruence and 'surprise' 
developed through the film-spectator relationship, I return to the 
violent image of Tootie 'killing' the snow family, which marks the 
culmination of the narrative protest against the father's arbitrary 
decision to go to New York. The film moment does not stand alone but 
works on the spectator within the context of the film's formal, 
structural and narrative systems and with what the spectator also 
brings with her. 
The impact of this image on the spectator is prepared for by such 
#elements' as the spectator's emotional investment in Tootie and the 
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identification with her point of view that the film has constructed up 
to this point, as well as the immediately preceding pathos of 
Esther's /Garland's singing of 'Have yourself a merry little Christmas'. 
Underlying this immediate memory is the fear of the destruction of the 
family that Tootie is acting out on behalf of the spectator in the face of 
the film's investment in it; this works on a deeper level in 
representing the subject's destruction of the good object. Underlying 
and contradicting the fear of destroying is the opposite unconscious 
wish to kill the father who has deprived the child of its desire, 
combined with the awareness of the enormity of that wish, expressed 
in the violence of Tootie's act: the wish and fear of Oedipus. 
Accompanying this is the opposite child's exultation at her own power. 
These different levels of involvement in Tootie's act on the part of the 
spectator augment the impact of the image on her. 
Elsaesser states that 'Minnelli constantly reduces his stories to their 
moments of visual intensity where he can project the dramatic 
conflicts into the decor' (Elsaessei, 1969, p. 22). The image of Tootie 
killing the snow people is strongly and visually memorable, through 
the effects of lighting and the uncanny, surreal quality of the snow- 
people which are neither human, nor very snow-like, yet strangely 
'alive' in appearance. Tootie's action is also extended, as if to insist on 
the spectator registering it; there is a mad quality to her beheading, one 
after the other, of the snow-people, until she collapses crying with the 
emotional and physical effort into Judy Garland's arms. Overall, the 
image is disturbing in a way that is quite out of proportion to what the 
film as a musical or family comedy would seem to promise. 
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Such moments cumulatively give the film a 'use potential' which 
binds the spectator into it and enables her to make use of it as an object. 
Like the spatula and the analyst's comments, it can be taken in and 
become a subjective object. By this process of usage, in the end, any film 
I engage with in potential space may become 'my' film - my 
subjective object, a part of myself. As in the spatula game, I may take it 
in, in parts or as a whole, to my inner space, where it 'joins up with' 
my other internal objects and becomes cathected with elements from 
my own unconscious, so that the-images I may evoke for myself, that 
have come from or are associated with the film, now belong to my own 
psyche. 
Used in this way, the film-spectator interaction has the potential in it 
for the spectator's 'self articulation' and 'transformation'. At such 
moments of the cinematic encounter something 'moves' both in the 
spectator and as if between the spectator and film. Bollas's notion of an 
'aesthetic embrace', suggests a sensuality in this psychic experience as 
well as its discreteness from the flow of the linear, narrative form; 
Milner's description of the unexpectedness of her joy in mundane and 
usually fleeting events in A Life of One's Own (Milner, 1934) suggests 
its intensity. In analysis, there are such moments of insight as 
Winnicott describes, for instance when the patient suddenly, and with 
surprise, arrives at an interpretation for herself which encompasses the 
work of a whole session, and which may be expressed in rather cryptic, 
even poetic terms. For the playing spectator there is no mystery about 
the existence of such moments for they may well be part of what she 
seeks in watching a film. The accumulation of such moments gives the 
spectator a particular kind of pleasure: an experience of the sense of 
Self. 
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The experience of the Self 
Bollas explores the notion of 'transformation' for the subject in The 
Shadow of the Object, where (similarly to Milner) he hypothesises that 
the subject's experience of the Self has its origins in the merged state 
before the baby is subjectively separated out from its mother (for the 
film viewer the state of merging with the film). He employs the term 
the 'transformational object' to describe an experience of the baby 
which he likens to both the analytic and the aesthetic set-up. As the 
baby's 'other self' the mother represents a process of 'internal and 
external transformations' (Bollas, 1987, p. 14). In such an experience the 
wish of the subject is not for an 6ther but for the non-verbal, pre- 
subjective experience of 'self transformation'. Such moments have an 
'uncanny' quality in that they seem to re-evoke a memory that was 
'never cognitively apprehended', but which was 'existentially known' 
(p. 29). 
This attempt to describe the events in the pre-subjective state that pre- 
figure the aesthetic - or indeed any other - significant adult 
encounter suggests an elaboration of both Milner's and Winnicott's 
accounts of formlessness and merging as the basis for creativity and an 
experience of the Self. In Winnicott what is important is the psychic 
resting point of unintegration as a prelude to an experience of the Self 
experience; for Milner, the merging of the artist into her material is a 
necessary de-subjectivisation to allow the artistic product to take form. 
Bollas suggests that the creative experience through which the Self is 
experienced has already taken place within the merged state itself. 
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The transformational object is formulated as a Winnicottian 
'subjective object', a part of the subject, in the state where subject and 
object do not yet exist. Bollas pos its that the transformational object- 
mother is therefore experienced by the baby as itself: not as an other, 
but only as 'a process of alteration, a stirring of change: 'infants do not 
internalise the mother as a person or imago. They do internalise the 
maternal process ... ' (Bollas, 1987, p. 6). Bollas's description of the 
mother-as-transformational object as the 'most primitive archaic object 
relatioif, that precedes object relations in the usual sense of the term, 
and of the subject's longing to return to the state of merging as that 
which'alters' the state of the self, is a way of articulating an experience 
of consciousness that might exist in the merged state. This carries a 
movement of 'transformation', that will eventually lead to the 
establisl-dng of what Winnicott calls a 'unit self' that Freud was able to 
take for granted and which Jung, like many others, had to seek. 
In all the three writers I have been considering, the notion of an 
experience of the Self within the merged state counters the idea of a 
loss of subjectivity as something to be feared and dreaded: the 
experience of a void, an endless falling, the loss of the sense of T and, 
finally the return to a state of non-life. What seems to be the same 
phenomenon of loss of the subject becomes a gain: expressed in Freud's 
oceanic feeling; Winnicott's unintegration; Milner's fusion of the artist 
with her material, Bollas's aesthetic embrace and, for the mystic, to 
which these all refer, the state of"at-one-ment': instead of emptiness, 
fullness; instead of nothing, everything. Even in the passive, 
unintegrated state of waiting something is happening: the stirring of 
the movement of the Self, wl-dch is 'for ever immune from the reality 
principle, and for ever silent' (Winnicott, 1963, p. 192, ). In this case the 
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wish of the film viewer becomes not to replay desire, nor to experience 
a hallucinatory, compensatory wish-fulfilment, but to replay an 
experience of the Self in moments of transformational congruence 
between herself and the film. 
The paradox of this process that offers a route to the Self through 
artistic and aesthetic activity is that it is an experience that has both the 
quality of uniqueness, and, at the same time, what appears to be the 
opposite quality of an identity with everything, a non-separation: the 
artist becomes (merged in with) the piece of clay, yet also makes a 
unique object. The film spectator loses herself in the film and finds her 
Self. One way of conceiving this paradox is to accept it: that in being 
'everything' I am most myself (this would express the mystical 
experience). Another way, more applicable to this thesis, is to conceive 
of two different 'selves' as the difference between the subject-in-process 
and the Self. The exhilaration of're-defining 'myself' in every 
encounter and transaction that may be associated with the notion of 
the 'subject in process' (the spectator-subject constructed within the 
film-viewing process) is made possible because of a continuity from the 
merged state, where the Self may be found, to subject-object 
differentiation. Playing within the transitional area of potential space is 
the means of maintaining contact between the merged and the 
separated state and of ensuring that the (separate) subject-in-process 
continues to have reference to and be connected with the Self (as- 
everything). Without this reference, connection and continuity there 
remains either the fear of breakdown, the loss of subjectivity into 
madness, or a life lived by the False self, constructed in the face of the 
failure of the True self. With the connection maintained, not only does 
the loss of subjectivity leads to the finding of the Self, but an experience 
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of the Self also underlies and can be articulated through every 
encounter. To return to the terms with which this thesis began, the 
spectator's encounter with a film in potential space is a means of 
maintaining the connection between outer, shared reality and her 
inner reality which now includes the experience of the Self. 
Let us then assume that somewhere in the baby's experience of 
merging is a blueprint for the adult's heightened sense of Self in 
moments of creativity (making, playing, meaningful experience) which 
marks the connection between the inner and the outer world. Each 
moment of the making and remaking of the subject in process, the 
speaking subject that exists in the world and is specific to each 
encounter, is informed by the 'memory' or trace of the original state of 
merging. It is the experience of a connection with the Self as a part of 
everything that enables an encounter in daily life to feel meaningful 
and real to the person; what may from the outside seem to be the same 
event may be experienced in terms of 'aliveness' or 'deadness', 
depending on the state of the Self as true or false. 
The experience of fusion and unintegration recalls the earliest mother- 
baby fusion which is the base for all subsequent experiences of 
connectedness through the subjective object. Another way of 
conceiving this is that the mother's role is to maintain for the infant its 
experience of a pre-existing Self. At first the mother 'is' the baby, then 
she 'becomes' a transformational object, the baby's 'other self', and, 
progressively, an object in a world of objects, the 'environmental' 
mother. The baby who is learning to play alone needs an other to 
represent the Self and provide physical continuity with the original 
state of fusion. But the state of fusion is not with the mother, for there 
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is no other, no object, in the merged state; rather she represents and 
activates the Self-as-everything. The umbilical cord connects the baby 
not to the mother but to life. 
The Self is not, then, the mother, not even the subjective mother in 
the merged state. Her importance is in her holding presence that 
enables the developing infant not only to 'emerge' into being a 
separate subject, but at the same time to maintain a connection with 
the original Self-as-everything. The worst loss is not that of the 
object/mother, which could be mourned and replaced, but the loss of 
the Self-as-everything, which the mother of the merged state (the 
baby's 'other self) has represented. 
In a meaningful encounter with an other the experience of the Self is 
returned to the subject, through playing, fusion and the use of a 
transformational object. For the playing spectator, too, the encounter 
with a film and her engagement with its world and its stories becomes 
a way of replaying the drama of that elusive movement between her 
two selves when she both re-discovers herself as a subject and re- 
experiences her Self. 
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A4eet me in St. Louis: the ending 
Iri the following analysis of the final episode of Meet me in St. Louis I will 
explore how the ending of the film consolidates and brings together for the 
spectator the two main aspects of Winnicott's work that I have been 
considering in this chapter: the use of an object and the experience of the 
SelL 
13oth Wood and Britton argue that the final, Spring, episode of St. Louis, the 
opening of the St. Louis Fair, marks the failure of the film's project to 
sustain the myth of the family and St. Louis as its idealised setting. In a 
passage that aptly (and amusingly) sums up Wood's attitude to the film, he 
points to how the film is 'considered puzzling, because it is such a let 
down'; assuming that'we expect a big lavish production number, clinching 
the sense of celebration' he continues: 'whereas all we get is the family and 
its guaranteed perpetuation in the young lovers gazing at some bright 
lights and concluding that life has nothing more to offer. They are right of 
course ... '(Wood, 1979, p. 11). For Britton (1978), the episode, which does 
indeed treat the opening of the exposition cursorily, confirms the film's 
covert view of the family's 'dark' and repressive side, in the dreariness of 
its setting, in John Truett's references to the previous'swamp' and Tootie's 
talk of 'dead bodies'. For him the ending is not so much a 'let down' as a 
confirmation of his thesis about the film. 
From the point of view of this thesis, however, the ending has a different 
function and is read differently. Unlike Britton, I will argue that the 
episode is very successful in reaffirming and celebrating the family of 
wl-dch the spectator has become a part; and that the ending 
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brings to a conclusion those psycl-dc processes which the film-spectator 
interaction has activated in spite of, and partly because of, its cursory, 
even formulaic, treatment. 
Firstly, I will review changes that have taken place in the position of 
the playing spectator by this stage in the film. At the film's opening she 
moves into the transitional area of her potential space, represented by 
the film space, which enables her to begin playing a part in the film. 
Playing is activated in a range of complex moves through the 
interaction of different 'elements' in the spectator and the film, 
including the musical comedy and the song-and-dance numbers; the 
family patterns and structures; and the characters, most sustainedly 
Tootie. The spectator psychically sings along, takes part in the 
community activity and ritual, moves with the characters, and in 
general participates in their narrative. 
At certain moments the spectator's playing breaks down through the 
force of the repressed unconscious in, for example, her participation in 
scenarios of forbidden wishes; the replication of her dreaming; the re- 
playing of both the repetition and the repeal of loss, so that at times she 
merges with, and loses herself in, the film. Moments of 'alliance' 
between the spectator's and the film's unconscious bind her to the film 
without her realising it or understanding what is happening. 
From the perspective of the creafive unconscious, engaging with the 
film also gives the spectator moments of an experience of the Self, in 
three ways. Firstly the satisfaction of preoccupied active playing with 
the film in potential space is a process that brings together what 
Winnicott defines as the 'personal psychic reality ... from which the 
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individual "hallucinates" or "creates" or thinks up or conceives of' 
(Winnicott, 1989, p. 57, op. cit. ) and shared reality. Secondly, merging 
with and losing herself in the film enables her to contact the creative 
unconscious. There are particularly marked instances of such an 
encounter, when elements in the' spectator meet with congruent 
elements in the film, and bring about moments of unexpected 
pleasure, a feeling of 'oneness' with the film, equivalent in force, 
though not in apparent content, to the moments of unexpected 
'breakdown' through the return of the repressed. Throughout, the 
spectator has 'used' the film on screen to construct her own'film', 
which has become both her play object and, in part, her subjective 
object. 
The work that this final episode must do for and with the spectator is 
to enable her to consolidate the film for her use, and at the same time 
to move away from it and give it up. This process will involve two 
'films': the spectator's subjective film object and the actual film that 
exists outside the spectator in the world of shared reality. The spectator 
must be able to 'destroy' the film that has existed inside her in order to 
retain those aspects of it that have become a part of herself, and, at the 
same time, to place it (the 'real' film) outside her in order and 
acknowledge its separate, and continuing, existence. By the end she too 
will be re-established as a separate subject, not a part of the film (except 
for the 'other' film that she has made her own and which she will 
retain as a subjective object, a part of the merged state. ) 
To be satisfactory in these terms, -the ending therefore has to 'return, to 
the spectator 'her' film, and, at the same time, re-establish the external 
film as a separate object that the spectator no longer needs or is bound 
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to. For the playing spectator the function of narrative closure generally 
may be to register the ending of the playing, in order to acknowledge 
the final separation and difference of film and spectator, and even of 
the fictional and the non-fictional world as she 'moves' out of her 
potential space. Whatever she has gained from the encounter, she 
retains; yet in the end she moves on while the film is returned from 
the screen back to its place on celluloid. At another viewing it will 
become a different object for this or another spectator's use. 
Spring: the final episode 
The family melodrama part of the film has apparently been completed 
by the end of the previous Winter episode, after the film's most 
emotionally laden sequence, when Tootie killed the snow people. The 
family crisis set up by Mr Smith's decision to leave St. Louis is resolved 
and the family has been reunited and confirmed as a unit by his 
renunciation of his move to New York. The final shot of that sequence 
was of the parents' embrace, Mrs Smith tearful with emotion, with 
their family behind them, excitedly opening presents. The spectator 
may be aware and remember that it is Tootie who has saved the family 
by her violent and iconoclastic act of killing the snow family, but the 
film has 'forgotten' this in this concluding shot foregrounding the 
parents. For the spectator, this image marks a move away from the 
force of the unconscious, represented so insistently in Tootie's act, to 
the 'adult, view of the parents who look on, rather than participating 
in their children's excitement and playing. It is an image of a 
satisfactory calm such as may be sought through a family row; the 
spectator can feel relief at seeing that the family is no longer at odds 
and that there has been a return to the given order where parents, not 
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the youngest child, take the family decisions. Collective satisfactions 
have replaced the individual infant's importunate demands, whether 
of Tootie or Mr Smith. The family has been confirmed as an on-going 
unit, with the coupling relationships of all three older children quickly 
and easily (indeed peremptorily) established within this episode. The 
main remaining narrative strand is the St. Louis Fair, with which 
theme the film opened, and which has been absent in the Winter 
episode. Even now, however, the celebration will have more to do 
with the consolidation and contipuation of the family than with the 
Fair. 
This final episode is extremely short, lasting just four minutes, and, 
except that it completes the cycle of the four seasons, might not seem 
substantial enough to stand on its own alongside the other three 
episodes. A final 'big' musical number, 'Boys and girls like you and 
Me', was cut from it, leaving the only number in it a final repetition of 
the title song (Shipman, 1992, p. 157). 
In various ways this episode recalls the film's opening in a circular 
structure which is important to the film's work. It opens with the now 
familiar greeting card device of the Smith house with trees in blossom, 
a picture which includes a tableau of the girls of the family dressed in 
pink and white in full conventional Edwardian dress, an image which 
strongly marks the film's evocation of Edwardian nostalgia. Strings 
play in the background. As in the opening scene, there is a cab in the 
foreground, which starts to move as the freeze frame 'comes to life. As 
in the opening, too, the camera moves us towards the house, but this 
time the two older girls run towards the cab, to the spectator. For a 
moment we seem to be welcomed by the girls coming towards the 
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camera; the spectator's familiarity with the film's characters is an 
important aspect of her relationship to the ending. At the opening of 
the film the camera moved the spectator to the inside of the house 
where she could insert herself into the playing (the ketchup tasting 
ritual). In this scene, by contrast, the spectator is kept outside. There is 
now no need for the spectator to enter the house to find the family; it is 
assembled already waiting for her, available in the public space outside. 
Along with the family of whom she has become a part, the spectator is 
now moving from her inner world (of childhood and family drama) 
to the outer world (away from the film world). This is the first time 
that the parents have been seen out of the home, which has 
represented the family's internal life; the city has so far been presented 
as a rather unreal backdrop, lacking material substance. 
The parents and grandfather appear from the house. The generation 
divide is particularly marked now that the family is being extended: the 
new young-couples leave in one cab, the parents, grandfather and 
children in another. At the beginning of the film we saw Tootie in a 
much less smart, water-carrier cart, casually, even provocatively 
dressed, exchanging confidences with the driver. This time, still sitting 
by the driver, she acts much more formally, play-acting her 'adult' 
instruction to the driver to take them to the 'Louisiana State 
Exposition'. Tootie is growing up (as the spectator has to at the end of 
the film) and is dressed as a girl not as a child, her tomboyishness gone. 
The enjoyably subversive route to playing and particularly to the 
unconscious that she has represented for the spectator has not however 
quite disappeared from the film but resurfaces passingly in this episode. 
In Tootie's self-conscious direction to the driver, where she is enjoying 
playing a part (with herself as audience) and in her quite apparently 
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unmotivated words a few moments later once they are at the fair, 
about "a great tidal wave that drowned the city and washed up all the 
dead bodies"', the spectator is reassured that her subversiveness still 
remains - and that, with a sense of the film's collusion, she can hold 
it to herself like a secret. 
Trumpets reintroduce the music of the title number and add to the 
note of celebration, as the cab leaves the scene (and the viewer) and 
moves off, and the camera pans round to track it briefly from behind. 
This begins to suggest the viewer's exclusion from the family, a 
distancing that is carried through into the next scene; for an instant the 
spectator is left behind. The title music, 'Meet me in St Louis', recalls 
the beginning of the film and its promise of the event which is now 
about to take place. For this film, and for the spectator, St. Louis has 
partly represented the family setting, the spectator's psychic home. 
The scene of the Fair is introduced in a quick dissolve. The setting is 
dark and palely lit, muted and unspectacular. A long shot shows 
crowds around a large fountain. The people's milling movement is 
shown as if choreographed, weaving in and out in patterns. The 
spectator is not there, taking a part, but distanced by the long shot, in 
the place of the director or the onlooker, choreographing or admiring 
the movement. A moving image can set up a psychic movement - so 
that the spectator may be given a part in the movement but not in the 
actions of the characters, nor in the narrative. 
The camera moves in to a medium shot of the younger Smith girls, 
with their grandfather, eating candy floss. The camera has located 'our' 
family in this crowd. The camera follows them in a quick tracking shot, 
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to join the rest of the family. Throughout this episode the point of 
view is that of the camera, watching the characters watching. Rarely 
given the point of view of any of the charactersf unplaced within a 
reverse shot structure, the spectator is distanced from them. The family 
is arranged as if for a picture along a balustrade, in a happy family 
portrait. They are looking past the camera at something (The Fair) in 
the distance. The spectator is ignored in their look which seems to be 
directed beyond us, over our heads. Tootie makes her seemingly out- 
of-key remark about the place being full of 'dead bodies' in close-up; at 
which the camera pulls away. The remark is however neutralised by 
her father's rather indulgent 'oh Tootie': bad thoughts are now 
contained within the family (and in the spectator's knowledge of 
them); they will not erupt and take over the film or the spectator. 
In this unspectacular setting the family/ spectator have to make their 
own celebration; the celebration will be an internal affair not the 
exterior spectacle that might be expected of a musical. 
A cut brings into shot two nuns wearing very large head-dresses. The 
unexpected oddness of the sight briefly jerks us out of the family scene 
and even out of the film in a moment of Brechtian distancing. The 
film seems to have no place for nuns; they exist outside a family 
structure, and are entirely unmotivated narratively. They are a 
reminder that there are institutions, restraints and perhaps even 
pleasures outside the family (the nuns look very self-contained with 
their huge head-dresses and their hands tucked in their sleeves). They 
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may even provoke authorial speculation about the film's Italian 
director or about other extra-diegetic reasons for their inclusion. 15 
Esther and John, in shot alone, lean over the railing, also looking 
towards and beyond camera. Esther's face is rapt, but John's response to 
her 'I never saw anything look so beautiful' strikes another bizarre 
note: 'I preferred it when it was a swamp and we were alone'. 
Whatever is being idealised, in this case the fair, the film continues to 
deflate it; each time the spectator is put back in her place as onlooker 
and commentator, outside the unconscious themes. The scene seems 
to be insisting on the external world to which the spectator will return; 
the nuns' world is outside the narrative; the setting does not live up to 
what seemed to have been promised in fantasy. At the same time the 
spectator is allowed to have it both ways; she remains 'with' the film's 
affirmation of the family. 
The whole family is now gathered, jostling together, still lined up by 
the balustrade facing the camera. There is a quick humorous assertion 
of the father's authority - as he leads the way to the restaurant, to 
which only he claims to knows the way - the others have got it 
wrong. This reiteration of the father's place/no-place in the family is a 
reminder that the spectator knows this family well by now. The young 
people have disagreements, the father claims authority (but the 
spectator retains the knowledge of Tootie's power in the previous 
episode). The spectator remains outside, watching the family, here 
presented as a unit, affectionately and amusedly. Their look goes out to 
the camera (to the Fair) over the head of the spectator. The cursory 
15For Britton (1978), the nuns represent he repressiveness of the church as one of the institutions which maintains the entrapment of the family. 
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nature of this episode encourages the withdrawal of the spectator's 
cathexis, as if accepting that endings may be best achieved quickly when 
interest is diminishing. 
Again a trumpet announces the title theme, the distant buildings light 
up and the family turns back. The repetition again of the theme tune 
suddenly reaffirms the spectator's place back into the film, recalling 
that in the opening sequence she was invited to take part in the singing 
as it was passed on and taken up ýy different members of the family: 
that the number contained a promise of community and togetherness 
in the family and included the spectator in the film/action. In contrast, 
in this episode the spectator is kept at a distance, in the city away from 
the family house, not included in their scenarios. The repetition of the 
opening theme tune serves as a reminder and instant review for the 
spectator of what has taken place in the intervening period: a reminder 
of the spectator's affective experience of it. 
A long shot shows the distant buildings lighting up, reflected in the 
water. The crowd mills around, again shot from a distance as a non- 
individualised pattern. Again in long shot, we see the backs of the 
family as they look. What they are looking at is still unclear; again the 
spectator is apart from the scene and momentarily puzzled. 
In a quick series of cuts, different members of the family are shown in 
turn in close-up as they register for us their reactions to what they see, 
looking again out over the balustrade to behind camera. This returns 
the spectator to their point of view and invites her to share in their 
reactions and emotions. What the family registers is the fulfilment of a 
fantasy, expressed first by the mother: "I've never seen anything like it 
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in my whole life", then by Rose: "We don't have to come here on a 
train and stay in a hotel. It's right here in our home town". 
This affirmation of 'home's best', which has been variously asserted 
throughout the film, is not only a social message. It represents the 
maternal setting which the film has constructed for the spectator 
through the representation of both the Smith family and the city of St. 
Louis, the apparent site of the family's desires; it is the family that has 
been actualised through the course of the film whereas the city has 
served just as a background symbol for the family's desire to keep 
together. The physical space of the Smith home, the structural space of 
the family dynamics, the psychic space of the maternal setting and the 
transitional space between spectator and film are by this point in the 
film a part of the spectator's psyche. No actual 'display' however 'big' 
could live up to the characters' fantasies. This 'family', on screen and 
by now also an internal one, can indeed create its own spectacle. 
The next cut shows Tootie and grandfather, the most aberrant 
members of the family. Tootie momentarily dispels the idealism of 
Mrs Smith and Rose by a reminder of doubts about possible fragilities 
(of the family structure, her fantasies, the family as represented by St. 
Louis) and voices anxiety (the spectator must in a moment leave the 
film ): '"rhey won't tear it down will they? " Grandfather reassures her. 
Another quick cut gives the final shot in the film to Esther and John 
(the film's 'romantic' couple of the musical), both, like the others, 
looking into the distance: Esther has the last, affirmatory word which is 
clearly written as the film's final line: "I caret believe it. Right here 
where we live. Right here in St Louis". In spite of its brevity and the 
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clichdd affirmation, this fleeting end moment is oddly convincing: for 
the playing spectator of this film, it expresses no less than the truth. 
The final image of the film is of darland's rapt face looking out to 
camera, a look which, as before in the film (for example in 'The Boy- 
next-door') is ambiguous about its object - the spectator is not quite 
included in her look. Esther looks out, reminding the spectator of her 
place out of screen, somewhere beyond, 'out there' in her viewing 
space. She is also, however, in close up, close to and inside the 
spectator. This moment recalls previous occasions when 
Esther/Garland has appeared in close-up, expressing her desire, which 
is here fulfilled; (her real desire has been revealed to be for her material 
and psychic 'home', here symbolised by St. Louis, rather than the boy- 
next-door). Now, as then, her look also draws the spectator into it 
Garland looks inside as well as býyond herself, activating the 
spectator's own desire and already nostalgic memories. The spectator 
too has wished to find her psychic home and her wish, along with its 
fulfilment, are now returned to her. St. Louis as an emblem of 'where 
we live', as a psychic home, is also inside the spectator's psychic space, 
metamorphosed as a part of her Self. 
Immediately (this series of cuts has been very fast), the music, and now 
its singing, are taken up by the extra-diegetic chorus in a final cut to the 
greeting card message: 'The End'. This card has previously taken the 
spectator into the film space and the Smith house; now the same 
device, but containing a different message, marks the film's ending and 
closes off its world that the card images represented and which is no 
longer there. The song also effects and eases the transition from the 
film to the external world; the chorus continues its singing as the 
image on screen shifts from the diegetic space and the St. Louis couple 
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to the card that signals the film's completion. As the spectator is 
moved outside the narrative action, away from the couple to the 
greeting card device, the off-screen chorus takes her out of the film as it 
brought her into it at its opening; and the tune is remembered after it 
and the film have stopped playing. 
I have argued that in watching a film the playing spectator may make 
creative use of it as a transitional object for her own psychic purposes. 
Afterwards, she may remember and inwardly replay bits of it. She may 
continue to visualise cathected images from it; and transformed 
elements from it may have become integrated into her psyche in ways 
she may not be aware of. The film ending confirms this process for the 
spectator but also closes itself off from it. The film itself, on reel, is 
dispensed with. The spectator is no longer the film. She is herself; the 
film, again, just a film. 
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CONCLUSION 
When Winnicott presented his concept of potential space in 'The 
location of cultural experience' in 1966, he was attempting to fill a gap 
in Freud's topography of the mind, in order to find a psychic place for 
cultural experience (Wu=*cott, 1971, pp. 95-6). Potential space was an 
elaboration of his concept of the transitional object that fills another 
gap, the separation that it also paradoxically creates between the baby 
and mother: 'the use of an object symbolises the union of two separate 
things at the point in time and space of the initiation of their state of 
separateness' P. 96-7). 
The continuing importance of the transitional phenomenon and of its 
derivative, potential space, in adulthood is that it bridges the gap 
between the persoWs inner, psychic reality, in which Winnicott 
included the mysterious, isolated Self, and the objective, external world 
of shared reality. Located 'between the individual and the 
environment' (originally the object) potential space is 'the place ... that 
is not a separation but a form of union (Winnicott, 1971, p. 98): the 
psychic place of the infinite variability of playing. These concepts about 
playing enabled Winnicott to tackle the question that had not seemed 
to belong to psychoanalysis of Viat life is about' (ibid). However, in 
this exploration of cultural experience Winnicott himself created a gap 
by not specifying the process of the continuity from the baby's playing 
to adult cultural experience, although he refers to the 'inherited 
tradition', from which we may draw 'if we have somewhere to put 
what we find' (p. 99). 
In proposing a model of a playing spectator in film studies I have 
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sought to address this gap of Winnicott's. I have argued that watching a 
film is an adult form of playing, which can refer to both a specific 
activity and a more generalised orientation to living. The playing 
spectator's desire for cinema is to participate dynamically in its stories 
and to have the possibility of being taken up by unconscious processes. 
The playing spectator comes into a relationship with a film through 
her psychic move into her potential space and into the screen space, 
where she suspends disbelief and can use the film as a transitional 
object for her playing. Her relationship with the film functions both as 
a relief from and as an aid to her negotiation with the world: as 
"entertainment' and for 'use'. Further, the spectator plays to obtain an 
experience of a sense of creativity and of the Self. 
At the same time I have argued that the notion of a playing spectator 
finds a space in theories about the viewer's relationship to film. It is 
situated between the desiring, unconscious and the 'thinking', 
conscious spectator positions of film studies, and between the notion of 
the spectator constructed by cinema and the viewer that is pre- 
constituted as a separate system. The notion of playing is located with 
those theories and analyses that emphasise process and movement in 
the film viewer relationship and which argue for the spectator's ability 
to take up multiple subject positions and scenarios in her engagement 
with the film. 
Although her playing undergoes vicissitudes, particularly 
interruptions by the incursion of the repressed unconscious, the 
playing spectator is not caught up in her own, or in the film's, 
unconscious operations, nor is she placed in a distanced, critical 
position. She moves in a realm of cinematic illusion that does not 
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deceive. Playing fully absorbs the spectator into the film but does not 
make of her a passive subject; in playing the spectator actively and 
creatively participates in the film.: play as both actor and maker, 
reconstructing its scenarios for her own use. 
In introducing Winnicott's theories of playing to an exploration of film 
spectatorship I am arguing for a reconsideration of the value and 
psychic significance of watching a film as an example of cultural and 
aesthetic activity. The major defining conceptual difference between 
the notion of the playing spectator and the spectator of contemporary 
film studies is encapsulated in the Winnicottian concept of the creative 
unconscious and the (True) Self, which, I have argued, the spectator 
can experience through her playing, dreaming and merging with a 
film. For Winnicott, the capacity for creative playing is the crucial mark 
of psychic well-being, and opportunities for playing are as important 
for the adult as for the baby. Playing in potential space enables the 
subject to maintain a dynamic connection between outer, shared reality 
and inner, psychic reality, so that her inner world becomes validated 
and the external world becomes a part of herself. For the playing 
spectator this process takes place within her relationsl-dp with the film, 
where, in the same movement, she reasserts the film and herself as 
both autonomous and yet interconnected. The spectator makes use of 
her continually fascinating film-play object to remake herself in 
relation to her inner and outer realities, and she emerges from that 
experience better able to make her mark on her world. 
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1-Meet me in St Louis (Chorus) 
2. The boy next door audy Garland). 
3-The Trolley Song: Clang, clang, clang goes the trolley (Chorus) 
4-Skip to my Lou (Chorus) 
S. The Cake Walk: Under the Bamboo Tree audy Garland and 
Magaret O'Brien), 
6. Over the Bannisters (Judy Garland) 
7. You and I (Mary Astor, Leon Ames) 
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